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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

BETTER DEVILS OF OUR NATURE:
THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE-JUSTIFYING IDEOLOGIES IN OPINION FORMATION

Extensive theoretical and empirical research has examined the role that violencejustifying ideologies play in generating violent behavior. Yet, a substantial body of this
work employs measures that are consistently associated with sexist attitudes and gender
stereotypes. As a consequence, scholars are limited in our ability to fully comprehend
individuals’ propensity to endorse, or even promote violent behavior – or how these
attitudes influence perceptions of victims and related policy preferences.
I contribute to this line of research by creating a gender-neutral battery of antiviolence questions, in large part divorced from sexist stereotypes, to assess the
consequence of those attitudes for politics and public policy in the United States. This
flexible new measure of “violence-rejecting sentiment” can travel across policy areas and
disciplines. Individuals scoring higher on this scale are less comfortable with violence as
a social tool. My new instrument builds upon a common measure of “honor codes”,
commonly used in research on rape and rape victims (Saucier et al. 2015) but it requires
fewer question items (7 vs. 35), and in large part isolates attitudes toward violence from
gender role expectations. Finally, I use survey experiments and regression analyses to
examine how these attitudes (toward gender and violence respectively) independently
and interactively impact opinion formation; this includes evaluations of victims of sexual
and police violence, but also assessments of support for public policies to address these
issues in the United States. I find that violence-justifying ideologies – sexism and racism
in particular – attenuate the normatively positive effects of anti-violence values in many
circumstances. This includes support for policies and services to assist victims and
reduce violence.
KEYWORDS: Attitudes toward Violence, Violence against Women, Rape, Police
Violence, Opinion Formation
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CHAPTER 1. ON HUMAN VIOLENCE
1.1

Introduction
When the petite brunette stepped into her apartment-complex elevator in April

2007 and found 31-year-old Robert Williams waiting there, she did not anticipate the
unspeakable horror that awaited her. Williams got off on the same floor as the 23-yearold Columbia University journalism student, followed her to her door, and shoved his
way into her apartment, where he repeatedly raped and sodomized the young woman for
19 torturous hours. Williams doused his victim in bleach and boiling water, forced pills
down her throat, glued her mouth shut, and bound her with shoelaces and duct tape. This
vicious attack, which began around 10 p.m., continued late into the following afternoon.
Williams then hurled the woman into her bathtub and demanded she gouge out her own
eyes with a pair of scissors. After trying to end her life instead, by attempting to stab
herself in the throat, Williams cracked her skull open with a heavy object and slit her face
and eyes with a butcher knife (Eligon 2008).
The violence Williams delivered on his 23-year-old victim might be exceptionally
horrendous, but violent attacks – including murders, attempted murders, and forcible
rapes – appear in the news media from around the globe every day. Violence remains a
devastating feature of modern society that impacts millions of individuals year after year,
and the damage that these events inflict upon victims is immeasurable.
Despite the fact that violent attacks occur on what seems to be a day to-day, if not
hour-to-hour, basis, evidence indicates that acts of violence may actually be declining
over time (Elias, 2000; Krieken, 1989; and Pinker, 2011). Circumstantial evidence from
1

the United States might back up this optimism. While victimizations have been on the
rise in the United States lately – the total number of violent crimes increased from 2015
to 2016, and again from 2016 to 2018 – this uptick follows a 62% decline from 1994 to
2015 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2019).
The Pinker school of thought attributes the decline of violence to changing
cultural norms. It’s not just that opportunities for violence have declined, or that the
incentives for violence have changed. Rather, “civilizing” influences are winning out.
People are socialized into a value system that teaches them to abhor violence. These antiviolence values constrain their own behavior, and also aggregate up so that governments
and social groups behave less violently as well.
This dissertation focuses on the behavioral mechanism that supposedly explains
declining violence. One observable implication of the Pinker school of thought is that
cultural norms ought to shape public opinion in a fashion that alters public policy. At the
individual level, therefore, whether someone rejects or embraces violence-justifying
attitudes ought to shape that person’s policy-relevant opinions. I am skeptical about the
extent to which abstract values actually constrain politically relevant behavior, however,
including how an individual processes a specific act of violence as well as how the
individual evaluates public policies rooted in violence. This question of why violence has
declined has both practical implications for policy makers (as a guide for attempts to
prevent future violence) and scientific value for scholars (as a contribution to our
understanding of mass behavior).

2

1.2

Values about Violence
Optimists argue that attitudes lead the way, and that a decline in citizens’

tolerance of violence has produced a corresponding increase in support for public policies
that assist victims and promote equitable judicial outcomes. My data are cross-sectional,
so I cannot observe how these attitudes and policy preferences have changed over time.
Rather, I contribute to this line of research by focusing in on the individual-level linkage
between abstract values and politically relevant opinions. I do so by 1. creating a shortscale measure of anti-violence values; 2. observing the explanatory power of such values
in predicting politically relevant opinions; and 3. examining how violence-justifying
attitudinal constructs, such as gender and racial stereotypes, allows an individual to get
around or ignore broad cultural values.
While there are infinite forms of human violence and depravity in the world, I
focus exclusively on violence against women and police violence in the United States.
Addressing each in separate empirical chapters, I find that once other attitudinal packages
(e.g. gender and racial stereotypes) are considered, an individual’s orientation toward
violence (or non-violence) has minimal bearing on opinion formation. This is true for
both individuals’ perceptions of victims and propensity to support public policies to
address the violence. More specifically, when I employ experimental methods to bring
gender and racial stereotypes to the fore, making them salient for survey respondents,
these predispositions undermine the meaningfulness of abstract cultural values toward
violence. These violence-justifying ideologies dominate when it comes to explaining
opinions toward victims, perpetrators, punishments, and policies.

3

Stephen Pinker (2011) argues, in his seminal work The Better Angels of our
Nature, that violence has declined over time and that we are living in the most-peaceful
era of human existence. One important implication of this thinking, if true, is that our
present is less sinister than our past. The peace we enjoy today is a result of past
generations, appalled by the brutality of their time, working hard to reduce it – a change
in values encouraged by a torrent of historical forces (e.g., the growth of government
power, commerce, feminization, and cosmopolitanism).
Other scholars offer a less-optimistic view of human nature and its mutability.
Wrangham and Peterson (1996), for example – in a book that also attracted popular
attention in its day – argue that aggressive behavior is hard-wired in humans and rooted
in our ties to primate ancestors. Perceived in this way, violent (or non-violent) behavior is
not a result of prevailing cultural norms or values, which may change quickly or adapt to
laws and customs, but instead biologically based.
Theoretically, these views are not mutually exclusive, but they do suggest the
need for a multi-pronged approach to reducing violence (e.g. identifying effective and
persuasive techniques to decrease violence-justifying attitudes in the first place and
implementing effective institutional reforms to deter violent behavior and punish
perpetrators). We must also address the possibility that individuals will justify violence
when it suits their (perceived) interests – that it is not values, but material incentives that
explain changes in violence.

4

The Slow Policy Progress against Violence
Some scholars do consider incentives and opportunities for violence (Elias 2000;
Krieken 1989). They credit the decline in humans’ taste for violence with the mass
expansion of public policies designed to protect classes of victims that faced extreme
persecution in earlier times. I argue that while conditions certainly have improved over
time, the codification of laws to combat violence – especially violence against women
and racial minorities – has proven painstakingly slow in the United States. Racism and
sexism provide longstanding, culturally resonant excuses for resorting to the use of force,
and as I demonstrate in later chapters, gender and racial stereotypes continue to shape
individuals’ perceptions of victims and evaluations of crimes – much more so than
attitudes toward violence (or non-violence) in the abstract.
1.2.1

Violence against Women

In the not-too-distant past, legal and cultural norms protected the right of a man to
control his wife’s sexuality. Prior to the 1970s, men usually were not prosecuted for
murdering an adulterous wife, forcibly preventing her from leaving the house, or using
intimidation, coercion, and violence to control her movements. In fact, until the late
1970s, marital rape was not a crime in any state. And despite the codification of laws to
protect women, the judicial system has often failed victims of rape and sexual assault. For
example, jurors have been known to let sexist attitudes toward women affect their
deliberations in rape trials (Jacobsen & Popovich 1983), including sentencing decisions
(Mazella & Feingold 1994; Spohn & Spears 1996). Eventually, it took a wave of
feminism in the late 1970s to help shift public perceptions of rape, and today the criminal
justice system is required to take these crimes seriously (Rivera, 1996).
5

Htun & Weldon (2012) found that feminist mobilization – more so than
progressive parties, women in government, or other political and economic advancements
– explains variation in the development of policies to address violence against women
internationally. In other words, VAW is rarely raised as a priority among social justice
and human rights organizations without pressure from feminists demanding laws that
alter the opportunities and incentives for such violence. The authors point out that most
human rights groups did not recognize rape as a violation of women’s rights until
pressured by feminists in the 1990s to do so. And it was not until the Violence against
Women Act of 1994 that policies providing funding for rape prevention, the use of DNA
tests and rape kits, and the implementation of laws putting first-time rapists behind bars
took hold (Pinker 2011, 403).
In sum, it takes a strong women’s movement to command the attention and
support of the general public and, equally as important, to convince politicians to place
institutional reforms on legislative agendas. This is certainly true of movements to
combat violence against women in the United States. That progress continues today, as
new organizations have emerged to support victims of sexual violence. Perhaps most
well-known, the #Me Too movement began with the goal to “address both the dearth in
resources for survivors of sexual violence and to build a community of advocates, driven
by survivors, who will be at the forefront for creating solutions to interrupt sexual
violence in their communities” (Me Too 2018).
1.2.2

Anti-Black Violence

Police violence is another phenomenon that dominates media coverage in the
United States. These stories often include a racial component, with the victims being
6

young black males. That African-Americans face racial disparities in the criminal justice
system is nothing new. Post-slavery, in many regions of the United States, the
government turned a blind eye as raging mobs publicly tortured and executed victims in
the street. These violent lynchings – thousands of recorded incidents exist – remain a
blight on American history. Despite the fact that between 1882 and 1968 almost 200 antilynching bills were introduced in Congress, not a single bill was enacted. It was not until
June of 2005 that the U.S. Senate apologized for its’ failure to enact anti-lynching bills
when they were most needed (Associated Press 2005). And it would take until 2018 for
Senators to propose the “Justice for Victims of Lynching Act”, designating lynching a
Federal hate crime (Garcia 2018).
While we have definitely made substantial progress in terms of race relations over
time, racial disparities in the criminal justice system continue to strain the American
fabric. The Sentencing Project, a non-profit organization dedicated to criminal sentencing
reform, for instance, claims that African-Americans experience racial bias at nearly every
level of the criminal justice system – from their initial interactions with law enforcement
officers, to adjudication and sentencing, to parole and re-entry (Sentencing Project 2008).
Police shootings involving white officers and black suspects spark mass protests and riots
nationwide, and numerous organizations have emerged to address perceived injustices.
Perhaps most prominent, Black Lives Matter began as a “call to action in response to
state-sanctioned violence and anti-black racism. The impetus for that commitment was,
and still is, the rampant and deliberate violence inflicted on us by the state” (Black Lives
Matter 2018).

7

While it is true that the Supreme Court, Congress, and state legislatures have
produced or defined laws to curb and punish violent acts, the extent and durability of this
“cultural shift” is less clear. Do the top-down, elite-imposed policies truly enjoy mass
consent? Have the bottom-up, citizen-led social justice movements changed hearts and
minds? Or, do both lack a strong popular foundation?
1.3

Explaining Policy Preferences Related to Violence
Given the astonishingly slow and tentative progress exhibited by policies intended

to stop violence against women and racial minorities, social science would benefit from a
better understanding of why the public does or does not support policies to protect
victims of violent crimes and punish perpetrators. Isolating the attitudes that may erode
public support for such policies should be equally important. And because the two efforts
have something in common – both involve the public’s tolerance for violent action,
whether at the hands of a predator, or to punish that predator – the discipline’s approach
to each policy question should not take place entirely in isolation. Instead, this
dissertation tries to explain a handful of politically relevant attitudes and opinions using a
unified framework, including similar explanatory variables.
Do individual attitudes rejecting violence matter in terms of politics and public
policy? And if so, does a broad decline in violence-justifying attitudes translate to public
support for policies to support victims and punish perpetrators? What role do racial and
gender stereotypes play in terms of public perceptions of victims and suspects, or support
for violence-related public policies? In the United States these are important and timely
questions – questions I address directly in this project.

8

The possibility that prejudice and stereotyping – common justifications for
treating other people badly – might be hidden because elites consider them socially
undesirable is troubling. The implication is that when people make actual decisions, such
as whether to discriminate, those underlying prejudices may rival facts and
circumstances, or general anti-violence values, when it comes to criminal justice
outcomes and the treatment of victims and perpetrators
I will not be the first researcher to consider how an individual’s attitudes might
influence policy-relevant behavior, but I will contribute to the literature on opinion
formation by using experimental studies and issue framing to examine the factors that
help shape support for policies to assist survivors and punish criminals. More
specifically, I contribute to prior research by 1. creating a short-scale measure of antiviolence values, distinct from sexist stereotypes surrounding male behavior; 2. employing
experimental survey designs to investigate additional factors that influence perceptions of
violent crime victims; and 3. examining the impact of gender and racial stereotypes on
citizen support for victim services and punitive policies.
Political scientists (Bartels 1998; Druckman 2001) have demonstrated that public
policy preferences often depend on how an issue is framed. This holds for a range of
policies including affirmative action (Kinder & Sanders 1990), spending on the poor
(Sniderman & Theriault 1999), and citizen support for war (Hetherington & Suhay 2011),
to name a few. Related work suggests that “for most people – most of the time” attitudes
are not stable, that when completing surveys “they are responding to the issue as they see
it at the moment of the response”, and that different frames produce different results
(Zaller 1992, 94-95).
9

Early work on survey response and mass opinion (Converse 1962; Achen 1975;
Taylor & Fiske 1978) questioned the American public’s ability to construct and maintain
stable attitudes on a range of political issues and led Zaller to conclude that individuals
“…do not typically possess ‘true attitudes’ on issues as conventional theorizing assumes,
but a series of partially independent and often inconsistent ones. Which of a person’s
attitudes is expressed at different times depends on which has been made most
immediately salient by chance and the details of questionnaire construction, especially
the order and framing of questions” (1992, 93). Related research suggests that the way
issues are framed by elites has a strong influence on public opinion (Druckman 2001;
Slothuus & DeVreese 2010), and that political opinions are not always either positive or
negative but ambivalent, or simultaneously positive and negative (Lavine 2001). Applied
to my research, the implication is that attitudes against violence might be little more than
lip service, while politically relevant opinions will actually depend on how an event or
policy is framed and which particular biases sway the individual in each case.
Both my methodological contribution and my substantive contribution to the
study of opinion formation stem from my attempt to unify these disparate literatures
(violence against women vis à vis police violence) under the umbrella of the broader
theoretical debate about the power of cultural norms. Rather than rely solely upon
existing measures for attitudes toward violence, which are often confounded with gender
or racial attitudes (e.g. sexist attitudes toward women in the study of rape, or racial
stereotypes toward minorities in the study of police violence), I develop and test a
truncated measure of anti-violence values that ought to span those subjects if, as some
suggest, individuals (men or women) really are bound by their inherent distaste for
10

violence. Then, I apply that new measure to two existing literatures – rape and police
violence – that have nibbled at the idea that cultural norms are predictive of violencerelated policy preferences.
1.4

Outline to Dissertation
The dissertation will proceed as follows: In Chapter 2, I briefly review the

scholarship crediting cultural shifts and civilizing influences with a gradual conquest of
violence, as well as competing theories suggesting that violent behavior is biologically
rooted and enduring. Despite the growth of anti-violence cultural norms, research
suggests that people will find ways to justify violence, sometimes directly through outgroup formation and sometimes indirectly through institutions that insulate them from or
provide cover for the violence (Wolgast 1992). I briefly review work examining how
people build these ideological and institutional waivers to escape anti-violence norms.
In Chapter 3, I summarily review the problems with some popular measures for
attitudes that scholars use, and develop and test a unique, flexible scale of “anti-violence
values” that can travel across policy areas and disciplines. My new instrument builds
upon a prominent measure of “honor codes” used in the literature on sexual assault
(Saucier et al. 2016), but it requires fewer question items (7 vs. 35), and in large part
disentangles attitudes toward violence from attitudes toward gender.
In Chapter 4, I use this simple scale of anti-violence values, built from genderneutral question wording, to help model perceptions of sexual assault and rape, including
factors that influence sentencing in court cases involving these crimes. My work
contributes to this literature by: 1. providing theoretical and empirical support for my
claim that a gender-neutral survey instrument should be used in studies predicting
11

perceptions of rape victims and other rape-related outcomes of interest, at least as a
control variable; 2. examining how other attitudinal orientations (e.g. hostile and
benevolent sexism, rape myths, and victim characteristics) shape perceptions of a victim
– as somehow having precipitated her victimization, and support for related policies (e.g.
expenditures on services and support for institutional reforms); and 3. Assessing the
influence of victim behavior and other characteristics on the decision to increase or
decrease a defendant’s recommended sentence.
In Chapter 5, I examine what shapes attitudes toward victims of police violence as
well as factors that influence citizens’ evaluations of police shootings. In this study, I
move beyond simple racial manipulations of officers and suspects – common in the
literature – to incorporate many other factors believed to shape evaluations of use-offorce incidents, including the prevailing narratives, or issue frames describing these
events. I will provide theoretical support for my claim that anti-violence values are one
important predictor in models measuring support for criminal justice policies.
Additionally, racial considerations, perceptions of the criminal justice system, issue
framing of the event under consideration, and authoritarianism will explain variation in
support for policy reforms. By including these factors and experimental treatments in
empirical models I will be able to examine the impact that each have on respondents’
evaluations. Finally, in Chapter 6, I provide a brief conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2. OUR BETTER ANGELS
2.1

Introduction
Empirically, this thesis asks one overarching question: Does the embrace of

cultural values abhorring violence help predict evaluations of real-life circumstances that
involve the use of physical force, or correlate with related public policy preferences? In
asking and answering that focused research question, however, I hope for this thesis to
speak to a much broader debate over the success of the civilizing process and its likely
durability. Finding that these abstractions are more than just lip service, that they
genuinely constrain people – that they shape policy preferences or govern politically
relevant judgements about predators and victims of violence – would offer some hope
that the relative peacefulness of today’s world is a construct that can be passed down
through socialization to future generations. On the other hand, if people can partition
these abstract values from their practical assessments of real-life circumstances, or apply
them only to certain groups of people, then the civilizing process would seem to be more
vulnerable to changes in context.
To position my research within that big-picture scholarly discourse, I begin by
setting up the debate between optimistic and pessimistic theories of human nature –
specifically, the relationship human beings have with violence. Next, I lay out my
theoretical argument that social constructions, individual notions of a deviant “other”
(e.g. out-group formation), and support for violent policies perpetrated by institutions at
the hands of “others” – artificial persons – provide waivers that allow people to escape
anti-violent social norms. I argue that individuals can be more punitive toward, and
relatively tolerant of violence committed against, perpetrators that they fear, loathe, or
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view as “outsiders” – and less sympathetic toward victims of crime who do not conform
to traditional social, cultural, or gender expectations. In other words, the significance of
abstract anti-violence values will be conditional on real-life circumstances. Gender
stereotypes will shape evaluations of female rape victims, for example – and racial
stereotypes will influence evaluations of police shootings – more powerfully than
attitudes toward violence in general.
2.2

A Theory of Forward Progress
Stephen Pinker (2011) is hardly the only scholar to take an optimistic view of the

trajectory of human civilization (Elias 2000; True 2015), but as a public intellectual who
wrote a book-length treatise on the subject less than a decade ago, one that compiled
evidence from a wide variety of disciplines, he stands out for having modernized and
popularized the concept.
Pinker’s wide-ranging book poses some difficulty, because he is not explicitly
theoretical, and he does not isolate the underlying hypotheses being offered to explain
why violence has declined. However, as my attempt to tease out his tacit theory will
show, he attributes declining violence in large part to changes in values. For each time
period he discusses, cultural norms serve as part of his explanation for why conditions
improve, and for some periods, those norms represent the dominant explanation. It is that
hypothesized causal linkage – anti-violent attitudes result in less willingness to commit
violent acts or to endorse them when committed by others – which I will test in the
empirical portion of this dissertation.
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The first transition period that Pinker offers for the decline in violence – when
human beings transitioned from hunter-gatherer societies to civilizations with organized
governments – conflates two causes that he views as related: a change in food source, and
the change in political forms that resulted. Evidence strongly supports the first part of this
argument. Today, evolutionary scientists examine the many ways that violence among
hunter-gatherer societies may have helped shape the evolution of social behaviors
(Bowles 2009; Mirazon et al. 2016; Lambert 1997), and contemporary researchers are
scrambling to document mortality rates among the few remaining hunter-gatherer
societies before they disappear altogether. There is little doubt, however, that the stability
provided by a transition to agriculture allowed the development of the state, which could
suppress human violence in ways that tribal organizations did not.
His second argument is that, beginning in the late Middle Ages and into the 20 th
century, homicide rates in much of Europe dramatically declined. This claim is more
description than explanation, and on its face seems to contradict the praise for
agricultural-based societies implied in the previous discussion. Feudal Europe was, in
fact, an extraordinarily violent place where the head of the state (e.g. the king) had little
direct control over the people. Pinker describes medieval people in general as impulsive,
crude, inconsiderate, dirty, and animalistic. He dubs the subsequent psychological and
cultural shift away from these behaviors as the “civilizing process.” Thus, the causal
explanation lurking under the surface is that values changed. Furthermore, this change
was internalized and reinforced because the new circumstances altered individual
psychology. “To take advantage of the opportunities, people had to plan for the future,
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control their impulses, take other people’s perspectives, and exercise the other social and
cognitive skills needed to prosper in social networks” Pinker claims (2011,77).
Slavery becomes important in the Enlightenment era. For much of human history,
slavery as an institution – the legal right of one person to own another – was the rule, not
the exception. Upheld in the Bible, justified by Plato and Aristotle, and practiced across
the globe, slavery persisted in some states until as recently as 1980. Slave systems
perpetuate violence. The rise of anti-slavery (and also anti-torture) activism therefore also
represented a battle against interpersonal violence. As Pinker notes, during the
Enlightenment period, large numbers of like-minded individuals organized against these
previously sanctioned forms of violence, resulting in mass rejection of them.
Economic considerations helped influence the mass movement that began in the
18th century to combat state support for slavery. Serfdom and sharecropping had become
less expensive than forced bondage in many places. Yet humanitarian concerns were the
driving force behind the abolition of slavery. Intellectuals, and their “advocacy of liberty,
equality, and the universal rights of man let a genie out of the bottle and made it
increasingly awkward for anyone to justify the practice” (Pinker 2011, 155). This is
clearly a cultural explanation for the abolition of an inherently violent economic system.
As for torture, from ancient to early modern times torture was viewed as an
acceptable form of punishment. Many states had few, and ineffective, means to control
crime – so punishments were designed to be as brutal as possible to deter others from
breaking the law. As was the case with slavery, intellectuals and writers took up the cause
against human torture. Reformers railed against institutional cruelty that they viewed as
primitive, savage, and barbaric. Their growing appeal to the humanity of the people
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throughout the 18th century led to the abolition of punitive torture in every Western
country by 1850.
Pinker reminds us that there have been no wars among the major powers since the
end of World War II, more than two-thirds of a century often referred to as the “Long
Peace” (2011, 249). Political scientists continue to debate the determinants of this
extended period of international accord. Some scholars (Kinsella 2005; Slantchev &
Alexandrova 2005) call it a “democratic peace” based on their claim that “democracies
rarely fight one another because they share common norms of live-and-let-live and
domestic institutions that constrain the recourse to war” (Rosato 2005, 585). Democratic
countries build strong economic ties to each other as well, through international trade, a
pattern that might or might not stem from a value-based preference for mutual
cooperation (Bartilow & Voss 2009).
It is possible to explain away the Democratic Peace as being a strategic outgrowth
of the Cold War (Farber & Gowa 1997). During that period, the United States and the
Soviet Union engaged in proxy wars while carefully avoiding extreme escalations, and
only fought each other on battlefields in neutral nations – in part due to a persistent fear
of imminent nuclear war. However, it would seem unfair to attribute the Long Peace
entirely to concern with self-preservation. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the decline of American economic dominance brought this bipolar international system to
a close in the early 1990s, the major powers continued to avoid interstate war with one
another. Empire building by violent conquest appears to have come to an end. Even
terrorism, around which fears have escalated, has declined sharply both internationally
and domestically over time.
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Pinker again emphasizes behavioral causes that are a mixture of cultural values
and psychology. He argues that this “long peace” is a “result of one of those
psychological re-tunings that take place now and again over the course of history and
cause violence to decline” (2011, 251). The panic and fear – or psychological damage –
that terrorism generates is actually a symptom of this changed mindset; because humans
today are so horrified by violence, they make a big deal of it when it happens, obscuring
the relatively low death tolls from terror attacks worldwide.
Finally, the “Rights Revolution” marked a moral shift in humanity, a movement
toward non-violence and an emerging organized defense of minorities and other outgroups who might have been likely targets for violence. A product of the Enlightenment
and humanism, this movement grew from prosperity, democratic government, expanding
economies, and technologies that made ideas and people more mobile. Increased capital
for law enforcement, education, and social services expanded during economic booms.
Democracies provided a space where historically disadvantaged groups could finally
participate fully in society. The shift away from an economy based primarily on trade,
Pinker argues, produced the “hidden hand of an information economy that may have
made institutions more receptive to women, minorities, and gays, but it still took
government muscle in the form of antidiscrimination laws to integrate them fully”
(2011,477).
Categorizing this complicated story that spans five different eras might seem
impossible – economics, politics, technology, values, and psychology swirl around in it –
but at a minimum it seems clear that Pinker considers “civilizing” anti-violent values to
be a significant causal explanation for why violence has declined in practice. His work,
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and the work of like-minded scholars, therefore, sets up the hypothesis that this
dissertation will test: Adherence to a humanistic abhorrence for violence should influence
evaluations of real-life circumstances that involve the use of force, and help shape related
public policy preferences relevant to social and political perspectives.
2.3

A Theory of Biological Determination
Some scholarship casts doubt on whether violent impulses can be so easily purged

from human interactions. Wrangham and Peterson (1996), for example, underscore the
evolutionary roots of violent human behavior, tracing it not to youthful socialization or
psychological adaptations but to inbred biological imperatives. The authors’ account of
human violence contrasts with Pinker’s rosy story of evolving cultural norms and values,
focusing instead on reproductive competition, defense of scarce resources, and natural
selection.
Recent research in this vein has shown that the animal genetically closest to
human beings, the chimpanzee, is especially violent. Chimpanzees engage in murder,
rape, and lethal raids that are similar to human war. By the early 1970s, Jane Goodall was
observing these behaviors in Tanzanian chimps, a development that marked a profound
shift in the study of human behavior because it undermined a romanticized view of
humans in their natural state that blamed society for corrupting humankind. Of thousands
of mammals, and millions of other animal species, the violent behaviors described in this
research exist only among humans and chimpanzees.
Richard Dawkins (1976), in his controversial book The Selfish Gene, similarly
argued that selfish and violent behavior – especially in males – is a product of human
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beings’ instinctive struggle for survival. Other evolutionary scholars examine violent
human behavior in the context of genetic fitness. Raine points out that “despite what we
may think of our good-naturedness, we are, it could be argued, little more than selfish
gene machines that will, when the time is ripe, readily use violence and rape to ensure
that our genes will be reproduced in the next generation” (2013, 14). Viewed in this way,
the influence of evolution on behavior is a story of genetic competition and the hardwired capacity for violence required for successful reproduction.
Biological explanations for rape, as a specific act of violence, have been
dismissed in the literature (Brownmiller 1975; Dworkin 1981). Gender is a social
construct, so feminist theory casts doubt on whether biological imperatives can explain
cross-gender interactions. At some level, a man’s decision to rape a woman must be
rooted in socially and politically structured gender systems (Vogelman & Eagle 1991,
213). Nevertheless, even if the particular expression of violence might have social
origins, the rapists’ underlying impulse to engage in violence may not.
Optimism about changing human nature seems to be undermined by what
happens whenever civilization temporarily collapses. Arquilla (2015) looked at trends in
violence in terms of wars and found that those in which a million people or more died
doubled between 1900 and 1950. These “big kill” wars include the Spanish Civil War,
the two World Wars, and the civil war in China. During the second half of the 20 th
century, the so-called Long Peace, the number of “big kill” wars doubled again. Six of
these devastating wars occurred in Africa, a continent then emerging from a period of
colonization that exposed residents to Western values. Smaller conflicts that cause the
death of hundreds of thousands also are trending upward. Violent impulses appear to
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remain widespread, even if the devastating nature of modern technology often can be
sufficient to deter nations from indulging those impulses.
Focusing on wars involving 10 million casualties or more does not seem to
support optimistic conclusions either. After doing so, Cirillo and Taleb challenge the
claim that human belligerence has changed in some kind of structural way. The
methodology of war may have changed, such that battle deaths no longer serve as the best
indicator of hostile conflict, but the pattern of deadly events does not appear different. In
technical terms, they argue that “inter-arrival times among major conflicts are extremely
long, and consistent with a homogenous Poisson process: therefore, no trend can be
established – we as humans cannot be deemed less belligerent than usual” (2015, 1). The
shift away from battlefield deaths, a narrow indicator of declining violence, masks the
evolving nature of war toward state-sponsored assassinations and the increasing use of
remote-controlled drones.
2.4

Ideological Waivers Justifying Violence
Even if we believe that anti-violence cultural norms mark the contemporary

zeitgeist – that a random person is indeed less willing in contemporary times to commit
violence against another random person – it may be that people dodge those norms to
tolerate (if not endorse or even demand) violence when their predispositions encourage it.
In particular, people build ideological waivers that allow them to escape principles of
non-violence in certain circumstances or against specific groups (Wolgast 1992;
Schneider et al. in Sabatier & Weible 2014; Nisbett & Cohen 1996). In doing so, they can
conform to civilized norms while doing little or nothing to stop violence that they think
will benefit them. Accordingly, I argue that even if culture makes a difference, attitudes
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toward specific groups of people (out-groups) will more powerfully shape evaluations of
real-life circumstances that involve the use of force, and opinions regarding relevant
public policies.
2.4.1

Social Constructions

Long ago, scholars realized that much of the political landscape is socially
constructed – drawing on emotions and symbols – rather than objective reality (Luke
1989). The social construction of target populations, either positive or negative, often
determines how politicians and policymakers allocate benefits and burdens to specific
groups (Chanley & Alozie 2001; Barrilleaux & Bernick 2003). Closely related to outgroup prejudice, “social constructions are powerful images or stereotypes that help
explain why public policy, which can have such a positive effect on society, sometimes –
and often deliberately – fails in its nominal purposes, fails to solve important public
problems, perpetuates injustice, fails to support democratic institutions, and produces
unequal citizenship” (Schneider et al. in Sabatier & Weible 2014, 105).
The allocation of benefits and burdens that a target group receives is closely tied
to whether the public and political elites view the group as “deserving” or “undeserving”
of resources (Gilens 1996; Feldman & Huddy 2005). Conceptually, social constructions
are similar to individual perceptions of in-groups and out-groups: groups with which the
individual identifies and groups from which the individual feels alienated. Out-groups are
often racially, ethnically, religiously, or behaviorally defined. Positive or negative
stereotypes may be attributed to distinct social groups such as members of the military,
the elderly, mothers, the unemployed, criminals, etc.
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Social-identity theory attempts to explain how these categorizations can shape
individual behavior. It focuses on how one defines the “self” in terms of group
membership, group processes, and intergroup relations (Hogg 2018). An individual’s
social identity is based upon that individual’s belief that he or she belongs to a specific
group. Accordingly, subjectively similar individuals represent the in-group, while
individuals who differ represent the out-group. Intergroup categorization, and the social
comparison process which it requires, produce predictable consequences: In-group
members are judged positively, and out-group members are judged negatively (Stets &
Burke 2000). The concept of identity is of great interest to political psychologists who
study political behavior. These socially constructed groups may contend with each other
over a variety of resources – political, economic, or cultural – depending on the context
in which they find themselves (Voss 1996). Political demands for group respect (e.g.
racial minorities and gays and lesbians) require explanations that incorporate identity
(Taylor 1994; Monroe et al. 2000; Huddy 2001).
One approach tries to expand beyond the dual categorization of in-group vs. outgroup. That approach sorts groups into several distinct social roles. The socialconstruction framework (Schneider & Ingram 1988; 1993; 1997), partitions target
populations into four subgroups: the advantaged, contenders, dependents, and deviants.
The advantaged (e.g. doctors, homeowners, the elderly) enjoy high levels of political
power, a larger share of resources and benefits, and very few burdens. Contenders (e.g.
activists, banks, and labor unions) also receive more benefits than burdens but are viewed
negatively by much of society. Dependents (e.g. mothers, the handicap, and the poor) are
constructed as deserving of resources and benefits; however, these groups have very little
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political power and may be overlooked by policymakers. Deviants (e.g. drug dealers,
criminals, dropouts) also receive very few benefits, have very little political power, suffer
much greater burdens, and are often targets in terms of punitive policy. Much of society
blames deviants for social ills in the United States, which affords politicians and
policymakers cover to target these groups with little consequence. As Schneider et al.
point out, “policymakers stand to gain considerable political capital from punishing those
who do not have the power or wherewithal to fight back and whom the broader public
believes are undeserving of anything better” (2014, 112).
In the following pages, I develop my theory that social constructions and
identities are categorizations that produce a wide-range of “ideological waivers”
individuals can build to forgive violent behavior, violence they otherwise claim to abhor.
By categorizing a victim as part of an out-group, violence can be justified. If true, this
theory provides additional evidence that individuals’ attitudes toward violence (or nonviolence) in the abstract, are interlinked with their attitudes toward specific “types” of
victims and predators when it comes to preferences involving punitive policies.
2.4.2 Racial Stereotypes
Racial prejudice is one example of an ideological waiver (out-group formation)
that allows individuals to overlook violence against – or the targeting of – specific groups
of people. For instance, some whites believe that blacks are more likely to be criminals,
are inherently more violent; those whites view the criminal justice system as a
satisfactory means to control them (Gilliam & Iyengar 2000; Weaver 2007). Accordingly,
“racial prejudice contributes to whites’ support for police use of force, and this
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relationship should be stronger for the use of excessive force than for the use of
reasonable force” (Barkan & Cohn 1998, 749).
Additional research on implicit racial bias suggests that individuals link blacks
and other minority groups to a range of social problems including crime, violence, and
undesirability as neighbors (Bobo & Kluegel 1997; Bobo 2001; Quillian & Pager 2001).
Or, as Loury explains, “race is a mode of perceptual categorization people use to navigate
through a murky, uncertain world” (2002, 17). Racial bias in this form can persist
regardless of conscious prejudice towards blacks or other minorities, a concept that many
scholars refer to as “symbolic racism” (McConahay 1976; Kinder & Sears 1981; Sears
1988; Devine 1989). And, the idea that some whites believe blacks should be treated
equally, but unavoidably harbor negative attitudes toward blacks at the same time, has
strong effects on whites’ racial policy preferences. This should extend to attitudes toward
crime and punishment policy.
Blacks, on the other hand, are more likely to report being victimized by the police
(Weitzer & Tuch 2004) and are less likely to trust law enforcement (Rosenbaum et al.
2005). They tend to view law enforcement as an institution designed to protect dominant
(white) group interests and equate law enforcement with the institutionalized
maltreatment of minorities and the neglect of subordinate (black) interests. Accordingly,
some blacks endorse what Anderson (1999) coins a “code of the street” – an ideology
that justifies violence and aggression by certain people in certain contexts.
Anderson examines the informal rules that govern behavior in economically
depressed urban areas, which often exhibit particularly high levels of violence and an
“ethic emerges where the influence of the police ends and personal responsibility for
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one’s safety is felt to begin…a quite primitive form of social exchange that holds wouldbe perpetrators accountable by promising an ‘eye-for-an-eye’, or a certain payback (1999,
10). Residents of many inner-cities face serious challenges and an increased risk of being
victimized. These beliefs are a byproduct of a widespread fear and lack of trust in the
police and criminal justice system in the United States. This is especially true of young
black individuals living in crime ridden inner-cities.
2.4.3 Gender Stereotypes
Sexism and perceived gender expectations are ideological waivers for violence
that allow individuals to target victims and reward predators. For example, research
suggests (Glick & Fiske 1996; Viki & Abrams 2002) that hostile sexism is associated
with greater endorsement of rape myths, and “benevolent sexism” seems to indicate that
when women violate traditional gender stereotypes they are perceived to be at least
partially to blame for being attacked sexually. In other words, individuals are able to
forgive violent behavior that otherwise they may have been inclined to abhor. In a
practical sense, scholars have found a link between negative perceptions of victims and
juror decisions in rape trials (Brownmiller 1975; Ellison et al. 2009). When jurors
perceive victims as deviants based upon evidentiary considerations like sexual history
(Barber 1974), level of resistance (Deitz et al. 1984), or alcohol consumption (Norris et
al. 1992), they are much less likely to sympathize with the victim or severely punish the
perpetrator.
As Peacock & Barker point out, “Across much of the world, rigid gender norms
and harmful perceptions of what it means to be a man or woman, encourage men to
engage in high-risk behaviors, condone gender-based violence, grant men the power to
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initiate and dictate the terms of sex, and make it difficult to for women to protect
themselves from either human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or violence and to seek
health services” (2014, 2). Other research (Murnen et al. 2002, Flood 2011) suggests that
men’s adherence to sexist, patriarchal, and sexually hostile attitudes increase the
likelihood that they may commit violence against women. In short, negative
constructions of masculinity and gender-inequitable attitudes harm women.
2.4.4 Honor Codes
Honor codes provide yet another example of an ideological waiver that relaxes
non-violent norms – one that justifies violence less based on the identity of the target and
more based on the violation of other social norms. Existing social science research on
honor codes already documents the role they play in shaping individuals’ support for
violence and violent public policies (Barnes et al. 2012; Cohen & Nisbett 1997). This line
of research suggests that for some people, a set of moral values (honor beliefs) require
that individuals respond aggressively to insult, threat, or provocation to maintain a
reputation for strength and toughness (Osterman & Brown 2011). Accepting personal
responsibility for one’s own safety reflects a form of social exchange where affronts and
provocation are met with swift and aggressive retaliation. Cultural adaptations of honor
include behavior that is organized around pride and respect backed by the credible threat
of violence. Far from preventing violence, this form of civilized behavior sometimes can
require it.
Large bodies of work examine cultural differences in these beliefs, and the
evidence suggests that some human groups perpetuate violence more than others (Nisbett
& Cohen 1996; Anderson 1999). These belief systems can attach to perceived gender
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roles (Rodriguez et al. 2002; Saucier et al. 2015), to cultural identity (Nisbett & Cohen
1996), or to individual-level needs (Vandello et al. 2008). Whatever the source, this sort
of violence-justifying belief system can aggregate up to explain different social outcomes
across entire regions (e.g. higher levels of violence in the American South and parts of
the West than elsewhere in the United States).
The shared assumption that violence is often justified, if not required, also helps
shape laws and public policy outcomes in these regions. Examples include “opposition to
gun control, support for laws allowing for violence in protection of self, home, and
property; a preference for a strong national defense; a comfort with the institutional use
of violence in socializing children; and a willingness to carry out capital punishment and
other forms of state violence to prevent crime and maintain social order” (Nisbett &
Cohen 1996, 83). More recently, stand-your-ground laws found in the South have
generated controversy nationally (Lave 2012).
The research on violence-justifying ideologies traces them to the same sort of
economic and technological circumstances that dominated Pinker’s optimistic book.
Scholars root the origins of honor culture to the prevalence of herding economies among
early settlers. Nisbett and Cohen suggest that honor cultures “should be found wherever
the possibility exists that scarcity will be produced by the predatory actions of others,
especially when the state is unwilling or unable to provide protection from such
predation” (1996, 89). If conditions change, the context-dependent “civilizing process”
can change with it, so that it is not so civilizing.
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2.4.5 The Artificial Person
While it may not be apparent immediately, I will make the case here that
representatives or institutions (artificial persons) at times provide cover or justification
for violent behaviors. Identities are constructed through the process of “othering” to
generate difference. In fact, ‘identity’ is not conceivable without difference. For instance,
in terms of individuals, it would not make sense to say “I am white” if it did not imply a
difference from being a different race or ethnicity. My focus in this section, however, is
on the modern state as a political identity, and the persons and institutions that maintain
the monopolization of violence enjoyed by the government (Diez 2004).
American citizens in large part accept – if only grudgingly at times – the
concentration of authority and power vested in those who represent the ‘state’ (e.g.
politicians, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and even juries of their peers).
These are the actors who maintain the state’s monopolization of violence, the ones who
make laws, punish criminals, declare war and peace, and perform all the other actions
necessary for maintaining the safety of the people (Skinner 1999, 2). The sovereign state
and its overreaching tentacles has been described as an ‘artificial person’, but a necessary
improvement to a world where competing identities produced constant war and a life
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1968, 186). Others, however, worry
about the power of the ‘state’, through its representatives and institutions, to impose
selective violence.
Wolgast provides an excellent example of the artificial person as a problematic
facet of society. She points out that the “more we practice the substitution of one person
for another, the more natural the practice becomes. And the variety of artificial persons
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becomes greater…military actions [for example] are seen as the deeds of citizens in
whose name they are done, whether these authors command them or not” (1992, 14). She
certainly is correct that the idea of the artificial person is applicable to a variety of
representatives. For example, law enforcement or agents of the criminal courts should be
viewed as artificial persons. For that matter, the same could be said of vigilantes – those
outside the law who deal in violence. And, to turn Wolgast’s point on its head, while
some individuals may be alarmed by the behavior of representatives whose behavior they
are assumed to endorse, others may approve of those same behaviors while at the same
time escaping personal responsibility for the consequences they produce. This is how the
concept of the artificial person can serve as a waiver, or justification for violent behavior.
Cops and courts purportedly act out the will of the people. Yet, this arrangement
allows individuals to escape responsibility while (indirectly) endorsing violence. It also
can allow us to avoid conscious awareness of what’s being done in our names. One can
claim to abhor violent behavior, and at the same time tolerate if not embrace the brutality
of others’ actions – whether it is a police officer killing a suspect, a judge imposing the
death penalty, or a soldier wiping out foreign enemies. More worrisome, perhaps, is the
likelihood that some individuals endorse such secondary actions, or indirect violence,
against only some (out-groups) of people about whom they may know relatively little. I
examine this possibility empirically in later chapters.
2.5

Conclusion
Violence-justifying ideologies come in a variety of forms and allow individuals to

respond aggressively – or allow others to do so in their place – while still retaining a
surface-level commitment to civilized norms. The examples discussed in this chapter are
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part-and-parcel of American culture but looking across time or place would furnish an
array of additional examples. The overall point, however, is that societies have
constructed justifications for violence before – and when they do so, it does not require
the collapse of civilization or the reversal of the entire “civilizing process” to permit such
backsliding. Norms against violence may not have the constraining power that Pinker
gives them credit for having, either because people conform to them without really
drawing on the values or because they can abandon them based on a variety of
convenient excuses.
My goal with this dissertation is to test for those possibilities as best I can using
survey experiments. In the following chapters, I will contribute to that enterprise
theoretically and empirically in several ways. First, I will develop and validate a
generalized, flexible scale of “anti-violence values” that can travel across policy areas
and disciplines, and which serves to disentangle attitudes towards violence from genderattitudes. Then, I will test my theory that other stereotypical attitudes about specific
groups (e.g. blacks, women, law enforcement officers), interact with attitudes about antiviolence, bias evaluations of victims and predators, and have serious implications in
terms of politics and public policy. Ultimately, my conclusions about the civilizing
process will lean toward the pessimistic side of the debate outlined in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 3. CONCEPTUALIZING AND MEASURING HONOR-BASED
ATTITUDES TOWARD VIOLENCE
3.1

Introduction
Violent crime continues to be a serious problem nationwide, and research shows

(Flood & Pease 2009) that public policies designed to decrease violent crime rates must
address the underlying attitudes that overtly normalize and justify violent behavior. It
might seem straightforward to create and use a scale that directly asks people about their
attitudes toward violence, but that is harder than it seems. Aside from the most abstract
of questions, most survey items designed to assess attitudes toward violence already
frame them in policy terms, distracting from the underlying cultural values that
supposedly motivate policy preferences.
This problem arose as a detour in my own empirical work for this dissertation. I
tried using an adapted General Violence measure already appearing in the literature
(Schnabel 2018), but the question items did not hold together well as a scale and, instead
of capturing broad attitudes toward interpersonal violence, they appeared to reflect
political ideology.
A different option and the path that ultimately I will follow in the research to
come, builds from a scale used in the Honor Beliefs literature (Saucier 2016). That scale
initially posed a major problem as well, because it did not use gender-neutral question
wording. Instead, it specifically framed honor in terms of how men should behave.
Conflating attitudes toward violence with attitudes toward gender is problematic because
core beliefs about the appropriate roles of men and women are an important and
consistent predictor of support for certain, very specific forms of violence. For example,
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in their investigation of gender-role attitudes, religion, and spirituality as predictors of
beliefs about violence against women, Berkel et al. found that “gender role attitudes were
the best overall predictor of domestic violence beliefs” (2004, 119). Their study,
however, did not assess respondents’ attitudes toward violence more generally.
The focus of this chapter, therefore, is on conceptualizing and measuring
individuals’ attitudes toward violence and gender as independently as possible to
determine the role that each plays in predicting perceptions of victims, perpetrators, and
violence-related public policy preferences. This requires developing a survey instrument
that does not confound the two explicitly. Doing so will allow me to examine, in later
chapters, across social groups and beyond gender, important mediating factors (i.e.
“ideological waivers”) that help shape public opinion and policy related to violence.
Measuring Attitudes toward Violence
Research on violence cannot get away from gender entirely. We know that males
are disproportionately to blame for crimes of all kinds, and research suggests that cultural
norms influence violent behavior among men (Vandello et al. 2008). Gendered violence,
in particular is overwhelmingly committed by males (Flood & Pease 2009), so from a
policy standpoint it is understandable that scholars focus on mysoginistic or patriarchal
culture – and the behaviors of men – when they study violence against women.
While other research (Curry 1998; Jones 2009; Strauss 2008; Howard 2015)
shows that women sometimes do perpetrate violence, they certainly do not commit
violent acts at rates comparable to men. What many women do, on the other hand, is
participate in the masculine honor codes advanced by Saucier et al. (2016) that endorse
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and teach violence. Men may be the ones specifically expected to build a reputation for
strength and toughness (Cohen & Nisbett 1996), but women perpetuate this value system.
As Vandello and Cohen point out, “Women are clearly very much a part of all cultures of
honor – teaching it to their sons, enforcing it on their menfolk and, quite often, even
participating in its violent behavior patterns themselves. This was true historically and it
appears to be true in many cultures of honor today” (2003, 86).
The Honor Belief literature therefore examines closely the consequences of
gender expectations and the endorsement of male violence. Scholars have used the
Masculine Honor Belief Scale (MHBS) developed by Saucier et al. (2016) to examine
whether honor codes correlate with violence-justifying attitudes. Their scale consists of 7
distinct factors related to masculine honor beliefs including (1) masculine courage (e.g.
“a man should not be afraid to fight”); (2) pride in manhood (e.g. “a man should be
expected to fight for himself”); (3) socialization (e.g. “you would want your son to stand
up to bullies”); (4) virtue (e.g. “a man who ‘doesn’t take any crap from anybody is an
admirable reputation to have’”); (5) protection (e.g. “it is a male’s responsibility to
protect his family”); (6) provocation (e.g. “if a man’s spouse is insulted, his manhood is
insulted”); and (7) family and community bonds (e.g. “a man’s family should be his
number one priority”). The resulting measure, therefore, consists of 35-items, most of
them explicitly mentioning gender.
The Masculine Honor Belief Scale successfully predicts behavior-related attitudes
in both domestic and international research. This includes published work suggesting that
masculine honor beliefs are associated with men’s assertion that offensive slurs warrant
violent reprisal (Saucier et al. 2014) and that walking away from a fight is “non-manly”
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(O’Dea et al. 2017). It also predicts attitudes toward rape and rape victims (Saucier et al.
2015), war and peace (Saucier et al. 2018), and gun enthusiasm and aggression (Matson
et al. 2019). In terms of American electoral politics, Matson et al. (2019) also found that
masculine honor beliefs helped to predict positive perceptions of Donald Trump, and
negative perceptions of Hillary Clinton.
While this masculine measure of honor is quite useful for studying the role of
gender expectations in predicting violent behavior perpetrated by men, it does not allow
the researcher to focus on general anti-violent attitudes. The gendered (i.e., sexist)
attitudes about who should engage in violence contaminate any attempt to measure
whether violence should take place at all. To parse out those two distinct types of
attitudes, I employ a pair of strategies:


First, I will re-word the questions in the honor scale so that they are
gender-neutral. Instead of asking about men, husbands, and sons, I will
ask about people more generally. Respondents may make assumptions
about who would or would not be engaging in the actions they are
endorsing, but at least I will not be imposing that judgment on them.



Second, to counteract any remaining gender-based attitudes in those scales
– which could appear, for instance, if a respondent asked about violence
assumes that it would be men engaging in it – my analysis will include
more explicit measures of gender attitudes as well. With controls included
for two measures of sexism, the independent variation remaining in my
honor-based, but adapted, anti-violence scale ought to be the portion
reflecting generalized attitudes against violence.
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This adapted scale allows me to address my primary research question directly,
which is whether individuals who condemn violence, on average, are more likely to
support public policies to assist victims and punish perpetrators. The correlational results
presented in this chapter support my use of the new scale in the analyses presented in
chapters four (sexual assault and rape), and five (police violence).
Admittedly, I found it rather difficult, if not impossible to completely disentangle
gender attitudes and attitudes toward violence. This is likely because in the United States
individuals are, in large part, socialized to believe that honor codes apply mainly to men.
I do, however, defend the value and scholarly utility of asking violence-related questions
without imposing gender roles upon survey respondents, and I will provide support for
my neutrally worded scale. Specifically, using gender-neutral question items produces a
sharp decline in the association between honor beliefs and benevolent sexism for both
males and females, thereby picking up the influence that gender has on a person’s
sympathy toward violent crime victims – a relationship that remains hidden when using
the masculine honor belief scale. The new measure also produces a notable decline in
association with conservatism, compared to the original.
It follows then that honor codes should be assessed beyond the narrow sets of
beliefs that many people have in terms of male behavior. Research should be robust to the
possibility that a respondent’s expectations of anyone, male or female, in terms of violent
behavior, are not much different from the respondent’s expectations of males in certain
situations – which, if true, should inform theories of violence. On the other hand,
adherence to specifically masculine honor codes might be nothing more than an indirect
way to express sexist values. The argument I advance in this chapter is that more research
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is needed to examine gender-neutral attitudes towards honor-based violence and the role
they play in shaping public opinion and violence-related public policy preferences.
It’s not even clear that a narrowly masculine measure of honor could provide a
full picture of attitudes related to gender-based issues. In particular, conflating gender
attitudes and attitudes toward violence seems problematic when attempting to predict
attitudes toward sexual assault or rape victims. A man with a strong sense of honor, and
therefore a willingness to fight if necessary, might also hold highly protective attitudes
toward women (what scholars sometimes call benevolent sexism) – or, he might carry his
comfort with the use of force when resolving conflicts over to conflict between a man
and woman. A man who feels distaste toward violence might similarly abhor sexual
assault – or, alternatively he might harbor feelings of a misogynist nature (what scholars
sometimes call hostile sexism) that encourage him to diminish the significance of sexual
assaults, especially if something about the circumstances prevent them from becoming
openly violent.
For research contexts in which the theoretical distinction between gender attitudes
and honor attitudes could matter, scholars ought to employ a different measure.
Accordingly, my research moves beyond the gender-specific orientation typical of most
work in this realm, to develop a non-gendered anti-violence measure that could predict
attitudes toward victims of violence and toward violence-related public policies.
3.2

Seeking Gender-Neutral Honor Questions
My primary argument, thus far, is that attitudes toward violence should be

assessed independently of someone’s attitudes about male behavior, or for that matter
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about other social groups. That said, a common theme unites research in this realm. The
respect for strength – the idea that an individual should maintain a willingness to risk
serious injury or death in defense of symbolic as well as tangible goals – is common in
many of the world’s cultures. Such a belief system provides the justification for why
individuals employ violent acts when resolving disputes. Broadened to a societal level,
the need for a community or a country to exhibit such strength may be employed to
justify aggressive public policies, including those that allow the state to impose harsh
punishments or that tolerate acts of violence by individuals in positions of power.
In the remainder of this chapter, I set out to examine (in an explicitly genderneutral way) the implications of an individual’s belief that violence is not acceptable. To
pursue this approach to honor and violence, I first needed to disentangle gender roles
from attitudes toward violence that are commonly conflated in prior research. To do so, I
decided to build explicitly on the widely used Masculine Honor Belief Scale (MHBS)
developed by Saucier et al. (2016), but to modify it by altering the language in a genderneutral way. The original masculine question wording is displayed in bold face, while the
non-gendered replacement wording is displayed in italics (Table 3.2.1).
The measure I propose exploits all of the advantages of the MHBS but ought to
help scholars better understand the complexity of honor beliefs as they relate to
perceptions of aggression and violence – not only with regard to rape or other crimes that
typically target women, but also in unrelated policy areas such as police violence. This
modification will allow me to parse out the independent role of honor beliefs and other
violence-justifying attitudes (e.g. those built from racism, sexism, or authoritarianism) in
predicting support for relevant public policies.
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Table 3.2.1 | Honor Belief Question Items
Masculine Courage

It is important for a man (an individual) to act bravely.
A man (an individual) should not be afraid to fight.
It is important for a man (an individual) to be able to face danger.
It is important for a man (an individual) to be able to take pain.
It is important for a man (an individual) to be courageous.

Pride in Manhood

It is important for a man (a person) to be more masculine (tougher) than other men
(people). **
A man (a person) should be embarrassed if someone calls him a wimp. **
A man (a person) should be expected to fight for himself (themselves).
If a man (a person) does not defend his wife (their spouse), they are not a very strong man
(person).
If a man (a person) does not defend himself (themselves), they are not a very strong man
(person).

Socialization

If your son (child) got into a fight, you would be glad that he (they) stood up for himself
(themselves).
You would want your son (child) to stand up to bullies.
As a child you were taught that boys (you) should defend girls (other children).
If your son (child) got into a fight to defend his sister (a sibling), you would be glad they did
so.
As a child you were taught that boys (people) should always defend themselves.

Virtue

You would praise a man (a person) who reacted aggressively to an insult. **
Physical aggression is always admirable and acceptable (no change). **
It is morally wrong for a man (a person) to walk away from a fight. **
A man (a person) who doesn’t “take any crap from anybody” is an admirable reputation to
have. **
Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself (no change). **

Protection

A man (person) should protect his wife (their spouse) because it is the right thing to do.
If a man (person) cares about his wife (their spouse), he (they) should protect her (them)
even if everyone else thinks it’s wrong.
A man (a person) should stand up for a female (anyone) who is in the family or is a close
friend.
It’s a male’s (person’s) responsibility to protect his (their) family.
A man (a person) should protect his wife (their spouse).

Provocation/Insult

If a man’s wife (a person’s spouse) is insulted, his manhood (that person’s pride) is
insulted.
If a man’s (a person’s) mother is insulted, his manhood (that person’s pride) is insulted.
If a man’s (a person’s) father is insulted, his manhood (that person’s pride) is insulted.
If a man (a person) is insulted, his manhood (that person’s pride) is insulted.
If a man’s (a person’s) brother is insulted, his manhood (that person’s pride) is insulted.

Family Bonds

It is important to spend time with the members of your family (no change).
It is important for a man (an individual) to be loyal to his (their) family.
A man’s (an individual’s) family should be his (their) number one priority.
It is important to interact with other members of your community (no change).
It is a man’s (a person’s) responsibility to respect his (their) family.
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This chapter also describes the development of a short-form version of the
gender-neutral anti-violence scale. This is useful for a number of reasons. First, it
consumes much less space on a survey instrument, which either lessens the cost of
research or allows the inclusion of other useful questions (I will exploit that property in
chapters 4 and 5). Second, the subscales of the original measure include a relatively large
number of questions (5-items) dealing with similar issues, which could try the patience of
respondents who dislike the feeling that they are being asked the same thing multiple
times, ultimately producing less-reliable data. We can be more confident in survey
responses given to an instrument of more reasonable length. Finally, the question items
included in the MHBS are inherently sensitive in nature because they focus on
individuals’ willingness to endorse violence. I argue that the truncated version I propose
is less likely to prompt participants to provide what they believe to be socially desirable
responses.
My first pass at developing a new honor & violence scale focused on that
explanatory variable, along with related scales also employed by Saucier et al. (2016):


Hostile sexism (e.g. “women fail to appreciate all men do for them”)



Benevolent sexism (e.g. “every man ought to have a woman he adores”)



Trait aggression (e.g. “given enough provocation, I might hit another person”),
and



Conservatism (e.g. “how liberal or conservative do you perceive yourself to be
on foreign policy issues, economic issues, and social issues?)
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To examine the criterion validity of the MHBS, the authors included measures
they believed would be associated with the honor inventory: benevolent sexism and
aggressive personality traits. To examine discriminant validity, the authors included
measures they believed would not be associated with the inventory: conservatism and
hostile sexism.
Gender Attitudes
The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI), created by Glick & Fiske (1996)
includes two correlated components of sexism that, nevertheless, represent contrasting
orientations toward women. The questionnaire involves sexism, both sexist animosity (or
hostile sexism) and a subjectively positive alignment (benevolent sexism). Each, the
authors claim, encompass three sources of ambivalence: paternalism, gender
differentiation, and heterosexuality. The ASI is the most frequently used measure of
ambivalence toward women, with 3785 citations between 1996 and 2019 (Pennsylvania
State University 2019). Saucier et al. included the ASI in their original questionnaire,
which was designed to identify reliable items to include in the MHBS. While the authors
did not expect their measure would significantly correlate with hostile sexism, they did
hypothesize that higher levels of masculine honor would be associated with benevolent
sexism because it is “characterized by role restrictive behaviors that include men’s
protection of women” (2016, 9).
Aggressive Behavior
The Aggression Questionnaire, constructed by Buss & Perry (1992), is the most
frequently used inventory on human aggression, with 6019 citations between 1992 and
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2019 (CiteSeerX, 2019). Factor analysis yielded four distinct scales: physical aggression,
verbal aggression, anger, and hostility. This scale, however, focuses on individuals’
propensity to behave violently or be verbally abusive. Saucier et al. included the
Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry 1992) in their original study constructing the
masculine honor scale because the authors’ “conceptualization of masculine honor
includes the belief that physical aggression is sometimes appropriate, and even necessary,
we hypothesize that higher levels of masculine honor beliefs would be associated with
higher levels of trait aggression” (2016, 9).
Because the focus of my dissertation lies squarely on the predictive role of antiviolence attitudes and not propensity to behave violently, I chose not to model my new
scale on the Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry 1992). I also decided against
modeling other popular measures of attitudes toward violence to create my scale because
either the question items tapped policy orientations closely related to my dependent
variables of interest in later chapters (Velicer et. al 1989; Anderson et. al 2006) or were
specifically designed for children and adolescents (Funk et. al 1999; 2003).
Expectations for My New Measure
Having stripped the original MHBS of its gendered orientation and role-restrictive
language, I expect a much weaker strength of association between my new measure and
sexism, particularly benevolent sexism. I expect the same dip in correlation strength with
conservatism and, in both cases, I expect this to be true of male and female respondents.
Including these additional measures allows me to better understand what the MHBS as
well as my scale really are capturing. The primary purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to
present and evaluate a modified and updated, gender-neutral measure of honor-based
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anti-violence attitudes. Data from a large Mechanical Turk survey (N = 1049) is reported,
and my analysis lends support for my gender-neutral scale among adult populations in the
United States.1
3.3

Implementing the Gender-Neutral Honor Battery
Thousands of social scientists have published studies using data from Amazon’s

Mechanical Turk survey platform. Conducting research in this way is both efficient, and
relatively inexpensive. Perhaps more importantly, however, scholars have found evidence
that MTurk participants “provide data that meets or exceeds the psychometric standards
set by data collected using other means including student samples” (Buhrmester et al.
2018, 149), and that “relative to other convenience samples often used in experimental
research in Political Science, MTurk subjects are often more representative of the general
population” (Berinsky et al. 2012, 366).
Despite these advantages, other scholars (Dennis et al. 2019) have found that an
alarming number of participants circumvent conventional screening methods and provide
low-quality responses. Accordingly, I took additional steps to detect and delete fraudulent
responses from any “bad actors” who participated in my survey. Not only did I identify
multiple responses that originated from a single IP address, but I also identified multiple
responses that originated from a single geographic location using latitudinal and
longitudinal coordinates. This led me to exclude 294 potentially fraudulent observations.

1

Berinsky et al. (2012) examined the benefits, and potential limitations of using Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk web-based platform for subject recruitment in Political Science Research. When the authors used
Mechanical Turk samples to replicate previous experimental studies, they found that the average
treatment effects were very similar. In sum, the authors argue that the potential limitations to Mechanical
Turk samples – including subject attentiveness and the prevalence of repeat survey-takers – are not much
of a problem in practice.
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After closely inspecting my remaining data, I uncovered an additional 26 obvious
response-set observations and excluded those as well, which resulted in a final sample
size (N = 1049).
Participants and Materials
M-Turk Workers were given the opportunity to earn $0.25 for completing my
survey on Amazon’s research survey platform. Participants reported their level of
agreement with various statements endorsing honor beliefs. In total, data were collected
with a survey instrument given to 1,049 workers: 43% male, 79% white, 95% between
the ages of 18 and 65, with a median age of 39.38 and a standard deviation of 13.18.
Respondents were also asked to complete the scales on hostile sexism, benevolent
sexism, trait aggression, conservatism, and rape myth acceptance.
Workers were randomly assigned to complete one of two scales, the original
MHBS, or my modified, non-gendered version. That randomization produced little
variation in the two pools. The 523 workers who received the original MHBS were 44%
male, 79% white, 95% between the ages of 18 and 64, with a median age of 39.39 and a
standard deviation of 13.12. By contrast, the 526 workers who received my modified
scale were 42% male, 79% white, 95% between the ages of 18 and 65, with a median age
of 39.37 and a standard deviation of 13.24. The goal was to see how different the patterns
were across the two otherwise identical scales, allowing me to confirm – with data from a
non-student sample – that the MHBS conflates multiple attitudinal dimensions.
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Results – Masculine Honor Beliefs
The original MHBS items were highly reliable overall, with excellent internal
consistency (α = .95), and the items on each of the seven subscales also achieved
satisfactory levels of internal consistency, although it sometimes fell below the level seen
with the overall battery: masculine courage (α = .89); pride in manhood (α = .85);
socialization (α = .76); virtue (α = .85); protection (α = .87); provocation and insult (α =
.96); and family and community bonds (α = .85). 2
Principal Component Analysis
Recall that Saucier et al. (2016) reported that the MHBS question items in their
study yielded seven factors – or subscales – containing five question items each, which
combine to form a 35-item measure of masculine honor beliefs. However, I did not want
to assume that the question items went together or grouped as they did in the original
study. Some items clearly pertain to honor beliefs, while others clearly get at individual’s
attitudes toward violence specifically. Principal component analysis with varimax
rotation determined that the items actually produce a six-factor (rather than the sevenfactor) solution as reported by Saucier et al. (2016).
Provocation and Insult loaded strongest on the first factor (Eigenvalue = 13.09)
and explained 37% of the variance in the scale. The second factor (Eigenvalue = 5.06)
was mostly Protection items and explained an additional 14% of the variance. Courage
2

Alpha was developed to provide a measure of the internal consistency of a scale and is expressed as a
number between 0 and 1 (Cronbach, 1951). Analysts use the statistic to judge whether question items
included in a scale likely measure the same concept. The more that question items correlate with each
other, the higher alpha will be. Researchers typically employ a rule of thumb that alphas ranging between
.70 and .95 indicate a good scale (Bland, 1997; DeVellis, 2003). Alpha is also affected by the number of
question items; when there are very few items, alpha is reduced (Streiner, 2003). Such a scale may be
overly susceptible to the idiosyncratic focus of the few questions.
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loaded strongest on the third factor (Eigenvalue = 1.73) explaining an additional 5% of
variation in the scale. The fourth factor (Eigenvalue = 1.39) was mostly comprised of
Virtue items (or attitudes toward violence specifically) and explained 4% of scale
variance. Family and Community Bonds loaded strongest on the fifth factor (Eigenvalue
= 1.19) and explained 3% of the variance in the scale. Finally, the sixth factor
(Eigenvalue = 1.12) was overwhelmingly driven by two of the Socialization items and
explained an additional 3% of scale variance. No other factors emerged with an
Eigenvalue of 1.0 or higher.
Sex Differences
Male respondents scored significantly higher on Masculine Courage (t = 6.37, p =
.00), Masculine Pride (t = 4.89, p = .00), Masculine Virtue (t = 4.35, p = .00), Masculine
Protection (t = 4.57, p = .00), and Masculine Provocation/Insult (t = 4.28, p = .00). Males
and females posted similar scores on Masculine Socialization (t = 1.27, p = .10); and
Family and Community Bonds (t = -1.51, p = .07). In sum, male respondents were more
likely to endorse masculine honor beliefs on a range of issues, but females were equally
likely to agree that boys should defend themselves and others – with violence if
necessary, and that men should prioritize and defend their family. Males scored
significantly higher on the full 35-item masculine honor belief inventory compared to
females (t = 4.98, with 521 degrees of freedom, p < .001).
These results align with much of what Saucier et al. (2016, 10) reported in the
original study. Scores on the masculinity scale were strongly associated with measures of
trait aggression and benevolent sexism. However, contrary to their findings, data from
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this study suggest that scores on the scale also are strongly correlated with hostile sexism
and the conservatism measure (see Table 3.3.1 below).
Table 3.3.1 | Masculine Honor Intercorrelations

1. MHBS
2. Trait Aggression
3. Benevolent Sexism
4. Hostile Sexism
5. Conservatism

(1)
(2)
1
0.384***
1
0.731*** 0.256***
0.529*** 0.347***
0.426*** 0.151*

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001 35-Item Full Inventory

(3)

(4)

1
0.416***
1
0.332*** 0.560***

(5)

1

N = 523 N = 526

In this first pass, I replicated the original 35-item measure of masculine honor
beliefs, including seven 5-item subscales. Like the original creators of the masculine
honor scale, I found that the overall combined measure demonstrated acceptable internal
consistency, as did each of the subscales. In sum, higher levels of masculine honor beliefs
were significantly, and positively associated with higher levels of trait aggression, hostile
sexism, benevolent sexism, and conservatism.
Results – Gender Neutral Honor Beliefs
The gender-neutral additive scale works well overall – although notably, without
the gendered language to tie it together, my measure of internal consistency dipped a bit
(α = .93). The items on each of the seven subscales also achieved acceptable levels of
internal consistency: Courage (α = .83); Pride (α = .78); Socialization (α = .76); Virtue (α
= .81); Protection (α = .85); Provocation/Insult (α = .95); and Family and Community
Bonds (α = .79).
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Principal Component Analysis
Again, I conducted principal component analysis and determined that the data
produced a six-factor solution (rather than the seven-factor) solution suggested by
Saucier et al. (2016). The first factor (Eigenvalue = 11.15) picked up some Family and
Community Bonds items along with Protection items and explained 32% of the variance
in the scale. The second factor (Eigenvalue = 3.65) was entirely comprised of the
Provocation and Insult items and explains an additional 11% of the variance. Courage
and Pride items loaded strongest on the third factor (Eigenvalue = 2.48) explaining an
additional 7% of variation in the scale. The fourth factor (Eigenvalue = 1.85) was mostly
Virtue with two Pride items (or attitudes toward violence, and maintenance of a
reputation for being tough), and explained 5% of scale variance. The fifth factor
(Eigenvalue = 1.51) was mostly Socialization and an additional item relating to
reputation, and it explained an additional 4% of the variance in the scale. The sixth, and
final factor (Eigenvalue = 1.28) contained the remaining Family and Community Bond
items and explained an additional 4% of scale variance. However, the final factor
revealed that the question about obligation to the community does not fit well with those
about obligation to the family. This appears to represent respondents’ sense of
responsibility to self and family at the expense of the broader community – a finding that
did not emerge from the original gendered items. No other factors emerged with an
Eigenvalue of 1.0 or higher.
Interestingly, respondents did not score highly on items endorsing the stereotype
that individuals should maintain a credible reputation for aggressive behavior, or that
violence is often acceptable if not required. This suggests that, on average, respondents
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do not believe that violence is an acceptable social tool, providing preliminary support for
some scholars’ broader claim (Elias 2000; Pinker 2011) that humans have lost their
appetite for violence. What remains to be seen, however, is whether or not a distaste for
violence influences individuals’ perceptions of victims and perpetrators or helps shape
public policy preferences in any meaningful way.
While the additive index is adequate, it does not come together so neatly without
the gendered language structuring responses, which illustrates that my gender-neutral
wording is removing a problem. Contrary to my analysis of the masculine scale, which
produced one meaningful factor followed by statistical noise that required varimax
rotation to make sense of it, in this case, principal component analysis showed clear
factors emerging prior to rotation. Notably, the question items most directly tied to
violence held together and stood out more clearly. 3
Sex Differences
Male respondents again scored significantly higher on Courage (t = 4.17, p <
.001), Pride (t = 5.59, p < .001), Virtue (t = 5.37, p < .001), Protection (t = 4.02, p <
.001), and Provocation/Insult (t = 3.21, p < .001). Males and females again posted similar
scores on Socialization (t = 1.60, p = .06) and Family and Community Bonds (t = 0.15, p
= .44). Males scored significantly higher on the full 35-item gender-neutral honor
inventory compared to females (t = 4.92, with 524 degrees of freedom, p < .001). When
gender was not imposed upon respondents, females scored higher on most items, the
exception being family bonds and willingness to physically fight. Scores on the modified
3 Rotating principal components can improve their interpretability but also presents drawbacks. For

instance, because the variation between individual components is spread more evenly after rotation,
information on the most dominant individual sources of variation in the data may be lost (Joliffe 1989).
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honor & violence scale again correlated significantly with the measures of trait
aggression, hostile sexism, and benevolent sexism. However, in most cases, the
correlation coefficients are much smaller than those found using the original masculine
honor belief questions (see Table 3.3.2).
Table 3.3.2 | Gender-Neutral Honor Intercorrelations

1. HBS
2. Trait Aggression
3. Benevolent Sexism
4. Hostile Sexism
5. Conservatism

(1)
1
0.465***
0.587***
0.458***
0.319***

(2)
1
0.278***
0.417***
0.124**

(3)

(4)

1
0.391***
1
0.329*** 0.428***

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001 35-Item Full Inventory (Gender-Neutral)

(5)

1
N = 523

With the gendered language removed, my new measure correlates stronger with
trait aggression (+.08), but the correlations with benevolent sexism (-.15), hostile sexism
(-.07), and conservatism (-.11) decline sharply. This illustrates clearly that the original
scale was conflating a sense of honor with sexist attitudes reported by respondents who
might or might not have been open to the use of force more generally. This is particularly
true of the relationship between the modified scale and the measure of benevolent sexism,
the orientation that I most believed was contaminating the MHBS. Removal of the
gendered and role-restrictive language of the questions produced a notable drop in the
strength of association with benevolent sexism (-.15), and this was true of both males (.17) and females (-.15). Nevertheless, scholars who equate masculine traits with tolerance
for violence clearly are not wrong – even with gendered language removed, respondents
endorsing the use of force tend to be more likely to envision a division in gender roles as
well.
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3.4

Trimming the Honor Scale
Having compared the data produced using the competing measures, I now turn to

the selection of a short-form version of my gender-neutral scale. My goal in this section
is to choose the simplest scientific measure of unobserved anti-violence attitudes using
the fewest possible observed variables. To achieve this parsimony statistically, I began by
removing question items included in my gender-neutral scale that are not directly related
to individual attitudes toward violence.
Recall that principal component analysis indicated a six-factor solution, and that
the fourth factor (Eigenvalue = 1.85) was comprised mostly of Virtue with two Pride
items, which explained roughly 5% of scale variance. These seven items tap either the
belief that individuals should maintain a no-nonsense reputation, or that violence is often
acceptable if not required. Remember, these were also the least popular question items,
which suggests that on average, respondents do not endorse violence as a social tool. This
question set should allow me to investigate further whether anti-violence values influence
perceptions of victims and perpetrators or help shape related public policy preferences
(see Table 3.4.1).
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Table 3.4.1 | Principal Component Analysis Factor Loadings
Component 1
Courage 1
Courage 2
Courage 3
Courage 4
Courage 5
Pride 1
Pride 2
Pride 3
Pride 4
Pride 5
Socialization 1
Socialization 2
Socialization 3
Socialization 4
Socialization 5
Virtue 1
Virtue 2
Virtue 3
Virtue 4
Virtue 5
Protection 1
Protection 2
Protection 3
Protection 4
Protection 5
Provocation/Insult 1
Provocation/Insult 2
Provocation/Insult 3
Provocation/Insult 4
Provocation/Insult 5
Family Bonds 1
Family Bonds 2
Family Bonds 3
Family Bonds 4
Family Bonds 5

Component 2

Component 3
0.3671
0.3949
0.4393
0.414
0.388

Component 4

Component 5

Component 6

0.2765
0.3039
0.2363
0.4394
0.3896
0.4468
0.4446
0.3299
0.4255
0.3793
0.4101
0.3156
0.4911
0.3195
0.4693

-0.3790

0.2234

0.3024
0.3312
0.2764
0.3504
0.336
0.4182
0.459
0.4595
0.415
0.4409
0.3479
0.4019
0.3889
0.2088
0.3002

-0.3165

The seven items that I retained for my short scale are the ones that loaded mostheavily on the virtue/violence factor. They are as follows: (1) "It is important for a
person to be tougher than other people"; (2) "A person should be embarrassed if someone
calls them a wimp"; (3) "You would praise a person who reacted aggressively to an
insult"; (4) "Sometimes aggression is admirable and acceptable"; (5) "It is morally wrong
for a person to walk away from a fight"; (6) "A person who doesn't 'take any crap' from
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anyone is an admirable reputation to have"; and (7) "Physical violence is the most
admirable way to defend yourself".
These questions nicely capture an individual’s abhorrence of violence. My
argument is that a new short scale estimated from these questions, while derived from
closely related honor beliefs, is cleaner not only because it does not impose gender
expectations on respondents, but because it is comprised of items directly related to
violence and not honor more broadly. To determine goodness of fit, I used structural
equation modeling to examine the construct validity of my new, truncated scale. Fit
indices for the scale determined an acceptable fit: (p > X2 = .00; RMSEA = .08; CFI =
.95; TLI .93; SRMR = .03). Each of these diagnostic tests confirmed that my genderneutral short scale meets or exceeds standards for fit indices laid out in prior literature
(Hair et al. 2010; Awang 2012; and Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Sex Differences
Despite the removal of gendered language, male respondents again scored
significantly higher on "It is important for a person to be tougher than other people" (t =
4.66, p < .001); "A person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp" (t =
6.32, p < .001); "You would praise a person who reacted aggressively to an insult" (t =
4.76, p < .001); "Sometimes aggression is admirable and acceptable" (t = 3.26, p < .001);
"It is morally wrong for a person to walk away from a fight" (t = 5.19, p < .001); "A
person who doesn't 'take any crap' from anyone is an admirable reputation to have" (t =
1.76, p = .04); and "Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself" (t =
5.22, p < .001).
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This is not especially surprising because despite the gender-neutral question
items, many respondents are likely envisioning male behavior when reading these
statements. Male respondents were more likely to endorse these gender-neutral attitudes
toward violence and scored significantly higher than females on the full 7-item nongendered scale (t = 6.25, with 1047 degrees of freedom, p < .001).
Recall that the full 35-item gender-neutral honor scale produced sharp declines in
the strength of association with benevolent sexism (-.15); hostile sexism (-.07); and
conservatism (-.11). While scores on the truncated 7-item violence scale again correlated
significantly with these other variables, the strength of correlation dropped markedly
further with benevolent sexism (-.18); hostile sexism (-.13); and conservatism (-.17). This
lends further support for my claim that my new scale is capturing attitudes toward
violence rather than honor beliefs or gender stereotypes. For a comparison of correlation
coefficients across the 35-item masculine honor scale (MHBS); the 35-item genderneutral honor scale (HBS); and the truncated 7-item anti-violence scale (ATV); (see
Table 3.4.2 below).
Table 3.4.2 | Correlation Coefficients across Scales

Trait Agression
Benevolent Sexism
Hostile Sexism
Conservatism

MHBS
0.384***
0.731***
0.529***
0.426***

HBS
0.465***
0.587***
0.458***
0.319***

ATV
0.408***
0.280***
0.324***
0.154***

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001

This new short-form scale was constructed to measure a person’s attitudes toward
violence as independently from other attitudes as possible. The truncated version of my
scale is a worthy and defensible modification of both the full-item MHBS and the gender54

neutral HBS for the purposes of this project. I expected that the short scale would exhibit
weaker correlations with benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, and conservatism when
compared to the long form MHBS and the long form gender neutral HBS respectively.
Table 3.4.1 supports my expectations.
It was not possible to produce a measure of attitudes toward violence entirely free
from gender-role expectations, most likely because people in the United States are often
socialized to believe that violence is a male-exclusive behavior. However, the genderneutral short scale produced sharp declines in correlation strength with the other variables
as I predicted it should. This new scale should help me better understand how attitudes
toward gender and attitudes toward violence, independently and/or interactively, help
shape violence-related policy preferences and perceptions of victims and perpetrators.
Some might argue that the impressive declines in correlation I did find are a result
of the shorter scale itself – that fewer question items produced a poorly measured concept
of gender-neutral attitudes toward violence. To address this possibility, I created a
masculine short scale using the same question items I retained for the short-form genderneutral scale, but with their original wording intact. The gender-neutral short scale again
produced sharp declines in correlation strength, compared to the gendered parallel, with
benevolent sexism (-.11); hostile sexism (-.09); and conservatism (-.11) compared to the
masculine version of the same questions.
Others might question whether gender-neutral honor beliefs will correlate with or
help predict something that the original MHBS will not (or vice-versa). Saucier et al.
(2015) demonstrate that masculine honor beliefs are associated with perceptions of rape
and women who have been raped. If my new measures for gender-neutral honor are
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cleaner (i.e. less tangled up with gender stereotypes) they should correlate with rape myth
acceptance less strongly than the masculine worded versions.
Recall that respondents were also asked to complete question items involving rape
myth acceptance (Gerger et al. 2007). Intercorrelations for the full 35-item masculine
honor scale (MHBS), the 7-item masculine anti-violence short scale (MATV), the full 35item gender-neutral honor scale (HBS), and my 7-item gender-neutral anti-violence scale
(ATV), are provided; (see Table 3.4.3 below).
Table 3.4.3 | Correlations Including Rape Myth Acceptance

Trait Agression
Benevolent Sexism
Hostile Sexism
Conservatism
Rape Myth Acceptance

MHBS
0.384***
0.731***
0.529***
0.426***
0.455***

MATV
0.336***
0.394***
0.411***
0.263***
0.397***

HBS
0.465***
0.587***
0.458***
0.319***
0.439***

ATV
0.408***
0.280***
0.324***
0.154***
0.319***

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001

Stripping the gendered imposed language from the questions produced a subtle
decline in the strength of association with individuals’ endorsement of rape myth
acceptance on the 35-item gender-neutral scale (-.02), and the 7-item gender-neutral short
scale (-.08). While the decline in correlation strength across these scales played out as
expected, multiple regression analysis should allow me to determine whether my genderneutral scales predict something that the masculine versions do not – that is –
respondents’ propensity to endorse rape myths while controlling for other factors.
Rape Myth Acceptance
While early research on sexual violence focused primarily on perceptions of
victims and blame attributions for incidents of stranger rape (Acock & Ireland 1983),
56

date, acquaintance, and marital rape have gained attention more recently (Russell 1990).
We know that gender role expectations are one set of underlying attitudes that contribute
to the occurrence of sexual violence. For example, as Simonson and Subich point out,
“For men to fulfill the role expected of them by society they must be dominant, powerful,
sexually aggressive, and able to gain sexual access to reluctant women. In order for
women to fulfill their expected societal role, they must be fragile, passive, submissive,
yet still responsible for controlling the extent of their sexual activity (1999, 1).
Research shows (Mayerson & Taylor 1987) that individuals who embrace
stereotypical gender roles are more likely to endorse rape myths. Because both forms of
sexism included in this study serve to justify and maintain traditional gender roles, I
predict that respondents scoring higher on the overall measure of Ambivalent Sexism will
be more likely to endorse rape myths. Thus, I derive the following hypothesis:
H1. On average, respondents scoring higher on Ambivalent Sexism will be more
accepting of rape myths.
However, I also argue that it is important to partition out the Ambivalent Sexism
subscales to examine the independent effects of hostile versus benevolent sexism. While
closely related, hostile sexists seek to punish non-traditional women, while benevolent
sexists seek to protect women in traditional roles. As the creators of the scale point out,
“BS is the ‘carrot’ – the reward of positive affect, esteem, and protectiveness given to
women who embrace traditional gender roles; HS is the ‘stick’ – the hostility that women
who reject traditional roles in favor of taking on traditionally masculine roles face from
those wishing to ‘keep them in their place’ (Glick & Fiske 1996, 129). Because both
forms of sexism endorse coercion as a tool to maintain traditional gender roles, I predict
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that respondents scoring higher on my measures of benevolent and hostile sexism will be
more likely to endorse rape myths. However, I expect that hostile sexism will have a
greater effect than benevolent sexism. Based on these insights I derive the following
hypothesis:
H2. On average, respondents scoring higher on Benevolent Sexism and Hostile
Sexism will be more accepting of rape myths. However, this correlation will be
greater for those scoring higher on Hostile Sexism.
Recall that the goal of this analysis is to determine whether my gender-neutral
honor scale predicts something that the masculine version does not predict. Because both
versions measure honor beliefs, and because both are positively associated with rape
myth acceptance, it is likely that respondents scoring higher on either scale will be more
accepting of rape myths. However, the gender-imposed nature of the masculine honor
scale likely masks the differences we should see between males and females when it
comes to rape attitudes. We know, for instance that females, on average, are much less
likely than males to endorse rape myths (Burt 1980; Anderson & Cummings 1993), but
early studies did not include measures for gender-role expectations or traditionalism.
More recent work (Simonson & Subich 1999) provides evidence that gender role beliefs,
and the embrace of traditionalism that one acquires through early socialization, may be a
better predictor of rape attitudes than an individual’s biological sex. If true, removing the
gendered language from the masculine honor scale should unmask the fact that females,
on average, are less likely than males to endorse rape myths. In light of these propositions
I derive the following hypotheses:
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H3a. On average, an individual’s gender will not add significantly to the
prediction of rape attitudes beyond masculine honor beliefs.
H3b. Because the gender-neutral nature of my modified scale extracts gender-role
beliefs it will allow us to see that females, on average, are less likely than males
to endorse rape myths.
The first column of Table 3.4.4 shows the results of a regression analysis of rape
myth acceptance on ambivalent sexism. The results provide support for H1: that on
average, respondents scoring higher on Ambivalent Sexism are more accepting of rape
myths. Rape myth acceptance increased by (+0.04) for every one unit increase in
ambivalent sexism. I then partitioned out hostile sexism from benevolent sexism to obtain
the independent effects of each on respondents’ rape attitudes. The second column shows
the results of a multiple-regression analysis which provides support for H2: On average,
respondents scoring higher on Benevolent Sexism and Hostile Sexism are more accepting
of rape myths. However, this effect is greater for those scoring higher on Hostile Sexism.
Rape myth acceptance increased by (+0.61) for every one unit increase in hostile sexism
and increased by (+0.25) for every one unit increase in benevolent sexism.
Next, to explore the differences between the original masculine honor scale and
my modified gender-neutral version, I dropped the sexism measures to examine the effect
of honor beliefs and other control variables. In the third column of Table 3.4.3, I report
the results of a multiple-regression analysis of rape myth acceptance on masculine honor.
As expected, masculine honor beliefs had a positive and significant effect on the
likelihood that respondents would accept rape myths, all else equal. Respondents’
likelihood to accept these myths increased by (+0.59) for every one unit increase in
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masculine honor. Additionally, these results provide support for H3 a; that on average, an
individual’s gender will not add significantly to the prediction of rape attitudes beyond
masculine honor beliefs. Respondents’ sex did not have a significant effect on their
likelihood to endorse rape myths when controlling for masculine honor beliefs and other
factors. Females were no more likely to reject rape myths than males!
Finally, in the fourth column in Table 3.4.3, I report the results of a multipleregression analysis of rape myth acceptance on gender-neutral honor. As expected,
gender-neutral honor beliefs also had a positive and significant effect on respondents’
belief in rape myths. The likelihood to accept these myths increased by (+0.63) for every
one unit increase in gender-neutral honor, all else equal. However, these results provide
support for H3b; that because the gender-neutral nature of my modified scale extracts
gender-role beliefs it will allow us to see that females, on average, are less likely than
males to endorse rape myths. In this model, respondents’ sex was a positive and
significant predictor of their likelihood to endorse rape myths when controlling for
gender-neutral honor and other factors. Female respondents scored (-0.43) lower, on
average, on rape myth acceptance, all else equal. However, once hostile and benevolent
sexism were incorporated in Model 5 and Model 6, biological sex is was no longer a
significant predictor of rape myth acceptance.
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Table 3.4.4 | Effect of Honor Beliefs and Sexism on Rape Myth Acceptance
MODEL 1
Ambivalent Sexism

MODEL 2

MODEL 3

MODEL 4

MODEL 5

MODEL 6

0.04 **
(0.019)

Hostile Sexism

0.606 ***
(0.029)

0.545 ***
(0.051)

0.593 ***
(0.048)

Benevolent Sexism

0.251 ***
(0.030)

0.144 **
(0.057)

0.216 ***
(0.051)

Age

-0.009 **
(0.004)

0.006
(0.004)

-0.006 *
(0.004)

-0.008 *
(0.004)

Income

-0.007
(0.022)

-0.015
(0.023)

-0.001
(0.020)

-0.013
(0.020)

Education

0.06
(0.048)

0.036
(0.049)

0.088 **
(0.043)

0.125 ***
(0.043)

Female

-0.135
(0.121)

-0.428 ***
(0.126)

-0.011
(0.110)

-0.123
(0.111)

White

0.221
(0.178)

-0.092
(0.002)

0.244
(0.161)

-0.104
(0.169)

Black

0.194
(0.266)

0.348
(0.260)

0.299
(0.241)

0.087
(0.226)

0.041
(0.132)

0.094
(0.131)

0.012
(0.12)

Married

0.585 ***
(0.066)

Masculine Honor Beliefs

Observations

0.174 **
(0.083)
0.634 ***
(0.077)

Gender-Neutral Honor Beliefs

1049

1049

Adj. R2
0.42
0.42
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

-0.012
(0.113)

0.158 *
(0.080)

523

526

523

526

0.28

0.24

0.41

0.42

Anti-Violence Values
In the previous analysis I was able to demonstrate that my new measure, in large
part, removes the gender role expectations that the masculine honor beliefs scale (MHBS)
was created to capture (Saucier et al. 2016). My reason for doing so, ultimately, was to
create a shorter battery by retaining only those question items most directly related to
attitudes toward violence. As I stated earlier in the chapter, it might seem straightforward
to use an existing scale that directly asks people about their attitudes toward violence, but
that is actually much more difficult than it seems. Most existing survey items designed to
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assess attitudes toward violence inevitably frame them in policy terms that distract from
the underlying cultural values of interest to me. I tried using an adapted General Violence
measure already appearing in the literature (Schnabel 2018), but the question items did
not hold together well as a scale and, instead of capturing attitudes toward violence they
appeared to reflect political ideology (Conservatism). Rather than use those measures,
therefore, I turned to a scale used in the Honor Beliefs literature (Saucier 2016) that –
with adaption – got me much closer to what I needed.
To this point, however, I have not tested the predictive power of my anti-violence
values scale. Recall that my new, gender-neutral scale includes seven question items
assessing individuals’ level of abhorrence toward violence. These seven items tap either
the belief that individuals should maintain a no-nonsense reputation, or that violence is
often acceptable if not required. Remember, these were also the least popular question
items, which suggests that on average, respondents do not endorse violence as a social
tool. Accordingly, I scaled these items such that higher scores on the scale indicate a
greater aversion to violence. My goal in subsequent chapters, therefore, is to examine
whether anti-violence values help shape individuals’ perceptions of victims and
perpetrators of violence, or personal preferences in terms of violence-related public
policies. Steven Pinker argues that the steep decline in human beings’ taste for violence
has “been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that tolerate or glorify violence, and often
the attitudes are in the lead” (2011, xxii). While I do not have the necessary data to
engage the author’s claim that violence has declined over time, I have created a scale that
will allow me to test the substantive importance of anti-violence attitudes in subsequent
chapters.
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My new measure represents an individual’s abhorrence of violence in the abstract.
My argument is that this new short scale, while derived from closely related honor
beliefs, is cleaner – not only because it does not impose gender expectations on
respondents, but because it is comprised of items directly related to violence and not
honor more broadly. If true, I would expect my scale to help predict individuals’
willingness to endorse rape myths. Specifically, I expect that the more an individual
rejects violence, the less likely they are to endorse attitudes that vilify (or blame) victims
of sexual assault and/or rape. Stated as a formal hypothesis:
H4. On average, respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be
less likely to endorse beliefs that blame victims of rape, all else equal.
Table 3.4.5 | Effect of Anti-Violence Values on Rape Myth Acceptance

Age
Education
Income
Female
Black
White
Married
Conservative

MODEL 1
-0.006 *
(0.003)
0.042
(0.036)
0.001
(0.017)
-0.474 ***
(0.091)
0.562 ***
(0.196)
0.029
(0.141)
0.118
(0.009)
0.319 ***
(0.027)

Anti-Violence

MODEL 2
0.008 *
(0.004)
0.001
(0.049)
0.011
(0.022)
-0.351 ***
(0.126)
0.358
(0.257)
-0.091
(0.194)
0.089
(0.129)
0.211 ***
(0.036)
-0.305 ***
(0.033)

Gender-Neutral Honor

MODEL 3
0.008 *
(0.004)
0.013
(0.048)
-0.014
(0.022)
-0.316 **
(0.124)
0.291
(0.254)
-0.091
(0.191)
0.084
(0.127)
0.176 ***
(0.036)
-0.215 ***
(0.039)
0.371 ***
(0.089)

Benevolent Sexism
Hostile Sexism

Observations

1049

526

MODEL 4
MODEL 5
0.008 **
0.008
(0.004)
(0.033)
0.028
0.109
(0.047)
(0.012)
-0.009
-0.013
(0.022)
(0.019)
-0.298 **
-0.085
(0.122)
(0.111)
0.166
0.071
(0.251)
(0.224)
-0.054
-0.102
(0.188)
(0.168)
0.044
-0.011
(0.125)
(0.112)
0.144 ***
0.026
(0.036)
(0.034)
-0.202 ***
-0.105
(0.039)
(0.035)
0.187 **
0.052
(0.097)
(0.087)
0.249 ***
0.208
(0.056)
(0.050)
0.559
(0.048)

526

526

526

Adj. R2
0.15
0.26
0.28
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

0.31

0.45
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**
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***

***
***

In Model 1 of Table 3.4.5, I report the results of a multi-regression analysis of
rape myth acceptance on control variables commonly used in related studies. As
expected, females were significantly less likely (-.47) than males to endorse rape myths.
Additionally, conservatism produced a positive and significant effect such that for every
one unit increase in conservatism, on average, respondents were more likely (+.32) to
endorse rape myths.
In Model 2, I incorporate my measure of anti-violence values and find a
significant and negative effect such that for every one unit increase in anti-violence
sentiment, on average, respondents were less likely (-.31) to endorse rape myths. On its
face, it would seem as though anti-violence values are the real thing. In Model 3, genderneutral honor beliefs had a positive and significant effect on the likelihood that
respondents would accept rape myths, all else equal. Respondents’ likelihood to accept
these myths increased (+.37) for every one unit increase in gender-neutral honor. In the
fourth column, I incorporated benevolent sexism into the analysis. I found a positive and
significant effect on the likelihood that respondents would accept rape myths, all else
equal. Respondents’ likelihood to accept these myths increased (+.25) for every one unit
increase in gender-neutral honor, all else equal.
Model 5 represents my fully specified model and provides strong support for H4;
that on average, respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be less likely
to endorse beliefs that blame victims of rape, all else equal. Respondents’ likelihood to
accept these myths decreased (-.11) for every one unit increase in anti-violence values.
This effect remained significant despite the inclusion of measures for benevolent (+.21)
and hostile (+.56) sexism which, when included in the fully specified model, resulted in a
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respondent’s sex not producing a significant effect on their likelihood to endorse rape
myths, all else equal.
3.5

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was twofold; first, to develop and test a gender-

neutral honor scale in large part free from expectations of male behavior and next, to
extract from that battery a reliable measure for anti-violence values. In this section, I was
able to demonstrate that my new measure is well equipped to parse out the independent
and/or interactive roles of sexism and attitudes toward violence, and I was able to do so
using data collected from a substantial sample of Mechanical Turk workers.
My modifications to a popular measure of masculine honor (Saucier et al. 2016)
produced sharp declines in the overall strength of association between my gender-neutral
honor scale and both hostile, and benevolent, sexism compared to the masculine version.
This finding was consistent for both males and females. The gender-neutral scale also
produced sharp declines in the overall strength of association between conservatism and
the original measure. While I must admit that I was not able to entirely divorce gender
attitudes from honor beliefs, I did provide strong support for the utility of my scale and
evidence that it performs in a consistent manner theoretically distinct from its gendered
counterpart.
Using principal component analysis, I was able to then extract from the 35-item
gender-neutral honor questions the 7 items most directly focused on attitudes toward
violence. I scaled this variable such that higher scores indicate individuals’ increasing
abhorrence of violence. My new measure performed as theoretically expected when
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included in a multiple regression model predicting rape myth acceptance. In subsequent
chapters, it will allow me to more clearly examine the independent roles that stereotypes
(e.g. sexism and racism) and attitudes toward violence play in predicting perceptions of
victims and violence-related public policy preferences.
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CHAPTER 4. PERCEPTIONS OF RAPE VICTIMS AND SUPPORT FOR RELATED
PUBLIC POLICIES
4.1

Introduction
Brock Turner, a former swimmer at Stanford University was found guilty in 2015

of sexually assaulting, with intent to rape, an unconscious woman behind a campus
dumpster. The victim, known to the public only as “Emily Doe”, provided a lengthy and
emotional impact statement detailing the horror of her experience. In part the statement
read: “You took away my worth, my privacy, my energy, my time, my intimacy, my
confidence, and my own voice” (“Doe” in Bever 2016). Judge Aaron Persky sentenced
Turner to only six months in jail followed by probation. He reasoned that a harsher prison
sentence would have a severe impact on Turner who, in the end, served only three
months.4
First person accounts given by rape victims exhibit a recurring theme: The trauma
does not end when the attack ceases but is perpetuated through the reactions exhibited by
others who learn of the tragic event. Insensitive police officers, aloof medical staff, and
avoidant family members all contribute to a sense of alienation experienced by victims.
Yet, despite the central role played by individual attitudes in shaping the perpetuation,
experience, and policy environment in which sexual assault and rape occurs, the publicopinion literature offers only limited guidance for understanding it.
Sexual violence and rape are notoriously difficult to measure and there is no
single source of data available to provide researchers a clear, or entirely accurate picture
of these crimes. Researchers often rely on both the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National
4

In mid-July (2018) Judge Persky was recalled from office. The last time a California jurist was recalled
from the bench was 86 years prior.
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Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) – which measures crimes reported, and not reported
to law enforcement – and the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program administered by
the FBI, which measures those that are reported in order to estimate the prevalence of
sexual violence in America. These crimes are underreported for a variety of reasons
including the belief that police would not or could not do anything to help. In fact,
research suggests that rape is the most underreported crime of all, and that 63% of
incidents go unreported (Rennison 2002). According to one study, the conviction rate for
reported rapes is less than 10% (Frazier et al. 1994) and based on the 2018 NCVS, the
percentage of sexual victimizations reported to police declined from 40% in 2017, to 25%
the following year.
Even though the UCR and the NCVS provide a complementary assessment of
sexual violence in the United States, the official numbers they produce are often much
lower than those obtained by other agencies and private organizations. Additionally,
statistics alone fail to capture the looming danger that individuals face, females in
particular, when it comes to violent victimization.5 For example, approximately one in
five women will be raped at some point during their lives, and 20% - 25% of college
women will become victims of forced sex during their time in college (Cullen et al. 2000;
Black et al. 2011). Because negative stigmas are often placed upon victims of sexual
violence, and because they often fear that they will not be believed, many of these crimes
go unreported. These incidents of violence not only cause serious psychological damage
and significant short or long-term impacts on victims, such as Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD); they cost the United States more money than any other crime ($127
5 91% of victims of rape and sexual assault are female and 9% are male (Rennison 2002).
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billion annually) outpacing assault, murder, and even drunk driving (Miller et al. 1996;
Black et al. 2011).
Contributions to, and Extensions of Prior Literature
Rape is widely recognized as an act of power and violence (Anderson &
Swainson 2001) rather than eroticism, yet research in this realm tends to focus solely on
gender attitudes and stereotypes while ignoring individuals’ orientations toward violence.
For instance, much of this scholarship, (Spence et al. 1973; Muehlenhard et al. 1985)
centers on gender attitudes and stereotypes alone as explanations for perceptions of rape
victims and evaluations of sexual crimes. However, tolerance for a violent sexual act
might reflect attitudes toward violence rather than attitudes toward gender. In this
chapter, I use my adapted anti-violence values scale (created in Chapter 3) to determine
whether individuals who condemn violence, on average, are more likely to:


Believe a victim’s claim that she was raped;



Recommend a long prison sentence for her convicted rapist;



Support increased spending on policies to assist victims of sexual
violence; and



Personally advocate for those victims

I extend and contribute to this literature by: 1) providing theoretical and empirical
support for my claim that anti-violence values do not always translate to positive
perceptions of rape victims or support for policies and services to assist those victims; 2)
providing additional empirical support for my broader argument that any normatively
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positive effects of anti-violence values are (in most cases) absent once moderator
variables (violence-justifying ideologies) are included in the model; 3) examining
whether violence-justifying ideologies also moderate individuals decision to (not to)
impose harsh prison sentences on convicted rapists; and 4) replicating most of these
findings across multiple large N datasets. To the best of my knowledge these important
factors have never been incorporated into empirical models predicting support for victims
of sexual violence, policies to assist those victims, or punitive measures to crack down on
sexual predators. This research builds on recent work on ambivalent sexism and attitudes
toward rape victims (Brown & Pehrson 2019; Becker & Wright 2011) but expands on
this research by: 1) including a large, and more representative sample (not just
undergraduates), and 2) incorporating my new measure of anti-violence values.
The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I provide an historical overview of interest
group efforts to influence public opinion and promote institutional reforms to address
violence against women. These are formal, and informal groups that collaborate to
influence public policy and provide information and resources to the public and to
lawmakers. Many of these advocates play pivotal roles reducing violence against women
and fostering social and institutional change in the United States. Next, I review some of
the difficulties advocates encounter as they navigate an ever-changing political
landscape. For example, it is challenging to convince lawmakers to support – and
ultimately implement – programs and policies that require significant increases in
government spending. Without strong public support for policies to reduce sexual
violence and assist victims, lawmakers often lack the political will to act. Finally,
extending upon my analyses in chapter three, I re-introduce specific violence-justifying
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ideologies (e.g. hostile and benevolent sexism) which I argue attenuate the otherwise
positive force of anti-violence values. I present empirical evidence that those who
endorse violence-justifying attitudes (sexism in the current analysis) are less likely to
support victims of sexual violence, or policies and services to assist those victims. This is
especially true for those most opposed to violence.
4.2

Feminist Movements to Redress Violence against Women
Violence against women – sexual or otherwise – is a serious problem worldwide

and is now viewed as a question of human rights. While most people would agree that
such violence should be prohibited by law, this was not always so. In fact, as recently as
1999 the Eurobarometer survey indicated that one in three Europeans believed violence
against women should not be considered a crime (Htun & Weldon 2012). And in the
United States, prior to the Violence against Women Act signed into law by President
Clinton in 1994, the criminal justice system did not provide strong legal protections for
victims. In the not-too-distant past rape was regarded only as a crime against a man’s
property; it was not until the 1960s that the feminist movement helped to achieve
significant reforms in American rape law.
Htun & Weldon (2012) suggest that VAW is rarely raised as a priority among
social justice and human rights organizations without pressure from feminists. They
remind us that many human rights groups did not even recognize rape as a violation of
women’s rights until pressured by feminists in the 1990s to do so. VAW advocates face
many obstacles, however, because their efforts challenge male privilege and male
domination (Elman 1996). In fact, efforts to address violence against women represent a
direct threat to established gender roles in most places (Gelb & Palley 1996).
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Policy scholars (Kingdon 1984; Heikkila & Gerlak 2013) understand that social
movements play a primary role in getting new issues onto legislative agendas. Feminist
movements in particular work tirelessly to foment broad support for policies to address
violence against women, but to address these problems requires direct challenges to
historical social and legal norms that perpetuate women’s vulnerability (Rochon &
Mazmanian 1993). From a policy standpoint legal reforms, counseling and shelter,
training for first responders and judges, and public education are all important tools to
address VAW (Htun & Weldon 2012, 550).
The authors argue that feminist mobilization – more so than progressive parties,
women in government, or other political and economic arrangements – explains variation
in the development of policies to address violence against women internationally.
Additional research suggests that interest organizations and social movements play a
pivotal role in terms of democratic responsiveness, which enhances the impact of public
opinion. In a sweeping review on the topic, Burstein found that the “impact of opinion on
policy is most likely to be statistically significant when more than one organization is
taken into account…less when only one organization is included…and least likely when
no organizations are included in the movement (2003, 35). The transnational movement
fighting violence against women, spearheaded by feminist activists, has successfully
mobilized to promote several international agreements. Their continued success,
however, will require the sustained support of the broader public in general, and law
makers in particular.
Decreasing violence requires the efforts of transnational organizations demanding
reforms from the outside and working to change negative perceptions of victims. That is,
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legal reforms alone will be insufficient without parallel changes in attitudes due to the
role that police play in arresting, district attorneys in charging, and judges and jurors in
determining guilt and sentencing. Combating “rape culture” requires targeted efforts to
break down stereotypes and educate citizens. As Htun and Weldon point out, “In places
with less active feminist movements (such as Kuwait), as many women as men support
‘rape myths’, that is, commonly believed falsehoods about sexual assault” (2012, 553). A
strong women’s movement can capture the attention and support of the general public
and convince politicians to place institutional reforms on legislative agendas. This is true
worldwide; in their exhaustive analysis of social movements spanning 70 countries over
four decades, the authors discovered that feminist mobilization had the greatest impact on
the development of programs to address VAW (2012). Yet, all of these programs require
substantial funding, and lawmakers often lack the political will to address social issues
without broad support from the public.
4.3

Political Science and VAW Policy Implications
Mayhew recognized politicians as “single-minded seekers of re-election” who pay

close attention to the preferences of their constituents (1974). This helps explain why
congruence between shifts in public opinion and subsequent public policy adoptions are
common, especially when opinion on salient issues is stable (Page & Shapiro 1983;
Burstein 2003). Responsiveness to public opinion on specific legislation can be more
difficult, however, because it is hard for legislators to predict how the public will view
specific narrow bills. Instead, politicians will focus on the liberal versus conservative
“mood” of their constituents as most issues can be situated on this single dimension
(Poole & Rosenthal 1997; Peterson et al. 2003; Nicholas-Crotty et al. 2009). However,
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other research suggests that public opinion on some issues of politics and policy does not
fit so neatly on a single dimension (Stimson 1999), and that citizens are capable of finer
distinctions, beyond the ideological, when evaluating policies (Jacobs & Shapiro 2000).
For instance, some scholars argue that public opinion toward punitive criminal
justice policies is stable and reluctant to change (Mooney & Lee 1999; 2000; Stimson
2004). As Nicholson-Crotty et al. put it, “Because criminal justice policy is an area where
the public exhibits stable and genuine opinions and are likely to use these considerations
on election day, policy-makers are likely to be able to sense general attitudes about crime
and punishment that are separate from broader preferences for more or less spending, and
will adjust criminal justice policy in response to shifts in these attitudes” (2009, 631).
We know that many individuals have well-developed opinions on government
spending. Jacoby (1994) examined public attitudes across a set of ten public policies and
determined that citizens support spending on a wide range of social programs. He looked
at program specific spending preferences – welfare versus non-welfare initiatives – and
found that these represent two different components of public opinion toward
government spending. In regards to welfare related programs, Jacoby determined that
“government spending attitudes are responsive to most of the same factors that affect
other political attitudes, such as party identification, ideology, etc.”; and when asked
about spending in the abstract, “most citizens seem to translate the phrase ‘government
spending’ into ‘government spending on programs that could benefit the poor, blacks,
and other disadvantaged groups” (1994, 354). As a result, there is a significant level of
public opposition to such spending. While Jacoby did not include services for crime
victims in his analysis, one might surmise that individuals who are receptive to increased
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government spending in the abstract would also support increased spending to serve
victims of violent crime specifically.
Attitudes toward government spending are important to consider because, as I
mentioned before, programs to address violence against women and assist survivors
require substantial funding, and lawmakers often lack the political will to address social
issues without public support. Morrow et al. (2004) examined Canadian spending and
found a direct link between cuts in social entitlements and threats to women who are
attempting to escape or evade sexual violence. The authors concluded that the
“dismantling of the social welfare state alongside policy changes that are affecting how
the state responds to violence against women is significantly undermining women’s
equality, their safety, and the feminist anti-violence movement” (2004, 358). Survivors of
sexual violence often depend upon social welfare benefits as they attempt to escape
violent partners and rebuild their lives; budget cuts or decreased spending on social
services erodes the capacity of women’s organizations to assist victims. Reductions in
funding for health care, education, women’s shelters, grass roots feminist organizations,
legal aid, and many other services including economic support, transportation, and
childcare assistance make it difficult for victims to break the chains of violence.
Looking at budget cuts in Britain, Towers and Walby (2012) found that
reductions in spending led to sharp declines in the number of victims that women’s
shelters were able to accommodate, a decline in police and court services, a drop in
programs available to educate perpetrators upon re-entry, and a steep reduction across a
wide range of additional government funded services to assist victims of sexual violence.
The authors warned, “There have been and continue to be significant cuts in the funds for
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VAW services and services used in relation to VAW. These cuts in service provisions are
expected to lead to increases in this violence” (2012, 40).
4.4

Anti-Violence Values, Sexual Assault, and Rape
An individual’s orientation toward violence should help shape their attitudes

toward victims – and perpetrators – of sexual violence. Specifically, I expect that
individuals who are averse to violence will sympathize more with victims, and advocate
for more resources to assist survivors and decrease the frequency of these crimes in the
United States. It is less clear, however, whether violence averse individuals would
support harsh prison sentences for convicted rapists. For instance, violence averse
individuals who for some reason doubt a victim’s claim that she was actually raped might
consider a lengthy prison term for the “falsely accused” a form of violence.
To empirically test the numerous hypotheses that I present in this chapter, I draw
upon data from four unique surveys. Anti-violence values were assessed with the
inductively specified scale presented in chapter 3 (see Table 4.4.1). Independent and
dependent variables of interest are not uniform in all cases (sample A and B included the
inferior deductive ant-violence scale) or across all survey samples, so findings are
reported where available throughout the relevant subsections herein. Sample A
administered pilot items, in online questionnaire form, to 221 students enrolled in an
introductory American Government course at the University of Kentucky. Sample B
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administered additional question items to 311 unique Mechanical Turk workers. 6 Sample
C included the seven-item anti-violence values measure which I produced using principal
component analysis to narrow the range of violence related questions in the full honor
beliefs battery to seven empirically identified items. This survey was administered to
1,049 unique Mechanical Turk workers. Finally, sample D also included the inductive
seven-item anti-violence values measure and was administered to 923 unique Mechanical
Turk workers.7
Table 4.4.1 | Survey Samples for Sexual Violence Analyses 8
DEDUCTIVE

INDUCTIVE

SURVEY

DATE

SAMPLE

TYPE

MHBS

HBS

ANTI-VIOLENCE

ANTI-VIOLENCE

Sample A

4/21/2018

N = 221

Student Pilot

O

O

P

O

Sample B

5/11/2018

N = 311

M-Turk

O

O

P

O

Sample C

10/14/2019

N = 1049

M-Turk

P

P

O

P

Sample D

2/10/2020

N = 923

M-Turk

O

O

O

P

6 Deductive Scale: “An individual should not be afraid to fight”; “People should be expected to fight for
themselves”; “You would want your child to stand up to bullies”; “A person who doesn’t ‘take any crap’
from anybody is an admirable reputation to have”; “It is a person’s responsibility to protect their family”;
“If an individual is insulted, that person’s pride is insulted”; “A person’s family should be their number one
priority”.
7 Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “It is important for a person to be tougher than other people”; A

person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp”; You would praise a person who acted
aggressively to an insult”; “Epstein did not kill himself”; “Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and
acceptable”; “It is morally wrong for a person to walk away from a fight”; “A person who doesn’t take any
crap from anybody is an admirable reputation to have”; and “Physical violence is the most admirable way
to defend yourself”.
8 Data for sample A, B, and C were collected for project entitled “How Attitudes toward Violence and Race
Influence Public Policy Preferences”; University of Kentucky IRB approval # 16-0045-P45. Data for sample D
was collected for project entitled “Violence Justifying Attitudes”; University of Kentucky IRB approval #
50335.
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The anti-violence values short-scale that I created in chapter 3 does not impose
gender expectations on respondents – it is comprised of question items directly measuring
individuals’ rejection of violence broadly. Because female respondents scored
significantly higher on this scale, compared to males in the previous chapter, I derive the
following hypothesis:
H1a: “On average, females will score higher on anti-violence values when
compared to males.”
The correlational findings and regression analyses performed in chapter three
provide other clues for how I might expect my inductively derived anti-violence values
measure to perform. However, I have not yet examined the role of those values in
shaping individual evaluations of specific acts of violence. In the current chapter,
therefore, I present and empirically test several theories to explain not only perceptions of
a victim of rape, but willingness to impose harsh punitive consequences upon her rapist.
We know that negative stigmas are commonly placed upon victims of sexual
violence, and because victims often fear that they will not be believed, many of these
crimes go unreported. Extensive research (Lonsway & Fitzgerald 1994; Temkin 2010)
suggests that rape myths, or false stereotypes about rapists and rape victims, can lead
individuals to blame a victim of sexual violence, or at least question (her) honesty.
Perhaps the most troubling of these falsehoods is the belief that women commonly or
routinely lie about rape (Hayes et al. 2013). You will recall from chapter 3 that on
average, respondents who reported a greater aversion to violence were significantly less
likely to endorse rape myths. Because violence-averse individuals are significantly less
likely to endorse prejudicial beliefs that cast doubt upon victims of sexual violence - and
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more likely to sympathize with and support such victims - I derive the following
hypotheses:
H1b: “Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely,
on average, to believe a victim’s claim that she was raped.”
H1c: “Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely,
on average, to support increased spending on policies and services, and to
advocate for victims of sexual violence.”
While I expect that violence-averse individuals will be more likely to believe a
victim’s rape claim, there will inevitably be some who question whether the rape actually
occurred. Believing the victim’s claim is possibly the most obvious reason that
individuals might recommend a lengthy prison term. Thus, the following hypothesis:
H1d: “Respondents who believe the victim will be more likely, on average, to
recommend a long prison sentence for (her) convicted rapist”
Much of my focus in this chapter is on whether individuals who condemn
violence are more likely to support public policies to assist victims and punish
perpetrators. I expect that the answer is “yes”, in many cases violence-averse individuals
will be significantly more likely to sympathize with, support, and demand justice for
victims. However, I argue that violence-justifying ideologies have the power to dampen
the effects of anti-violence sentiment. In the following pages I examine additional factors
that should attenuate the otherwise positive effects of anti-violence values. When it
comes to questions of sexual violence, two prejudicial belief systems (violence-justifying
ideologies) warrant additional discussion. Rape myths and sexism can lead people to
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excuse sexual violence and be hostile toward victims. Determination of the guilt of sexual
predators, and the sentencing for their crimes are also influenced by these stereotypical
beliefs (Satish 2016); I discuss each in more detail in the following sections.
4.5

Rape Myth Acceptance
Researchers have long studied the underlying causes of rape to better understand

its persistence in civil society (Lalumiere 2005). Negative attitudes toward victims help
perpetuate rape, and rape myths enable a perpetrator to justify his/her behavior (Buddie
and Miller 2001). These negative stereotypes and misinterpretations of victims (i.e.
blaming the victim) have serious implications. Beyond the fact that they cause harmful
psychological damage, these prejudicial attitudes can also bleed into public policy
decisions (e.g. trial outcomes and rape-related services expenditures). Social scientists
have examined the consequences predispositions using a variety of research designs
including mock trials (Field 1978; Ellison and Munro 2009; Mazella and Feingold 1994),
rape vignettes (Sundberg and Barbaree 1991; Malamuth and Check 1980), videotape and
written scenarios (Sleed et al. 2002), and newspaper reports (Seligman et al. 1977).
Across these studies there is wide consensus that on average, men are more likely
than women to blame victims of sexual assault and rape, and that victim attributes (e.g.
sexual experience, level of resistance, clothing and dress etc.) influence individuals’
perceptions of victim credibility (Ward 1988). Such attitudes are in stark contrast to the
message feminists have been working to advance for years. As Harding points out, “If the
real crime of rape is the violation of another person’s autonomy, the use of another
person’s body against their wishes, then it shouldn’t matter what the victim was wearing,
if she was drinking, how much sexual experience she’s had before, or whether she fought
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hard enough to get bruises on her knuckles and skin under her fingernails” (2015, 12).
Based on these insights I derive the following hypotheses:
H2a. “On average, males will score higher on rape myth acceptance when
compared to females.”
H2b. “Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims,
respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on
average, to believe a victim’s claim that she was raped.”
H2c. “Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims,
respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on
average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist.”
H2d. Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims,
respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.”
4.6

Gender Stereotypes and Sexism
Glick and Fiske (1996) suggest that sexist attitudes include two positively

associated components which, nevertheless, reflect opposite orientations toward women.
Both sets of sexist attitudes produce negative perceptions of victims of sexual violence.
The authors developed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) to measure hostile and
benevolent sexism. While hostile sexism needs little explanation, they describe
benevolent sexism as “a set of interrelated attitudes toward women that are sexist in terms
of viewing women stereotypically and in restricted roles, but that are subjectively
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positive in feeling tone (for the perceiver) and also tend to elicit behavior typically
characterized as pro-social (e.g. helping) or intimacy-seeking (e.g. self-disclosure)”
(491).
Chapleau et al. (2007) interviewed a sample of 420 college students to examine
the effect of ambivalent sexism on rape myth acceptance. The authors found evidence
that hostile sexism is associated with greater endorsement of rape myths, but benevolent
sexism (when operationalized as a unitary construct) had no significant effect. However,
the component of benevolent sexism focused on the belief that women are “refined”
ladies was positively and significantly associated, which seems to indicate that when
women violate this stereotype, they are perceived to be at least partially responsible for
being attacked sexually.
Another study of men and women in Turkey and Brazil (Glick et al. 2002) honed
on ambivalent sexism and attitudes about wife abuse. Again, both forms of sexism were
demonstrated to positively correlate with attitudes legitimizing violence. Once more,
benevolent sexism was unrelated to such attitudes when hostile sexism was controlled for
in the model. The authors reasoned that “the ostensible protectiveness of benevolent
sexism is contingent, failing to shield women from abuse if they are deemed to have
challenged a husband’s authority or violated conventional gender roles” (Glick et al.
2002, 292). Or as Harding puts it, “If the real crime of rape is sullying a pure woman with
the filth and sin of sex – making her ‘damaged goods’ in the eyes of other men – then of
course it matters whether she was a virgin, and what kind of situations she willingly “put
herself” in, and whether she deliberately risked further physical injury to demonstrate her
refusal” (2015, 12).
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Important to the current discussion is the idea that “ambivalence may be evident
in both an unconflicted form, in which different subtypes of women elicit either
extremely negative reactions, as well as a conflicted form, in which particular female
targets activate both hostile and benevolent motives” (Glick & Fiske 1996, 494). Thus,
survey items attempting to tap benevolent sexism may suffer because they return positive
responses for different reasons from different people: from hostile sexists because they
seem to put a woman in her place, from others because they feel genuinely supportive or
protective. In sum, research involving hostile and benevolent sexism (e.g. Sakalh 2007;
Chapleau 2007) provides consistent support for the fact that higher levels of each produce
negative attitudes toward rape victims, but numerous studies (Glick et al. 2002; Abrams
et al. 2003; Sakalh 2007; and Chapleau et al. 2007) have found that benevolent sexism is
not related to attitudes toward a victim once hostile sexism is included in the model.
Based upon these studies, I derive the following hypotheses:
H3a. “On average, males will score higher on both benevolent, and hostile sexism
when compared to females.”
H3b. “Respondents who score higher on benevolent sexism will be more likely, on
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence. However, benevolent
sexism will no longer predict that support (or advocacy) once hostile sexism is
controlled for in the model.”
H3c. “Respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.”
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H3d: “Because hostile sexists tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score
higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim’s claim
that she was raped.”
H3e. “Because hostile sexists tend to blame victims, respondents who score higher
on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison
sentence for a convicted rapist.”
H3f. “Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence
values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less
likely, on average, to believe a rape claim.”
H3g. “Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence
values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less
likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist.”
H3h. “Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence
values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less
likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to
address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.”
4.7

Victim Characteristics
Research suggests a tendency for people to believe that female victims of sexual

violence are at least partially to blame for the attack (Muehlenhard 1988; Whatley 1996).
A females clothing, character, and demeanor are examples of variables that shape some
individuals’ impulse to blame her, rather than her assailant. And despite the fact that there
is no longer a legal requirement that a female vigorously resist a male’s sexual attempts
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in order to prove that she was raped, courts continue to evaluate victim resistance when
judging two critical elements of rape – non-consent and force (Anderson 1998). In fact,
several scholars have noted the importance of, and link between victim characteristics
and juror decisions (Brownmiller 1975; Ellison et al. 2009) and found that rape trials are
especially sensitive to the influence of extra-evidential factors.
To test these hypotheses, I included a realistic experimental design for assessing
the effect of victim characteristics on rape related opinion. In some of my samples
respondents were asked whether they believed the victim’s rape claim, and in every
survey, respondents were asked to place themselves in the role of a juror and recommend
a prison sentence for a convicted rapist. Each unique survey also included items to assess
respondents’ support for government spending on services to address sexual violence and
assist victims. Participants were randomly assigned to either a control, or one of two
treatment conditions which varied the characteristics and behaviors of a rape victim prior
to, and after her attack. In the “Control” condition, very little information about the
victim or her behavior was provided. In the “Non-Precipitory” condition, respondents
heard about a “moral” victim who was portrayed as cautious, doing everything possible
not only to avoid, but to resist her assailant. Finally, those who received the “Precipitory”
condition were presented with a victim who might be viewed as overly accommodating
and minimally resistant to her assailant.
This experimental manipulation allowed me to establish the causal effect of
victim characteristics and behaviors on belief in that victim and willingness to impose a
harsh sentence upon her rapist, among other sexual violence related questions of interest.
Random assignment is often used to study the effects of issue framing and priming
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(Iyengar et al. 1984; Kinder 1998; Druckman 2004) and, in the present analysis, any
differences between the treatment groups can be directly attributed to the victim’s
characteristics and behavior, all else equal. Based on prior research assessing extraevidentiary considerations common to rape cases, I derived the following hypotheses:
H4a: “Respondents presented with the “Non-Precipitory” treatment will be more
likely, on average, to believe the victim when compared to those presented the
control.”
H4b: “Respondents presented with the “Non-Precipitory” treatment will be more
likely, on average, to recommend a longer prison sentence when compared to
those presented the control.”
H4c: “Respondents presented with the “Precipitory” treatment will be less likely,
on average, to believe the victim when compared to those presented the control.”
H4d: “Respondents presented with the “Precipitory” treatment will be less likely,
on average, to recommend a longer prison sentence when compared to those
presented the control.”
4.8

Data and Measurements
To test my hypotheses, I administered two pilot surveys. The first was an online

questionnaire to students enrolled in an introductory American Government course at the
University of Kentucky (N = 221); the second was an online questionnaire to a small
sample of Mechanical Turk workers (N = 311) which prior research (Berinsky et al.
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2012) concludes is acceptable for peer-reviewed projects. 9 Having gained valuable
insights from those pilots, I composed additional question items and fielded two novel
large sample surveys (N = 1,049; N = 923) via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. As
noted earlier, independent and dependent variables of interest are not uniform in all cases
or across all survey samples, so findings are reported where available and when
appropriate.
I controlled for the effects of variables common to most empirical analyses in the
social sciences including individuals’ age, biological sex, education, income, marital
status, and political ideology. Based on prior research, I also included several items
which should be useful in characterizing individuals and their views of rape, or that might
influence attitudes toward victims, perpetrators, and policies to address sexual violence.
Following Jacoby (2000) I included a control for attitudes toward government spending
which asked respondents to place themselves on a continuum between the following
positions: 0 “Government should provide many fewer services, reduce spending a lot”,
and 10 “Government should provide many more services, increase spending a lot”. 10
This is a crucial control variable; it is likely that some individuals who sympathize with
victims of sexual violence, nevertheless, broadly oppose increases in government
spending.

9 Berinsky et al. (2012) examined the benefits, and potential limitations of using Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk web-based platform for subject recruitment in Political Science Research. They found that the
demographic characteristics of Mechanical Turk workers are more representative than student, or other
convenience samples often used in Political Science research. When the authors used Mechanical Turk
samples to replicate previous experimental studies, they found that the average treatment effects were
very similar. In sum, the authors argue that the potential limitations to Mechanical Turk samples –
including subject attentiveness and the prevalence of repeat survey-takers – are not much of a problem in
practice.
10 The measure for government spending preferences was included in sample A, B, and D.
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In Sample D, I included a control for authoritarianism, a set of beliefs scholars
have long struggled to measure. Adorno et al. (1950) developed the original F-scale
(fascism) to measure the authoritarian personality. This scale was not always reliable in
its time and is now considered conceptually obsolete. The most popular measure today is
Altemeyer’s Right Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale (Altemeyer 1981; 1988, 1996).
However, critics argue that the RWA confounds social conservatism and
authoritarianism, and that the attitudes the scale was designed to assess are often very
similar to the dependent variables it is used to predict (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). 11
Following Hetherington et al. (2011) I used the four-item authoritarianism index
which asks respondents to indicate which of two positive traits is most important for a
child to have: “respect for elders” versus “independence”; “obedience” versus “selfreliance”; “curiosity” versus “good manners”; and “being considerate” versus “being
well-behaved”. As the authors point out, these values are “fairly well-divorced from
political ideology and attitudes; therefore, the measure is unlikely to be conflated with
social conservatism and is easily distinguishable from the dependent variables” (551).
In samples C and D respondents’ level of aversion to violence was examined
using the inductively derived anti-violence measure.12 Recall that principal component
analysis in Chapter 3 produced a 7-item attitudes toward violence factor (Eigenvalue =
1.85) which was comprised mostly of question items from what Saucier et al. (2016)

11 Only sample D includes the authoritarianism scale.
12 Sample C includes (N=526) rather than (N=1,049). This is because half of those surveyed in that batch
were randomly assigned to receive the Masculine Honor Beliefs (MHBS) scale (Saucier et al. 2016) and
were excluded. Data from the full sample are reported whenever possible.
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identified as the “virtue” and “pride” subscales of their 35-item honor beliefs battery. 13
These seven items tap either the belief that individuals should maintain a no-nonsense
reputation, or that violence is often acceptable if not required. These also happened to be
the least popular question items which suggests that most individuals do not condone
violence. Respondents reported their agreement with these statements on seven-point
scales ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”, and the scale was then
recoded so that higher scores indicated a greater aversion to violence.
Sex Differences:
Recall H1a, that “On average, females will score higher on anti-violence values
when compared to males”. An independent t-test was run on each dataset to determine if
there were differences in the endorsement of anti-violence values based upon the
respondent’s biological sex. H1a was fully supported and is visually displayed in Figure
4.8.1 below.

13 The deductively derived scale administered in sample A and B proved inferior to the inductively
derived version administered in sample C and D and is, I suspect, not really capturing attitudes toward
violence. Some question items (e.g. “It is a person’s responsibility to protect their family”; “If an individual
is insulted, that person’s pride is insulted”; “A person’s family should be their number one priority”) are
likely not related to individuals’ orientation toward violence. Results from sample A and B are omitted.
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Figure 4.8.1 | Anti-Violence Values, by Sex
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Females, on average, scored significantly higher on anti-violence values when compared
to males in sample C and D.
Respondents’ endorsement of rape myths was assessed using a truncated, 7-item
version of the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale Short Form (IRMA-SF) developed
by Payne et al. (1999). The original IRMA-SF is a 20-item questionnaire that taps
respondents’ agreement with common rape myths. The scale was designed to incorporate
issues that fall under a number of subscales (i.e. “she asked for it”, “it wasn’t really rape”,
“he didn’t mean to”, “she wanted it”, “she lied”, and “rape is a trivial event”). 14
Sex Differences
Recall H2a, that “On average, males will score higher on rape myth acceptance
when compared to females”. An independent t-test was run on each dataset to determine
if there were differences in the endorsement of rape myths based upon the respondent’s
biological sex across each of the four datasets and is visually displayed in Figure 4.8.2.

14 Truncated Rape Myth Acceptance Scale: "When it comes to sexual contacts, women expect men to

take the lead"; "A lot of women strongly complain about sexual infringements for no real reason, just to
feel emancipated"; "Interpreting harmless gestures as sexual harassment is a popular weapon in the
battle of the sexes"; "If a woman invites a man to her home for a cup of coffee after a night out, this
means that she wants to have sex"; "Any woman who is careless enough to walk alone through dark alleys
at night is at least partly to blame if she is raped"; "Many women tend to misinterpret a well-meant
gesture as a sexual assault"; and "Alcohol is often the culprit when a man rapes a woman".

91

Figure 4.8.2 | Rape Myth Acceptance
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Males, on average, scored significantly higher on rape myth acceptance when compared
to males in sample A, B, C, and D.15
Respondents’ endorsement of sexist stereotypes was assessed using the
Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) developed by Glick and Fiske (1996). The ASI is a
22-item questionnaire which asks respondents to agree or disagree, on a seven-point scale
ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” with sexist attitudes toward
women.16 These question items were used to create two distinct 11-item scales
measuring hostile and benevolent sexism respectfully.

Sex Differences
Recall H3a, that “On average, males will score higher on both benevolent, and
hostile sexism when compared to females.”. An independent t-test was run on each
dataset to determine if there were differences in the scores on either benevolent, or hostile
sexism based upon the respondent’s biological sex. 17 H3a was supported across each of

15 Rape Myth Acceptance
Sample A: (t = 7.38, with 219 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample B: (t = 3.34, with 317 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample C: (t = 6.45, with 921 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample D: (t = 6.47, with 921 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
16 Sample “A” and Sample “B” included a nine-point scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly
Agree”.
17 Benevolent Sexism
Sample A: (t = 2.98, with 219 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample B: (t = 2.03, with 309 degrees of freedom, p < .05)
Sample C: (t = 5.36, with 1047 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample D: (t = 5.15, with 921 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
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the four datasets for both forms of sexism and is visually displayed in the Figures 4.8.3
and 4.8.4 below.

Hostile Sexism
Sample A: (t = 7.39, with 219 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample B: (t = 3.07, with 309 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample C: (t = 7.52, with 1047 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample D: (t = 8.32, with 921 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
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Figure 4.8.3 | Benevolent Sexism
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Figure 4.8.3 | Benevolent Sexism (Continued)
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Figure 4.8.4 | Hostile Sexism
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Figure 4.8.4 | Hostile Sexism (Continued)

4.9

Dependent Variables
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If you recall, respondents were randomly assigned to either a baseline condition
with very little information about the victim, or one of two treatment conditions varying
victim characteristics and behavior. Each of these rape case treatments is included in
“Appendix A”, with altered language in bold italics.
I then asked respondents about a range of sexual violence-related topics of
interest. The first two items measured the effect of a victim’s characteristics and behavior
on respondents’ evaluations in their role as a juror in a rape trial, including whether they
believe the rape occurred, and the number of years in prison they believe the convicted
rapist should serve (5-50).18 Respondents were also asked whether they would support
increases in government spending for services and policies to assist victims of sexual
violence – and whether they would donate materials or volunteer personal time to
advocate for victims.19
4.10

Empirical Results – Belief in a Victim’s Rape Claim
Drawing on data from survey sample C (N = 1,049) I conducted a one-way

between subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondent’s
belief that the reported rape actually occurred. There was a significant effect of
characteristics on belief at the p < 0.05 level for the three experimental conditions [F (2,
1,047) = 105.67, p = 0.00].

18 Sample C and D included the item measuring respondents’ belief that the rape occurred, while sample
A, B, C, and D each included the item asking how many years in prison respondents would impose at
sentencing.
19 Sample B, C, and D included items measuring support for increased government funding. Sample C and
D included additional items measuring willingness to actively advocate for or donate resources to victims.
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Because I found a statistically significant result , I computed a Tukey post hoc test
to compare each of my conditions against every other condition. 20 Post hoc comparisons
indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M = 6.2, SD = 1.1) and baseline (M
= 5.2, SD = 1.4) groups differed significantly at p < .05; the mean score for the
precipitory (M = 4.7, SD = 1.7) and baseline groups differed significantly at p < .05, and
the difference in means for the precipitory and non-precipitory groups also achieved
statistical significance at p < .05. This provides support for H4a. “Respondents presented
with the “Non-Precipitory” treatment will be more likely, on average, to believe the
victim when compared to those presented the control.” (Table 4.10.1).
Table 4.10.1 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions
Belief in Victim
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares
428.76
2122.11
2550.86

DF
2.00
1047.00
1049.00

Mean Square
214.38
2.03
2.43

N
322
341
386
1049

Mean
5.20
6.20
4.70
5.30

SD
1.37
1.09
1.69
1.56

F
105.67

Prob > F
0.00

Group Means
Baseline
Non-Precipitory
Precipitory
Total
Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)

Differences in Means
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline
Precipitory v. Baseline
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory

Contrast
0.97
-0.56
-1.53

Std. Err.
0.11
0.11
0.11

ᵼ

p > |ᵼ|

8.79
-5.17
-14.44

0.00
0.00
0.00

Lower
0.73
-0.81
-1.78

Upper
1.23
-0.30
-1.28

Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)

20 The Tukey's honestly significant difference test (Tukey's HSD) is used to test differences among sample
means for significance. The Tukey's HSD tests all pairwise differences while controlling the probability of
making one or more Type I errors.
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Turning to data from survey sample D (N = 923) I conducted a one-way between
subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondent’s belief
that the reported rape actually occurred. There was a significant effect of characteristics
on belief at the p < 0.05 level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 921) = 139.78,
p = 0.00].
Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M =
6.3, SD = 1.2) and baseline (M = 5.1, SD = 1.5) groups differed significantly at p < .05;
the mean score for the precipitory (M = 4.3, SD = 1.7) and baseline groups differed
significantly at p < .05, and the difference in means for the precipitory and nonprecipitory groups also achieved statistical significance at p < .05. This provides
additional support for H4a. “Respondents presented with the “Non-Precipitory” treatment
will be more likely, on average, to believe the victim when compared to those presented
the control.” (Table 4.10.2).
Table 4.10.2 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions
Belief in Victim
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares
590.04
1941.84
2531.88

DF
2.00
921.00
923.00

Mean Square
295.02
2.11
2.75

N
313
322
288
923

Mean
5.10
6.29
4.34
5.28

SD
1.47
1.16
1.70
1.66

F
139.78

Prob > F
0.00

Group Means
Baseline
Non-Precipitory
Precipitory
Total
Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)

Differences in Means
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline
Precipitory v. Baseline
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory

Contrast
1.19
-0.76
-1.95

Std. Err.
0.12
0.12
0.12

Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)
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ᵼ
10.29
-6.39
-16.51

p > |ᵼ|
0.00
0.00
0.00

Lower
0.92
-1.04
-2.22

Upper
1.46
-0.48
-1.67

Next, I included a control for the respondents’ biological sex. In survey sample C,
females were significantly more likely to believe the victim’s rape claim in the “Control”
condition (F = 3.82, p = 0.05); and the “Non-Precipitory” treatment (F = 22.71, p =
0.00); but only slightly significantly more likely than males to believe the victim’s rape
claim when given the “Precipitory” treatment (F = 3.26, p = 0.07).21 Taken together,
females were more likely, on average, to take a non-descript victim of rape, or a victim
who came across as someone who did nothing to contribute to her attack at her word.
However, females were only slightly significantly different than males in their
assessment of a victim who appeared “careless” or somehow “complacent” in her own
attack.
In survey sample D, females were significantly more likely to believe the victim’s
rape claim in the “Control” condition (F = 6.45, p = 0.01), the “Non-Precipitory”
condition (F = 17.55, p = 0.00), and the “Precipitory” condition (F = 7.87, p = 0.00). In
sum, females were significantly more likely, on average, to accept a rape claim–
regardless of the victim’s characteristics or behavior – when compared to males. In both
survey samples H4a “Respondents presented with the “Non-Precipitory” treatment will
be more likely, on average, to believe the victim when compared to those presented the
control” was supported. Comparisons of means, by biological sex are presented in Figure
4.10.1below.

21 If respondents do not believe the victim, it’s not a result of how she behaved prior to the attack, but
whether they think it really was an attack. Presumably they’re using precipitory behaviors to help them
infer whether she might have had a consensual interest that’s only afterward being ignored to pretend
what happened was an attack. The effect size was bigger than for the control – fewer in the category may
have caused the significance to be less.
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Figure 4.10.1 | Belief in a Rape Victim

103

Multiple-Regression Models
In the previous analysis I was able to demonstrate that, on average, individuals
base much of their belief in victims of sexual violence on the victim’s personal
characteristics and behavior both before and after the rape transpires. When a victim
conforms to traditional gender expectations (e.g. does not live with a romantic partner out
of wedlock), when it is clear that she was cautious not to put herself in danger (e.g. does
not allow a stranger into her home to use the telephone), when there is evidence that she
fought fiercely to prevent being violated (e.g. physical evidence of a struggle), and when
she reports the incident to law enforcement immediately, both males and females are
more likely to believe the victim’s claim that she was raped. On the other hand, when a
victim does not conform to traditional gender expectations when it appears that she put
herself at unnecessary risk of danger, when there is no physical evidence that she put up
fierce resistance, and when she does not report the incident to law enforcement
immediately both males and females are less likely to believe that the victim was actually
raped.
Thus far I have examined differences in individuals’ belief in a victim based upon
her characteristics and behavior – controlling for respondents’ biological sex – but absent
any additional covariates. I now turn to testing the additional hypotheses presented
throughout this chapter. Specifically, H2b: “Because individuals who endorse rape myths
tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will
be less likely, on average, to believe a victim’s claim that she was raped”; and H3d:
“Because hostile sexists tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on

104

hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim’s claim that she was
raped.”
My overarching argument throughout this project is that violence-justifying
ideologies (primarily sexism in the current analysis) should cancel out the normatively
positive outcomes that individuals’ aversion to violence might otherwise produce.
Assessing the attitudes that help determine individuals’ belief in a rape victim provides
the first opportunity to empirically test my theory. Specifically, H3 f: “Hostile sexism will
attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse
individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to believe a
rape claim.” Sample C and D included the question item assessing respondents’ belief in
the victim’s claim that she was raped.

Mechanical Turk Sample C
In order to test my hypotheses, I estimated six models. My key independent
variables are the 7-item anti-violence values battery and the 11-item measure of hostile
sexism. To assess the effect of negative stereotypes about women on the predictive power
of individuals’ aversion to violence, I included an interaction term between hostile
sexism and anti-violence values. I expect hostile sexism to produce negative signs: the
more sexist a respondent is, the less likely they will be to believe the victim. Antiviolence values should produce positive signs: the more a respondent abhors violence, the
more likely they will be to believe the victim. My key hypothesis, however, is that
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interacting these variables will have an attenuating effect; as sexism increases, the
normatively positive force of anti-violence values will diminish.
I also included numerous control variables including victim characteristics
(Control/Non-Precipitory/Precipitory), age, education, income, biological sex, marital
status, political ideology (conservatism), and rape myth acceptance. I used multiple
regression to estimate relationships in each of these models, and the results are reported
below in Table 4.10.3.
In the fully specified model (Model 6) we see that victim characteristics and
behavior continue to have a strong impact on whether respondents believe the victim’s
rape claim. Those given the “Non-Precipitory” treatment were significantly more likely
(+0.99) than those in the “Control” condition to accept the rape claim, all else equal.
Respondents given the “Precipitory” treatment were significantly less likely (-0.53) than
those in the “Control” condition to believe the victim, all else equal. Respondents
reporting higher levels of education were also significantly more likely to believe the
victim. For every one unit increase in education respondents scored higher (+0.14) on
belief, all else equal. Females were significantly more likely to believe the victim (+0.40)
when compared to men, all else equal.
Model 6 provides support for H1b: “Individuals who score higher on anti-violence
values will be more likely, on average, to believe a victim’s claim that she was raped”.
For every one unit increase in anti-violence values respondents were, on average, more
likely to believe the victim (+0.34), all else equal. The model does not provide support
for H2b: Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims,
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respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to
believe a victim’s claim that she was raped.
The relationship does go in the expected direction; for every one unit increase in
rape-myth acceptance respondents were, on average, less likely to believe the victim (.13), but the coefficient did not achieve significance. 22 I found this particular result
highly counterintuitive; if rape myths do not independently predict belief in a rape claim,
what does? It looks as though these two things do: hostile sexism and anti-violence
values. I suspect that hostility to women prevents respondents from developing the
sympathy toward a potential rape victim that anti-violence values normally generate, such
that it works only among respondents who score low on hostile sexism.
As expected, H3d: “Because hostile sexists tend to blame/doubt victims,
respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to believe
a victim’s claim that she was raped” was supported. For every one unit increase in
hostile sexism respondents were, on average, significantly less likely to believe the victim
(-.13) all else equal.
My key hypothesis was fully supported, H3f. “Hostile sexism will attenuate the
normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are
hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to believe a rape claim.” The

22 This non-finding may be a result of my using a 7-item truncated version of the original 20-item rape
myth battery.
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estimates of the anti-violence slope decrease as function of hostile sexism. 23 For
example, at the lowest level of hostile sexism the anti-violence values slope is at (+0.24),
and at the highest level of hostile sexism the anti-violence values slope is at (-0.38), a
decrease of (-0.62). For every one unit increase in hostile sexism, the anti-violence values
slope decreases by (-0.10). What we are likely seeing here is that the power of hostile
sexism is greatest in the case when the respondent is on the high end of anti-violence
values; not only do we have the general ill effect of hostility to women, the potential
victim also loses the sympathy that otherwise accompanies anti-violence values. Perhaps
this is because respondents are focused on the bad (violent) things that will happen to the
accused if wrongly convicted. That said, the interpretation of interactive effects can be
challenging. To visually display the impact of this interaction term I created a graph of
the adjusted means placing hostile sexism on the x-axis with separate graphs for “low”,
“medium”, and “high” levels of anti-violence values (See Figure 4.10.2).

23 I tested to see whether the interaction was significant across all three of my experimental treatment
conditions. In the baseline group, the interaction term was statistically significant at p < 0.10, and the
coefficient was in the expected direction (-0.12). In the non-precipitory group, the interaction term did
not achieve statistical significance. Finally, in the precipitory group, the interaction term was significant at
p < 0.10, and the coefficient was in the expected direction (-0.13).
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Table 4.10.3 | Explaining Belief in a Victim’s Rape Claim - Survey C (N=526)

Victim Condition
Non-Precipitory
Precipitory
Age
Education
Income

95
109

Female
Married
Conservatism
Anti-Violence

MODEL 1

MODEL 2

0.985
(0.107)
-0.571
(0.104)
0.007
(0.003)
0.059
(0.035)
0.018
(0.016)
0.355
(0.087)
-0.169
(0.094)
-0.178
(0.026)

1
(0.155)
-0.541
(0.144)
0.004
(0.005)
0.183
(0.050)
0.035
(0.023)
0.487
(0.129)
-0.083
(0.132)
-0.131
(0.037)
0.107
(0.060)

***
***
**
*

***
*
***

MODEL 3

***
***

***

***

***
*

Benevolent Sexism

0.997
(0.155)
-0.541
(0.144)
0.004
(0.005)
0.176
(0.050)
0.033
(0.023)
0.479
(0.129)
-0.173
(0.132)
-0.118
(0.038)
0.074
(0.064)
-0.074
(0.053)

Hostile Sexism

***
***

***

***

***

MODEL 4
0.991
(0.151)
-0.530
(0.141)
0.004
(0.005)
0.137
(0.050)
0.036
(0.023)
0.38
(0.128)
-0.146
(0.130)
-0.062
(0.039)
-0.034
(0.068)
-0.042
(0.052)
-0.256
(0.057)

Rape Myth

***
***

***

***

***

MODEL 5
0.993
(0.152)
-0.530
(0.141)
0.005
(0.005)
0.143
(0.050)
0.034
(0.023)
0.373
(0.128)
-0.148
(0.130)
-0.060
(0.039)
-0.051
(0.069)
-0.026
(0.053)
-0.191
(0.072)
-0.123
(0.084)

MODEL 6
***
***

***

***

***

Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence
2

Adj. R
0.23
0.23
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

0.23

0.26

0.26

Mechanical Turk Sample C (N = 526)

0.987
(0.135)
-0.528
(0.147)
0.004
(0.005)
0.142
(0.053)
0.034
(0.023)
0.404
(0.135)
-0.163
(0.132)
-0.048
(0.045)
0.345
(0.179)
-0.004
(0.057)
-0.486
(0.146)
-0.134
(0.091)
-0.103
(0.044)
0.29

***
***

***

***

*

***

***

Figure 4.10.2 | Predictive Margins Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence - Survey C

I also tested to see whether the interaction was significant across all three of my
experimental treatment conditions. In the baseline group, the interaction term was
statistically significant at p < 0.10, and the coefficient was in the expected direction (0.12). In the non-precipitory group, the interaction term did not achieve statistical
significance. Finally, in the precipitory group, the interaction term was significant at p <
0.10, and the coefficient was in the expected direction (-0.13) (Figure 4.10.3 – 4.10.5).
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Figure 4.10.3 | Predictive Margins for Control Group

Figure 4.10.4 | Predictive Margins for Non-Precipitory Condition
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Figure 4.10.5 | Predictive Margins for Precipitory Condition

Mechanical Turk Survey Sample D
In survey Sample D, authoritarianism was added as a control variable. I
performed multiple regression analysis to estimate relationships in each of my models,
and the results are reported below in Table 4.10.4.
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Table 4.10.4 | Explaining Belief in a Victim’s Rape Claim - Survey D (N=923)

Victim Condition
Non-Precipitory
Precipitory
Age
Education
Income
Female

95
113

Married
Conservatism
Authoritarianism

MODEL 1

MODEL 2

1.207
(0.112)
-0.749
(0.115)
0.004
(0.004)
0.091
(0.038)
0.001
(0.017)
0.484
(0.096)
-0.088
(0.101)
-0.054
(0.009)

1.217
(0.114)
-0.764
(0.114)
0.004
(0.004)
0.076
(0.038)
0.002
(0.016)
0.482
(0.095)
-0.082
(0.101)
-0.039
(0.010)
-0.548
(0.141)

***
***

***

***

***

***
***

**

***

***
***

Anti-Violence

MODEL 3
1.219
(0.110)
-0.789
(0.114)
0.003
(0.004)
0.083
(0.038)
0.001
(0.016)
0.411
(0.096)
-0.078
(0.110)
-0.033
(0.010)
-0.463
(0.142)
0.174
(0.047)

Benevolent Sexism
Hostile Sexism

***
***

**

***

***
***
***

MODEL 4
1.219
(0.110)
-0.789
(0.114)
0.003
(0.004)
0.083
(0.038)
0.001
(0.016)
0.411
(0.096)
-0.078
(0.110)
-0.033
(0.011)
-0.462
(0.150)
0.174
(0.049)
-0.002
(0.050)

***
***

**

***

***
***
***

MODEL 5
1.206
(0.108)
-0.833
(0.111)
0.004
(0.016)
0.051
(0.037)
0.004
(0.016)
0.272
(0.097)
-0.053
(0.098)
-0.004
(0.111)
-0.336
(0.147)
0.042
(0.052)
-0.022
(0.048)
-0.325
(0.048)

MODEL 6
***
***

***

***

***

Rape Myth

1.184
(0.108)
-0.835
(0.111)
0.004
(0.003)
0.054
(0.037)
0.002
(0.016)
0.261
(0.111)
-0.059
(0.097)
-0.004
(0.111)
-0.328
(0.147)
0.006
(0.054)
0.037
(0.048)
-0.228
(0.063)
-0.161
(0.067)

Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence
Adj. R2
0.28
0.29
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

0.3

0.3
0.33
Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)

0.34

MODEL 7
***
***

***

***

***
***

1.19
(0.100)
-0.824
(0.118)
0.004
(0.004)
0.052
(0.039)
0.003
(0.015)
0.276
(0.100)
-0.064
(0.098)
-0.004
(0.111)
-0.331
(0.153)
0.34
(0.137)
0.061
(0.050)
-0.455
(0.109)
-0.177
(0.075)
-0.089
(0.035)
0.35

***
***

***

**
**

***
**
***

In the fully specified model (Model 7) we see that victim characteristics and
behavior have a strong impact on whether respondents will believe the victim’s rape
claim. Those given the “Non-Precipitory” treatment were, on average, significantly more
likely (+1.19) than those in the “Control” condition to believe the victim, all else equal.
Respondents given the “Precipitory” treatment were significantly less likely (-0.82) than
those in the “Control” condition to believe the victim, all else equal. This time around,
respondents reporting higher levels of education were no more likely to believe the
victim. Females were significantly more likely to believe the victim (+0.28), on average,
when compared to men. Finally, respondents who scored higher on authoritarianism were
significantly less likely (-0.33) to believe the victim, all else equal.
Model 7 provides additional support for H1b: “Respondents who score higher on
anti-violence values will be more likely, on average, to believe a victim’s claim that she
was raped.” For every one unit increase in anti-violence values respondents were, on
average, more likely to believe the victim (+0.34), all else equal. The model also provides
support for H2b: “Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt
victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on
average, to believe a victim’s claim that she was raped.” For every one unit increase in
rape myth acceptance respondents were, on average, less likely to believe the victim (0.08). H3e: “Because hostile sexists tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score
higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim’s claim that
she was raped” was supported. For every one unit increase in hostile sexism respondents
were significantly less likely to believe the victim (-.46) all else equal. Finally, my key
hypothesis was fully supported, H3f. “Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively
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positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile
toward females will be less likely, on average, to believe a rape claim.”
The estimates of the anti-violence slope decrease as a function of hostile sexism.
For example, at the lowest level of hostile sexism the anti-violence slope is at (+0.25),
and at the highest level the slope is at (-0.28), a decrease of (-0.53). For every one unit
increase in hostile sexism, the anti-violence slope decreases by (-0.09). To visually
display the impact of this interaction term I created a graph of the adjusted means placing
hostile sexism on the x-axis with separate graphs for “low”, “medium”, and “high” levels
of anti-violence (See Figure 4.10.6).
Figure 4.10.6 | Predictive Margins Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence - Survey D

I also tested to see whether the interaction was significant across each of my
experimental treatment conditions. In the baseline group, the interaction term was
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statistically significant at p < 0.05, and the coefficient was in the expected direction (0.14). In the non-precipitory group, and the precipitory group, the interaction term
coefficient did not achieve statistical significance (See Figure 4.10.7 – 4.10.9).
Figure 4.10.7 | Predictive Margins for Control Group

Figure 4.10.8 | Predictive Margins for Non-Precipitory Condition
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Figure 4.10.9 | Predictive Margins for Precipitory Condition

In this section, I found strong support for my theory that violence-justifying
ideologies (hostile sexism specifically) have the power to cancel out the normatively
positive outcomes that individuals’ aversion of violence would otherwise produce. To
assess the effect of negative stereotypes about women on the predictive power of
individuals’ aversion to violence, I included an interaction term between hostile sexism
and anti-violence values. In samples C and D, as expected, hostile sexism produced
negative coefficients: the more sexist a respondent was, the less likely they were to
believe the victim. Anti-violence values also performed as expected; they produced
positive signs: the more violence averse an individual is, the more likely they were to
believe the victim. Most importantly, my key hypothesis – which speaks to my
underlying theory of violence – was that interacting these variables would produce a

117

negative sign: as sexism increased, the normatively positive force of anti-violence values
diminished.

4.11

Empirical Results – Prison Sentence for a Convicted Rapist
Drawing on data from survey sample A (N = 221) I conducted a one-way between

subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondents’
recommended prison sentence for her rapist. There was a significant effect of
characteristics on belief at the p < 0.05 level for the three experimental conditions [F (2,
219) = 11.52, p = 0.00].
Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M =
22.5, SD = 12.9) and baseline (M = 15.7, SD = 11.5) groups differed significantly at p <
.05. The mean score for the precipitory (M = 14.2, SD = 8.8) and baseline groups,
however, were not significantly different. Finally, the difference in means for the
precipitory and non-precipitory groups was statistically significant at p < .05.
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Table 4.11.1 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions
Recommended Prison Time
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares
2796.43
26461.69
29258.12

DF
2.00
219.00
221.00

Mean Square
1398.21
121.38
132.94

N
71
66
84
221

Mean
15.69
22.54
14.21
17.18

SD
11.45
12.96
8.75
11.53

F
11.52

Prob > F
0.00

Group Means
Baseline
Non-Precipitory
Precipitory
Total
Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=221)

Differences in Means
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline
Precipitory v. Baseline
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory

Contrast
6.86
-1.48
-8.33

Std. Err.
1.88
1.78
1.81

ᵼ
3.64
-0.83
-4.60

p > |ᵼ|
0.00
0.68
0.00

Lower
2.41
-5.67
-12.61

Upper
11.30
2.72
-4.05

Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=221)

Turning to data from survey sample B (N = 312) I conducted a one-way between
subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondents’
recommended prison sentence for her rapist. There was a significant effect of
characteristics on belief at the p < 0.05 level for the three experimental conditions [F (2,
309) = 11.06, p = 0.00].
Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M =
24.3, SD = 13.9) and baseline (M = 19.6, SD = 13.6) groups differed significantly at p <
.05. The mean score for the precipitory (M = 15.8, SD = 10.9) and baseline groups,
however, were not significantly different. Finally, the difference in means for the
precipitory and non-precipitory groups was statistically significant at p < .05.
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Table 4.11.2 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions
Recommended Prison Time
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares
3676.21
51336.26
55012.46

DF
2.00
309.00
311.00

Mean Square
1838.10
166.14
176.89

N
106
101
105
312

Mean
19.56
24.27
15.81
19.81

SD
13.56
13.99
10.94
13.30

F
11.06

Prob > F
0.00

Group Means
Baseline
Non-Precipitory
Precipitory
Total
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=312)

Differences in Means
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline
Precipitory v. Baseline
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory

Contrast
4.71
-3.75
-8.46

Std. Err.
1.79
1.77
1.80

ᵼ
2.63
-2.12
-4.70

p > |ᵼ|
0.02
0.09
0.00

Lower
0.48
-7.92
-12.71

Upper
8.93
0.42
-4.22

Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=312)

For survey sample C (N = 1,049) I conducted a one-way between subjects
ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondents’ recommended
prison sentence for her rapist. There was a significant effect of characteristics on belief at
the p < 0.05 level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 1,047) = 25.06, p = 0.00].
Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M =
20.6, SD = 13.4) and baseline (M = 15.6, SD = 11.7) groups differed significantly at p <
.05. The mean score for the precipitory (M = 14.3, SD = 12.5) and baseline groups did not
differ significantly, but the difference in means for the precipitory and non-precipitory
groups was statistically significant at p < .05.
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Table 4.11.3 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions
Recommended Prison Time
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares
7882.62
164525.40
172408.02

DF
2.00
1047.00
1049.00

Mean Square
3941.31
157.29
164.51

N
322
341
386
1049

Mean
15.64
20.61
14.25
16.74

SD
11.67
13.39
12.47
12.83

F
25.06

Prob > F
0.00

Group Means
Baseline
Non-Precipitory
Precipitory
Total
Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)

Differences in Means
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline
Precipitory v. Baseline
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory

Contrast
4.96
-1.39
-6.36

Std. Err.
0.97
0.95
0.93

ᵼ
5.09
-1.47
-6.82

p > |ᵼ|
0.00
0.30
0.00

Lower
2.68
-3.62
-8.55

Upper
7.25
0.83
-4.17

Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)

Finally, turning to data from survey sample D (N = 923) I conducted a one-way
between subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondents’
recommended prison sentence for her rapist. There was a significant effect of
characteristics on belief at the p < 0.05 level for the three experimental conditions [F (2,
921) = 63.23, p = 0.00].
Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M =
24.1, SD = 14.0) and baseline (M = 16.2, SD = 13.2) groups differed significantly at p <
.05; the mean score for the precipitory (M = 12.8, SD = 10.8) and baseline groups
differed significantly at p < .05, and the difference in means for the precipitory and nonprecipitory groups also achieved statistical significance at p < .05.
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Table 4.11.4 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions
Recommended Prison Time
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares
20671.01
150390.33
171061.34

DF
2.00
921.00
923.00

Mean Square
10335.51
163.47
185.53

N
313
322
288
923

Mean
16.17
24.06
12.78
17.87

SD
13.18
13.98
10.79
13.62

F
63.23

Prob > F
0.00

Group Means
Baseline
Non-Precipitory
Precipitory
Total
Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)

Differences in Means
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline
Precipitory v. Baseline
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory

Contrast
7.88
-3.39
-11.27

Std. Err.
1.01
1.04
1.04

ᵼ
7.77
-3.25
-10.87

p > |ᵼ|
0.00
0.00
0.00

Lower
5.50
-5.84
-13.71

Upper
10.27
-0.94
-8.84

Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)

Next, I examined differences based on the respondents’ biological sex. In survey
sample A, females were significantly no different than males in proposed sentence length
in the “Control” condition (F = 3.51, p = 0.07); but did propose significantly more years
imprisonment in the “Non-Precipitory” group (F = 12.90, p = 0.00); yet were
significantly no different from males in terms of proposed sentence in the “Precipitory”
group (F = 0.00, p = 0.98). In sum, females were more likely, on average, to propose a
longer sentence when the victim was cautious, when she resisted her assailant, and when
she immediately reported the assault to law enforcement, compared to men. However,
females did not propose significantly longer sentences when the victim was non-descript,
or when the victim could be seen as “careless” or somehow “complacent” in her attack.
In survey sample B, females were significantly no different than males in
recommended sentence length in the “Control” condition (F = 2.85, p = 0.09); the “Non-
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Precipitory” group (F = 1.34, p = 0.25); or the “Precipitory” group (F = 1.17, p = 0.19).
Overall, females were no more likely, on average, to propose a longer sentence when
faced with a non-descript victim, a cautious victim, or a victim that some might view as
“careless” or somehow “complacent” in her attack, compared to men.
In survey sample C, females were significantly no different than males in
proposed sentence length in the “Control” condition (F = 0.13, p = 0.72); the “NonPrecipitory” group (F = 1.98, p = 0.16); or the “Precipitory” group (F = 0.02, p = 0.90).
Once more, females were no more likely, on average, to propose a longer sentence,
regardless of victim type, compared to men.
Finally, in survey sample D, females were significantly more likely than males to
propose longer sentences in the “Control” condition (F = 6.45, p = 0.01); the “NonPrecipitory” group (F = 17.55, p = 0.00); and in the “Precipitory” group (F = 7.87, p =
0.00). This time around, females were more likely, on average, to propose a longer
sentence regardless of victim characteristics and behavior.
H4b: “Respondents presented with the “Non-Precipitory” treatment will be more
likely, on average, to recommend a longer prison sentence when compared to those
presented the control” was supported; respondents in the “Non-Precipitory” group
recommended significantly longer prison sentences when compared to those in the
“Control” group, and this was true for every sample. H4d: “Respondents presented with
the “Precipitory” treatment will be less likely, on average, to recommend a longer prison
sentence when compared to those presented the control” was only partially supported;
respondents in the “Precipitory” group consistently recommended a significantly shorter
prison sentence compared to those in “Non-Precipitory” group, but this was not always
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the case compared to those in the “Control” group as I hypothesized. The big news here
appears to be that what really separates males from females is not how they treat the
“honorable” versus “unethical” victim. It’s that males are not willing to be as harsh
against the convicted rapist – regardless of her characteristics and behavior. Overall
results by biological sex are presented visually in Figure 4.11.1.
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Figure 4.11.1 | Proposed Prison Sentence for a Convicted Rapist

95
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Multiple-Regression Models
In the previous section, I demonstrated that a victim’s personal characteristics and
behavior have a significant impact on whether others believe the rape occurred. In the
current section, I extended the analysis and found that these factors also significantly
impact recommended prison sentences. When a victim conforms to traditional gender
expectations, is cautious not to put herself in danger, fights fiercely to prevent being
violated, and then reports the incident to law enforcement promptly both males and
females recommend significantly longer prison sentences for her rapist. On the other
hand, when a victim does not conform to traditional gender expectations, is perceived to
put herself at unnecessary risk of danger, fails to resist, and does not report the incident to
law enforcement promptly both males and females recommend significantly shorter
prison sentences. This alarming finding was true across each of the four survey samples
reported in my analysis. When it comes to sentencing a convicted rapist, individuals are
placed in an uncomfortable position. If they doubt that the rape occurred, they may focus
on the consequences the accused will suffer if wrongly convicted. On the other hand, if
they believe the victim, they may focus instead on punishing her perpetrator. I now test
the additional hypotheses presented in this chapter. Specifically, H1 d: “Respondents who
believe the victim will be more likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence
for (her) convicted rapist””; H2c: “Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to
blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less
likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist.”; and
H3e: “Because hostile sexists tend to blame victims, respondents who score higher on
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hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a
convicted rapist.”
My overarching argument is that violence-justifying ideologies (sexism in the
current analysis) will cancel out the normatively positive outcomes that individuals’
aversion to violence might otherwise produce. Assessing the attitudes that help determine
the length of prison sentence a juror might impose upon a convicted rapist provides my
second opportunity to empirically test this theory. Specifically, H3 g: “Hostile sexism will
attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse
individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to recommend
a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist.”
In order to test these hypotheses, I specified a full model for survey sample C and
D.24 My key independent variables are the 7-item anti-violence values battery and the
11-item measure of hostile sexism. To assess the effect of negative stereotypes about
women on the predictive power of individuals’ aversion to violence, I included an
interaction term between hostile sexism and anti-violence values. My key hypothesis is
that interacting these variables will produce a negative sign: as sexism increases, antiviolence values normatively positive force will diminish.
Once more, I incorporated numerous control variables including victim
characteristics (non-precipitory/precipitory), age, education, income, biological sex,
marital status, political ideology (conservatism), rape myth acceptance, and

24 Sample A and sample B are excluded from the analysis for two reasons. Neither sample included the
question item tapping “belief” in the victim; both survey samples include the inferior (deductive) antiviolence values scale.
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authoritarianism. I used multiple regression analysis to estimate relationships in each of
these models, and the results are reported below in Table 4.11.5. 25
Table 4.11.5 | Explaining Prison Sentencing for a Convicted Rapist
SAMPLE C
Victim Condition
Non-Precipitory
Precipitory
Age
Education
Income
Female
Married
Conservatism

SAMPLE C

4.847 ***
(1.342)
-.673
(1.247)
-0.022
(0.041)
0.481
(0.446)
0.185
(0.204)
1.076
(1.136)
-0.527
(1.148)
-0.219
(0.348)

2.693 **
(1.356)
0.475
(1.227)
-0.033
(0.040)
0.171
(0.437)
0.111
(0.198)
0.267
(1.111)
-0.205
(1.116)
-0.089
(0.339)

-2.94 ***
(0.607)
0.441
(0.473)
-0.395
(0.637)
-2.318 ***
(0.740)

-2.828 ***
(0.589)
0.496
(0.459)
-0.018
(0.622)
-2.053 ***
(0.719)
2.169 ***
(0.379)

Authoritarianism
Anti-Violence
Benevolent Sexism
Hostile Sexism
Rape Myth
Belief

SAMPLE D

SAMPLE D

7.721
(0.995)
-3.51
(1.026)
-0.070
(0.033)
0.981
(0.342)
-0.178
(0.146)
1.75
(0.894)
0.6
(0.900)
-0.12
(0.103)
0.268
(1.357)
-0.73
(0.494)
0.865
(0.446)
-1.65
(0.582)
-0.37
(0.621)

5.03
(1.027)
-1.61
(1.026)
-0.070
(0.033)
0.861
(0.332)
-0.181
(0.142)
1.16
(0.870)
0.74
(0.873)
-0.11
(0.090)
1.023
(1.320)
-0.74
(0.479)
0.782
(0.432)
-1.13
(0.568)
-0.01
(0.604)
2.27
(0.297)

***
***
*
***

**

*
***
***

Adj. R2
0.09
0.14
0.16
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Samples C (N=1,049); and D (N=923)

***

**
**

*
**

**

0.2

25 If an independent variable does not appear in a model it is because those items were not included in
that sample. Covariates that did not achieve significance in any of the models (except the
authoritarianism scale) were excluded to preserve space.
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The results are unsettling; respondents relied heavily upon the victim’s
characteristics and behavior when deciding how harshly to punish her rapist. Did she
allow a stranger into her home? Did she attempt to physically defend herself? Did she
report the rape immediately? When the answers to those questions were “yes”,
respondents were willing to impose a significantly longer prison sentence – they did not
afford the same level of justice to the “Precipitory” victim. This was true despite the fact
that I controlled for “belief” in both fully specified models. Recall that sample C, and D
featured an additional question item asking respondents whether they believe that the
reported rape actually occurred.26 For every one unit increase in respondents’ belief in
the victim, respondents recommended an additional (+2.17) years in sample C, and an
additional (+2.27) years in sample D. Thus, H1d: “Respondents who believe the victim
will be more likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for (her) convicted
rapist” was fully supported in both samples. This suggests to me that “I bet she is making
this up” is, in fact, conceptually distinct from “She brought this on herself”.
In the fully specified models for samples C and D victim characteristics and
behavior have a significant impact on individuals’ decision to impose more (or less) years
in prison. In both cases, respondents in the “Non-Precipitory” group recommended
significantly more prison time - C (+2.69) and D (+5.03) – for the rapist compared to
those in the “Control” condition..27 Thus, H4b: “Respondents presented with the “Non-

26 Respondents were asked: “Based on the evidence provided, how likely is it that Jim Reynolds raped his

accuser. Responses ranged between “Extremely Unlikely” and “Extremely Likely” on a 7-point Likert scale.
27 Regression results for sample A and B not shown. These samples included my deductively derived
measure for anti-violence values. As indicated earlier, I suspect, that this measure is not really capturing
attitudes toward violence. Some question items (e.g. “It is a person’s responsibility to protect their
family”; “If an individual is insulted, that person’s pride is insulted”; “A person’s family should be their
number one priority”) are likely not related to individuals’ orientation toward violence.
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Precipitory” treatment will be more likely, on average, to recommend a longer prison
sentence when compared to those presented the control” was supported.
In sample C, violence averse respondents actually recommended significantly less
(-2.83) prison time, on average, all else equal.28 Older respondents imposed significantly
shorter sentences in sample D (-0.07). For every one unit increase in education
respondents in sample D called for an additional (+0.86) years. Sexism was not a
significant predictor of sentencing in sample C, however, in sample D, those scoring
higher on benevolent sexism called for significantly more time (+0.78), and those scoring
higher on hostile sexism recommended significantly less (-1.13) prison time. Those who
endorse the belief that women are often at least partially to blame for their own
victimization recommended significantly more lenient sentences, thus, H2 c “Because
individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score
higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long
prison sentence for a convicted rapist.” was partially supported. Respondents who
endorse rape myths preferred significantly shorter sentences in sample C (-2.05).
My key hypothesis, H3g: “Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive
force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward
females will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a
convicted rapist.” was not supported in the full model in any of my survey samples. The
interaction term (anti-violence values * hostile sexism) had no significant effect across
any of my models (not shown).

28 I did test for a moderating effect between anti-violence values and belief in the victim. In neither case
was the interaction significant.
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4.12

Support to Assist and Advocate for Victims of Sexual Violence
In this section I test additional hypotheses concerning support for government

spending on services to assist victims, and individuals’ willingness to personally advocate
for victims of sexual violence which I discussed in detail at the beginning of the
chapter.29 It is important to note that I expect each of my independent variables to
predict both (non)support for spending, and (un)willingness to advocate in a similar
manner. Thus, the analyses are presented in tandem. Specifically,
H1c: “Individuals who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, on
average, to support increased spending on policies and services, and to advocate
for victims of sexual violence.”
H2d. Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims,
respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.”
H3b. “Respondents who score higher on benevolent sexism will be more likely, on
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence. However, benevolent
sexism will no longer predict that support (or advocacy) once hostile sexism is
controlled for in the model”; and

29 Respondents were asked whether they think government funding should be higher or lower for the
following initiatives: Rape crisis centers, rape kit processing, first responder training, rape-prevention
education. In Sample C and D, respondents were asked how likely they are personally advocate for victims
in the following ways: Volunteer to work with victims in a rape crisis center, donate money to shelters,
donate other resources to shelters, demonstrate to raise awareness of sexual violence.

131

H3c. “Respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.”
Assessing the attitudes that help determine whether an individual supports
increases in government support for victims, and whether an individual is willing to
actively advocate for or donate resources to victims provides my third opportunity to
empirically test my overarching theory of anti-violence values. Specifically, H3 h.
“Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values.
Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.”
To assess the effect of negative stereotypes about women on the predictive power
of individuals’ aversion to violence, I included an interaction term between hostile
sexism and anti-violence values. I expect hostile sexism to produce negative signs, while
anti-violence values should produce positive signs. My key assumption, however, is that
interacting these variables will produce a negative sign: as sexism increases, anti-violence
values will no longer predict support for increased spending on policies and services to
address sexual violence, or willingness to advocate for victims of sexual violence.
Once more, I incorporated numerous control variables including age, education,
income, biological sex, marital status, political ideology (conservatism), rape myth
acceptance, government spending preferences, and authoritarianism. I used multiple
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regression analysis to estimate relationships in each of these models, and the results are
reported below in Table 4.12.1.30
Table 4.12.1 | Support to Fund Policies and Advocate for Victims of Violence
ADVOCATE
Age
Education
Female
Conservatism
Anti-Violence
Benevolent Sexism
Hostile Sexism
Rape Myth

Sample C
-0.013 ***
(0.004)
0.036
(0.053)
0.554 ***
(0.134)
-0.144 ***
(0.041)
-0.223 ***
(0.072)
0.161 ***
(0.056)
-0.168 **
(0.075)
-0.164 *
(0.087)

Sample D
-0.007 **
(0.003)
-0.023
(0.035)
0.515 ***
(0.092)
-0.01
(0.012)
-0.01
(0.051)
0.198 ***
(0.046)
-0.244 ***
(0.060)
-0.81 **
(0.064)
0.127 ***
(0.020)

Government Spending

FUND
Sample C
0.005
(0.004)
-0.008
(0.040)
0.329 ***
(0.102)
-0.077 **
(0.031)
0.036
(0.055)
0.002
(0.043)
-0.253 ***
(0.058)
-0.155 ***
(0.740)

Sample D
0.002
(0.003)
-0.033
(0.028)
0.122 *
(0.072)
-0.005
(0.009)
0.35 ***
(0.101)
0.073 **
(0.037)
-0.263 ***
(0.080)
-0.21 ***
(0.050)
0.121 ***
(0.016)
-0.08 ***
(0.030)

0.26

0.29

Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence
Adj. R2
0.16
0.2
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)
Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)

Anti-violence values did not perform as expected in my models to predict support
for increased government spending to assist victims and combat sexual violence.
Specifically, H1c: “Individuals who score higher on anti-violence values will be more
likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services, and to

30 If an independent variable does not appear in one of the models it is because those items were not
included in that sample. Covariates that did not achieve significance in either of the models were
excluded to preserve space.
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advocate for victims of sexual violence.” was only partially supported. In Sample D; for
every one unit increase in violence aversion individuals were significantly more (+0.35)
supportive of increased spending, all else equal. Additionally, in both models, the more
violence averse respondents were significantly less likely, on average, to personally
engage and advocate for victims. A one unit increase in anti-violence in Sample C
produced a drop of (-0.22), and a one unit increase in anti-violence in Sample D
(although not significant) produced a drop of (-0.01) in willingness to advocate for
victims of sexual violence, all else equal.
My key hypothesis was supported only partially in Sample D, H3 h: “Hostile
sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violenceaverse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to
support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to
advocate for victims of sexual violence.” The estimates of the anti-violence slope
decrease as a function of hostile sexism in terms of increased funding. For example, at
the lowest level of hostile sexism the anti-violence slope is at (+0.34), and at the highest
level the slope is at (-0.16), a decrease of (-0.50). For every one unit increase in hostile
sexism, the anti-violence slope decreases by (-0.08). To visually display the impact of
this interaction term I created a graph of the adjusted means placing hostile sexism on the
x-axis and separate graphs for “low”, “medium”, and “high” levels of anti-violence (See
Figure 4.12.1).
My measure for rape myth acceptance performed as expected, and H2 d: “Because
individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score
higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to support increased
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spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims
of sexual violence” was fully supported across both of my samples. For every one unit
increase in Sample C, individuals were significantly less (-0.16) supportive of increased
spending and (-0.16) less willing to advocate, all else equal. Inn Sample D, individuals
were significantly less (-0.21) supportive of increased spending and (-0.81) less willing to
personally advocate for victims., all else equal.
Figure 4.12.1 | Predictive Margins Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence - Survey D

My measure for benevolent sexism did not perform as expected, and H3 b:
“Respondents who score higher on benevolent sexism will be more likely, on average, to
support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to
advocate for victims of sexual violence. However, benevolent sexism will no longer
predict that support (or advocacy) once hostile sexism is controlled for in the model” was
only partially supported. Benevolent sexism was not significant in Sample C – with or
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without – hostile sexism included in the model in terms of increased funding. On the
other hand, in the fully specified model (including hostile sexism), a one unit increase in
benevolent sexism in Sample C produced a significant increase (+0.16) in willingness to
advocate for victims of sexual violence, all else equal. Additionally, a one unit increase in
benevolent sexism in Sample D also produced a significant increase (+0.20) in
willingness to personally advocate for victims of sexual violence, all else equal.
Unexpectedly, the coefficients for benevolent sexism, in both samples, remained
significant, in terms of advocacy, in the fully specified model.
H3c: “Respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.” was supported across the board
in Sample C and D. For every one unit increase in Sample C, individuals were
significantly less (-0.25) supportive of increased spending and (-0.17) less willing to
advocate, all else equal. Inn Sample D, individuals were significantly less (-0.26)
supportive of increased spending and (-0.24) less willing to advocate, all else equal.
Females were significantly more supportive of increases in government spending
in Sample C (+0.33) and Sample D (+0.12), all else equal. Females were significantly
more willing to advocate for victims in Sample C (+0.55) and Sample D (+0.52), all else
equal. Additionally, individuals’ broader attitudes toward government spending were a
significant predictor of their support for very specific services to assist victims and to
decrease the prevalence of sexual violence in society. Those scoring higher on
government spending were significantly more supportive of targeted spending efforts in
sample D (+0.12) and in willingness to advocate (+0.13).
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4.13

Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, I empirically tested my assumption that individual’s

orientation toward violence should help shape their attitudes toward victims – and
perpetrators – of sexual violence. I expected that individuals who are more averse to
violence would sympathize more with victims, support harsher punishments for
perpetrators, and advocate more for resources to assist survivors and decrease the rate of
these crimes in the United States. Anti-violence values were assessed with the inductively
specified scale which I produced, using principal component analysis, in Chapter 3. 31
Intuitively, one might surmise that aversion to violence is a good thing. And, I did
find empirical support for the expectation that anti-violence values will produce
normatively positive results in terms of sexual violence-related outcomes of interest. On
the other hand, I also found empirical support for my overarching theory, that violencejustifying ideologies (e.g. sexism ‘hostile in particular’, rape myth acceptance, etc.) often
diminish any normatively positive force that anti-violence values would otherwise
produce.
Respondents were randomly assigned to either a “Control” group which featured
a non-descript victim and very little information about the circumstances surrounding her
rape, a treatment group “Non-Precipitory” which featured a cautious victim who
physically resisted her attacker and immediately reported her rape to law enforcement, or
a treatment group “Precipitory” which featured a victim who did not behave cautiously,
31 Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “It is important for a person to be tougher than other people”; A
person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp”; You would praise a person who acted
aggressively to an insult”; “Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable”; “It is morally
wrong for a person to walk away from a fight”; “A person who doesn’t take any crap from anybody is an
admirable reputation to have”; and “Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself”.
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did not put up fierce physical resistance to her attacker, and did not immediately report
her rape to law enforcement. Respondents were asked to put themselves in the role of a
juror as they reviewed this incident.
After reading these fictitious rape scenarios, respondents were asked to report
whether they believed that the rape occurred. In both survey samples that included this
question, those who scored higher on anti-violence values were significantly more likely
to believe the victim, all else equal. However, I also found that hostile sexism diminished
the positive effects of anti-violence values to the point that they no longer produced
significantly more belief in the victim.
My experimental findings also produced unsettling results. When the victim
appeared to conform to traditional gender expectations, when it was clear that she was
cautious to not put herself in danger, when there was evidence that she fought fiercely to
prevent being violated, and when she reported the incident to law enforcement
immediately, both males and females were significantly more likely to believe her rape
claim. On the other hand, when a victim did not conform to traditional gender
expectations, when it appeared that she put herself at unnecessary risk of danger, when
there was no physical evidence that she put up fierce resistance, and when she did not
report the incident to law enforcement immediately, both males and females were
significantly less likely to believe that the victim was actually raped.
After respondents were informed that the rapist had been found guilty, they were
asked to recommend a sentence of no less than 5, and no more than 50 years in prison for
the perpetrator. Examining the data across four unique surveys I found little evidence that
anti-violence values significantly impact how harshly respondents believe a perpetrator
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should be punished. In fact, violence averse individuals might view incarceration itself as
a form of violence. In one model, for every one unit increase in anti-violence respondents
recommended significantly less (-2.94 years) time in prison, perhaps sparing the
perpetrator.
My experimental findings, once more, produced troubling results. When the
victim conformed to traditional gender expectations, when she was cautious, when there
was evidence that she fought back, and when she reported the incident immediately, both
males and females recommended significantly more time in prison. When the victim did
not conform to traditional gender expectations, when she put herself at risk of danger,
when there was no evidence of resistance, and when she did not report the incident
immediately, both males and females recommended significantly less time in prison.
Survivors of sexual violence often depend upon social welfare benefits as they
attempt to escape violent partners and rebuild their lives and budget cuts or decreased
spending on social services erodes the capacity of women’s organizations to assist
victims (Wasco, et al. 2004). Reductions in funding for health care, education, women’s
shelters, grass roots feminist organizations, legal aid, and many other services including
economic support, transportation, and childcare assistance make it difficult for victims to
break the chains of violence.
Respondents were asked about their support for increases in government funding
to assist victims of sexual violence and help prevent rape in the United States. Those
claiming to be more averse to violence supported significantly more federal funding in
only one sample, and in two other samples the violent averse supported significantly less
federal funding to assist victims and reduce sexual violence, all else equal. Respondents
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were also asked whether they would personally advocate for victims or donate time and
money to organizations that assist victims. In both samples that asked this question,
respondents were significantly less likely to advocate for victims or donate time and
resources to the cause, all else equal.
Negative attitudes toward victims help perpetuate rape, and rape myths enable a
perpetrator to justify his behavior. These negative stereotypes and misinterpretations of
victims have serious implications. Beyond the fact that they cause harmful psychological
damage, these prejudicial attitudes can also bleed into public policy decisions (e.g. trial
outcomes and rape-related services expenditures). Throughout this analysis, those who
endorsed rape myths and other negative stereotypes about women were consistently more
likely to blame the victim, to be more lenient on her perpetrator, to resist increased
government spending to assist victims and reduce sexual violence, and to decline to
engage in any way personally to advocate or support victims. Individuals’ aversion to
violence did little of substance to benefit victims or punish perpetrators, and when it did
produce significantly positive outcomes those effects were easily diminished by violencejustifying ideology – hostile sexism in particular.
Efforts intended to decrease rape in the United States should focus on breaking
down the stereotypes that allow individuals to justify violence against women. Whether
an individual condones violence appears to have little impact on their perception of
victims, their support for serious consequences for perpetrators, or their willingness to
actively engage in efforts to combat the problem of sexual violence in the United States –
once we account for the violence-justifying ideologies that work to diminish any benefits
of aversion to violence. Additionally, a victim’s characteristics and behaviors have a
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significant impact on whether she is believed in the first place, but also on whether her
perpetrator will be justly punished.
Victims’ advocates suggest that the standard for conviction in rape cases should
require only the “preponderance of the evidence” standard applied in civil cases. Rather
than demanding an absence of doubt, verdicts should depend on what jurists believe most
strongly. In other words, if a victim’s testimony leads jurists to believe that they did not
consent to sex, this would be sufficient to convict the defendant. One thing appears
certain; efforts to reduce rape should focus on breaking down the stereotypes that allow
people to overlook violent behavior, and reforming policies that make it difficult for a
victim to receive justice. Absent those efforts, it appears unlikely that widespread
aversion to violence will make any substantive difference.
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE VIOLENCE AND SUPPORT FOR
RELATED PUBLIC POLICIES
5.1

Introduction
During the summer of 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri a white police officer named

Darren Wilson fired 12 shots into 18-year-old Michael Brown, an unarmed black man.
His lifeless body lay in the street for more than four hours as detectives completed their
investigation. Ultimately, a St. Louis County grand jury would fail to indict Officer
Wilson and the United States Justice Department launched a civil-rights probe of its own
(Bell & Hunn 2014). Following his adjudication in state court violent waves of protest
and riots erupted in numerous American cities where outraged citizens vandalized,
looted, and burned businesses to the ground. Police donning military-grade riot gear
responded with tear gas, rubber bullets, and flash grenades. Protesters adopted the slogan
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“Hands Up, Don’t Shoot” in reference to eye-witness testimony that Brown had his hands
in the air attempting to surrender (Hartmann 2014).32
Brown’s death sparked heated debate over policing in the United States and
incidents of police violence continue to dominate national media coverage. One might
assume that a national database of information about lethal and non-lethal police
encounters exists, but this was not so until late 2018. In fact, as recently as 2016, thenFBI Director James Comey admitted to a gathering of police chiefs that “Americans
actually have no idea about how often police use force because nobody has collected
enough data” (Berman 2016). This lack of data on police violence remains a problem in
2020. While the FBI now collaborates with law enforcement agencies across the country
32 The Department of Justice concluded that Brown did not attempt to surrender, and the civil rights
probe officially cleared Wilson’s actions.

to collect this information, individual police agencies are not required to participate.
James Gagliano, writing for the Hill describes this as a ‘fundamental flaw’ in data
collection; he worries that incomplete datasets “lead to inaccurate results and fuel
speculation that statistics are skewed to protect law enforcement” (2018). Fortunately for
those who research police violence there are other sources that compile use of force
statistics.
Journalists for the Washington Post and the Guardian began compiling data on
officer-involved-shootings (OIS) in 2015. The Post found that police fatally shoot
approximately 1,000 individuals per year – this comports with the 1,134 deaths that the
Guardian chronicled in 2015. Alarmingly, the death rate for young black men was five
times that of white men the same age, but we know little of lesser force incidents because
the Post and the Guardian did not collect data on non-fatal encounters with the police
(Swaine et al. 2015). VICE News collected data directly from the 50 largest police
departments in the United States – including statistics on non-fatal shootings. Journalists
for VICE found that “Police shootings aren’t just undercounted – police in these
departments shoot black people at a higher rate and shoot unarmed people far more often
than any data have shown (Arthur et al. 2017).
The datasets compiled by the Washington Post, the Guardian, and VICE provide
important information, but it is not clear whether the OIS statistics they report are a direct
result of racial bias. That said, even the perception that the police are unjust leads many
people to question their legitimacy. Public reactions to the non-stop news coverage of
these incidents varies by race and many other factors (Dahlgren 1988; Eschholz et al
2002), but frequent exposure is believed to create the misperception that they occur more
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frequently than they actually do, and news organizations are known to emphasize the
racial elements of the events they cover (Gilliam & Iyengar 2000; Weitzer & Tuch 2004).
Explaining racial disparities in police violence is not as straightforward as one
might think. While descriptive statistics are instructive, researchers must also account for
additional factors including race-specific crime rates and the behavior a suspect exhibits
prior to the shooting. On the other hand, it is not clear that police departments are
providing reliable data; we do not know how often officers “bend the truth about the
context of a particular interaction so as to justify their own actions – for instance,
indicating a suspect was threatening when they were calmly following an officer’s
commands” (Fryer Jr. 2018, 4). In sum, the spotty data on OIS makes it difficult for
researchers to examine the role that race plays in officers’ decision to pull the trigger and
take a life.
One thing is certain; OIS are a serious problem in America that routinely spark
widespread outrage. Violent protests of law enforcement swept the country following the
shooting of 18-year-old Michael Brown, and each new body has the potential to produce
additional violence – violence that threatens civility and democracy in the United States.
Public scrutiny is an important check on police behavior, especially in the age of smart
phones and streaming video, and fact-based reporting on these incidents is essential.
Individuals must be willing to evaluate incidents of OIS objectively in order to determine
whether the actions of the officer involved were justified. Additionally, evaluations of
these incidents cut both ways in many instances, since the officer(s) sometimes are
minorities as well. This chapter examines the complex considerations that help shape
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individual evaluations of OIS and support for policies to prevent unnecessary incidents of
police violence.
Contributions to, and Extensions of Prior Literature
Police shootings – justified or not – are acts of violence (Williams 2015; Seigel
2018) yet research on OIS evaluations tends to focus mostly on the racial aspects of these
incidents while ignoring broader attitudes toward violence. For instance, most scholarship
focuses on racial attitudes and stereotypes alone as explanations for perceptions of law
enforcement officers (Huang & Vaughn 1996) and criminal suspects (Barkan & Cohn
1998). In this chapter, I use my adapted anti-violence values scale (created in Chapter 3)
to determine whether individuals who condemn violence, on average, are more likely to:


Believe that a lethal officer involved shooting is inappropriate;



Believe that a lethal officer involved shooting was unlawful; and



Support increased spending on policies to reduce police violence

I extend and contribute to the police violence literature by 1) providing theoretical
and empirical support for my claim that anti-violence values do not always translate to
outrage over police violence, or support for policies to reduce its prevalence; 2) providing
additional empirical support for my broader argument that the normatively positive
effects of anti-violence values often diminish once additional factors (violence-justifying
ideologies) are incorporated in the model; 3) empirically demonstrating that it is the level
of threat a suspect poses – rather than the amalgamation of race between the officer and
suspect – which has the greatest impact on individual evaluations of OIS; and 4) moving
beyond student samples to include Mechanical Turk workers, which prior research
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(Berinsky et al. 2012) concludes is acceptable for peer-reviewed projects. 33 To the best
of my knowledge, individuals’ orientations toward violence in the abstract have never
been incorporated into empirical models predicting reactions to police violence, policies
to reduce that violence, or support for increased government spending to improve
policing. This research builds on recent work on racial attributions in the justice system
(Peffley et al. 2017) and law enforcement policy (Ariel et al. 2015) but expands on this
research by incorporating my new measure of anti-violence values.
The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I briefly discuss public perceptions of the
police, and the implications of breakdowns in trust and legitimacy between officers and
citizens for democratic society. Next, I examine closely the role that the media plays in
helping shape individual evaluations of incidents of OIS specifically, and public opinion
of law enforcement broadly. Then, I provide a brief overview of racial disparities in the
criminal justice system that have always disproportionately impacted blacks – disparities
which persist today. Turning to the importance of interest groups, I review recent efforts
to influence public opinion, including members of the public demanding institutional
reforms to address police violence, but also law enforcement groups working to build and
maintain public support for the police. Next, I examine various policies and reforms
intended to minimize racial bias among law enforcement and ultimately, decrease
instances of police violence in the United States. As it turns out, a majority of the public
33 Berinsky et al. (2012) examined the benefits, and potential limitations of using Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk web-based platform for subject recruitment in Political Science Research. They found that the
demographic characteristics of Mechanical Turk workers are more representative than student, or other
convenience samples often used in Political Science research. When the authors used Mechanical Turk
samples to replicate previous experimental studies, they found that the average treatment effects were
very similar. In sum, the authors argue that the potential limitations to Mechanical Turk samples –
including subject attentiveness and the prevalence of repeat survey-takers – are not much of a problem in
practice.
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– and large percentages of the police – support serious institutional reform. Finally,
extending upon my analyses in chapter three and four, I re-introduce specific violencejustifying ideologies (racial stereotypes in particular) which I argue attenuate the
otherwise positive force of anti-violence values. I present empirical evidence that those
who endorse violence-justifying attitudes (racial stereotypes in the current analysis) are
less likely to question acts of police violence, or policies and services to quell this
violence. This is especially true for those most opposed to violence in the abstract.
5.2

Perceptions of Police and Law Enforcement
In order to perform their duties effectively police require the cooperation and

support of the community. Citizens who question the legitimacy of law enforcement are
less likely to comply with the law or cooperate with the police. Establishing and
maintaining that legitimacy requires fair and consistent behavior; officers must be
respectful of the public, perform their duties in an impartial manner, and act within the
limits of the law. Positive and frequent interactions with the community help police
officers earn the support of the citizens they are sworn to protect. This reservoir of
goodwill, in turn, allows them to more effectively perform their duties (Tyler 2004).
Unfortunately, anecdotal evidence across the country suggests a widespread
breakdown in the development of trust and legitimacy between officers and citizens. In a
number of recently publicized interactions, officers were denied services by employees of
major businesses across the United States, a trend that some experts argue is a reaction to
highly publicized incidents of police misconduct. An employee working the drivethrough window at an Arby’s in Pembroke Pines, Florida refused to serve a uniformed
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police officer, and cops were also denied services at a Chuck E. Cheese in Bowling
Green, Kentucky and a Starbucks in Philadelphia, PA (Bromwich, 2015).
Violent, targeted attacks on law enforcement officers are also on the rise. For
example, following a Black Lives Matter protest in Dallas, TX, during the summer of
2016, Micah Xavier Johnson opened fire on a group of police officers killing five and
injuring seven others. Johnson fled to a building located on the campus of El Centro
College where he was quickly surrounded by police. Negotiators claim that Johnson was
furious over police shootings involving black men, and that he wanted to target and kill
white officers. The standoff ended when police used a remote controlled bomb to kill the
suspect (Glum, 2016).
Research on race and attitudes toward the police is extensive, and it suggests that
Blacks are more likely to report being victimized by police (Weitzer and Tuch 2004,
Arthur 1993; Nelson & Kinder 1996; Epp et al. 2014; Ramirez 2015) and to view the
police less favorably (Rosenbaum 2005; Weitzer 2000; Reisig and Parks 2000; Huang
and Vaughn 1996). Blacks are also more likely than whites to live in high crime areas
where police misconduct is more common (Mastrofski et al. 2002). Research (Scherer &
Curry, 2010) suggests that “by virtue of their racial group consciousness, African
Americans experience a “linked fate” with fellow black citizens when evaluating salient
political issues” (93). This, of course, should transfer to attitudes toward the criminal
justice system generally, and law enforcement officers in particular. Taken together,
extant scholarship provides a host of reasons we might expect blacks to be suspicious of,
and negatively evaluate incidents involving police use of force.
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Others argue that racial disparity is not a result of law enforcement “targeting”
blacks, but a consequence of blacks committing a disproportional percentage of crime,
which results in more frequent interactions with the police. Some whites believe that
blacks are more likely to be criminals, and that the justice system is a satisfactory means
to control subordinate races. As Barkan and Cohn point out, “racial prejudice contributes
to whites’ support for police use of force, and this relationship should be stronger for the
use of excessive force than for the use of reasonable force” (1998, 749).

5.3

Media Coverage of Police Use of Force Incidents

Media coverage of OIS and other use of force incidents helps shape evaluations of
law enforcement officers more broadly. Media portrayals seldom provide a complete
picture of these incidents, but instead deliver what Gamson and Modigliani describe as a
frame, or “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding
strip of events” (1989, 143). Entman explains that framing strategies select “some aspects
of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation,
and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (1993, 52). So, when it comes
to police violence, the media clearly have the power to shape the narrative and to
influence the way consumers perceive events. This is not new; scholarship on bounded
rationality (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) supports the idea that when individuals make a
decision, they are limited by the information available, the cognitive limits of their brains,
and the brevity of time they have to decide (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). Individuals will
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interpret information differently depending on which interpretive schema applies, and
individual perceptions are reference dependent (Druckman 2001, Iyengar 1991).
Other work (Schlesinger et al. 1994) examines media coverage of law
enforcement specifically and its effect on public opinion, but the results are mixed. Some
findings (Chermak et al. 2006) suggest that the more a citizen reads the newspaper, or a
high-profile case of police misconduct, the more likely they are to think that the officers
involved are guilty. Others (Graziano et al. 2010) found evidence that attitudes about the
prevalence of racial profiling are susceptible to the manner in which the media construct
incidents of police misconduct. There is, however, widespread consensus that both
television and newspaper coverage of crime tends to focus on the most sensational and
violent cases (Roberts & Doob 1990). Even coverage that is not related to a specific case
can shape public opinion in that case (Greene 1990). Media coverage and the way that
violent incidents are framed has a powerful impact on individual evaluations of law
enforcement and, as Hans and Dee point out, because most of the public has little direct
experience with the justice system, knowledge and views of law enforcement are largely
dependent on media representations – and the media presents a distorted view of the legal
system (1991).
Alternatively, some media coverage of OIS has directly contributed to efforts to
better track and reduce police violence. The Washington Post, Vice News, and the
Guardian’s in-depth investigations of people killed by police in the US convinced the
federal government to collect better data on police use of force incidents and OIS.
Announcing those reforms in 2016, then-FBI director James Comey remarked that it was
“unacceptable, embarrassing, and ridiculous” that media organizations held better data on
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the issue than his own officials. Prior to those reforms, the FBI relied on police chiefs
voluntarily submitting their statistics – a method it turned out was capturing less than half
of all killings nationwide. Under the new government program, the Department of Justice
logged more than twice the rate previously reported for 2015 (Swaine & McCarthy
2016).
While the federal government is doing a much better job of tracking police
violence, there is concern that data alone will not be sufficient to bring about widespread
reforms in law enforcement. Stephen Rushin argues that newly amassed statistics should
be publicly available; this would incentivize local departments to prioritize declines in
violence (2016). But it would not guarantee that some of the more problematic
departments will voluntarily make expensive reforms. On the other hand, the Attorney
General could use civil rights litigation against law enforcement agencies to incentivize
the implementation of steps to reduce police violence. As Rushin points out, “Under 42
U.S.C. § 14141, the Attorney General has the power to seek equitable relief against
police departments engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional mis-conduct,
including excessive uses of force” (2016, 117).

5.4

Blacks, Law Enforcement, and Political Activism in the United States
The relationship between blacks and the police – beginning with laws controlling

the movement of slaves – has been adversarial throughout American history. From
slavery, to Reconstruction, to the modern era of mass incarceration, issues of race and
law enforcement persist. The high-profile shooting of Michael Brown during the summer
of 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri may have been the catalyst that sparked violent protests
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across American cities, but political activists in 2012 were already organizing to protest
the death of another young black teenager. Outraged by the shooting death of seventeenyear-old Trayvon Martin, community organizers Patrisse Cullors, Opal Tometi, and
Alicia Garza created #BlackLivesMatter calling for accountability when unarmed blacks
are murdered (Smith 2015). Black Lives Matter began as little more than scattered
conversations on social media, but as the deaths of unarmed men mounted the movement
gained national popularity. More vocal leaders joined the group fomenting strong
opposition to law enforcement, and between 2014 and 2015 more than 950 protests took
place nationwide – some of them quite violent (Ruffin 2016).
Documents from the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security released in
2017 revealed that the United States government viewed Black Lives Matter as a
potential threat. Emails and internal documents, obtained through a lawsuit filed by the
Center for Constitutional Rights and Color of Change, detailed the monitoring of Black
Lives Matter protests. In one of those emails, the FBI assessed that “…it is very likely
Black Identity Extremists perceptions of police brutality against African Americans
spurred an increase in premeditated retaliatory lethal violence against law enforcement
and will likely serve as a justification for such violence” (Vohra 2017). The Black Lives
Matter website, however, makes it explicitly clear that the group is not anti-police, saying
“This movement is not an anti-people movement; therefore, it is not an anti-police
movement. Most police officers are just everyday people who want to do their jobs, make
a living for their families, and come home safely at the end of their shifts” (Black Lives
Matter 2020).
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Blue Lives Matter, founded and run by current and former police officers, was
created to honor law enforcement, bolster public support, and provide resources for
police officers and their families. They formed in response to the Ferguson protests, and
claim that the nature of the profession makes them easy targets who are consequently
“bullied by slander, illegitimate complaints, frivolous law suits, and physical attacks” and
that “America watched as criminals destroyed property, and assaulted and murdered
innocent people, and they labeled these criminals as victims” (Blue Lives Matter 2020).
The group worries that much of the media and many politicians have damaged
community relations and made their job more difficult. They tout officer Darren Wilson –
who killed Michael Brown – as a hero, a man doing his job and forced to defend himself.
Citing an unprecedented number of attacks on police in 2016, Blue Lives Matter created
a membership program so that interested members of the public could become actively
involved in supporting law enforcement; the money is directed toward life-saving
equipment and training for police officers (Blue Lives Matter 2020).
The director at the Washington D.C. based Advancement Project, Thomas
Mariadason, claims that officer deaths in the line of duty have recently declined, while
the number of people killed by police has not. He argues that Blue Lives Matter is
promoting a dangerous narrative that “…any and all criticisms of police tactics
constitutes attacks on and a lack of respect for police officers is counterproductive,
undemocratic, and hinders efforts to fix this broken system” (Guha 2017).
5.5

Policies to Better Track, and Decrease the Rate of Police Violence
Access to detailed information about police shootings and the officers involved is

crucial if we want to create policies that minimize racial bias among police. In a recent
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evaluation of fatal police shootings, Nix et al. (2017) found that white civilians were
more likely to have been attacking the officer, and blacks were two times more likely to
have been unarmed at the time of the shooting. The authors argue that new training
programs and community engagement initiatives should be implemented to address
implicit bias among law enforcement officers. Cox et al. (2014) argue that implicit bias is
a factor that makes police less hesitant to shoot black suspects, while James et al. (2016)
counters that reverse racism, or the “Ferguson Effect” is a racial bias that makes police
more hesitant to shoot black suspects.
Ariel et al. (2015) randomly assigned police officers to “experimental shifts”
during which all contacts with the public were recorded on body-worn cameras. Officers
not equipped with body-worn cameras comprised the control group. The authors found
that officers in the control group were almost twice as likely to use force over the course
of the experiment. Other research demonstrates that officers believe that policies
requiring body-worn cameras would lead to improved interactions with citizens in the
community (Jennings et al. 2014). The successful implementation of new training
programs and community engagement initiatives for law enforcement agencies that Nix
et al. (2017) propose will depend, in large part, upon public support for these policies.
While discontent with police misconduct is widely documented (Chappell et al.
2004; Chermak et al. 2006) less is known about public support for reform. Weitzer and
Tuch examined attitudes toward corrective measures in policing and found that
“Respondents who believe that police corruption, unwarranted stops, and verbal and
physical abuse of citizens are common are more likely to favor reforms. The same is true
for those who are frequently exposed to news media coverage of incidents of police
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misconduct (2004, 391). Additionally, whites were reluctant to accept and support
policies giving minorities preferences in hiring to increase diversity in police departments
while close to half of blacks and Hispanics supported doing so. More than 75 percent of
blacks and Latinos said that more minority officers should be assigned to minority
neighborhoods, while less than half of whites agreed. On the other hand, the vast majority
of the public favored early warning measures to identify rogue officers and agreed that
stronger punishments for those officers would improve policing.
In 2017, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey of police, and public
opinion on policing and related policies in the United States. The majority of the public
(60 percent) said that the deaths of blacks during encounters with police in recent years
are signs of much broader problems, while a majority of police (67 percent) said that fatal
police-black encounters are isolated incidents. There were, however, large racial
differences on perceptions of deadly black-police encounters among both groups. The
majority of black citizens (79 percent) claimed that OIS deaths are signs of much broader
problems, and a majority of black police officers (57 percent) shared this view. The
survey also found that a clear majority of officers and a much larger share of the public
support the use of body-worn cameras. Two-thirds of police (66 percent) and most of the
public (93 percent) favor the use of body cameras by police. Large percentages in both
groups believe that police officers would be more likely to act appropriately, and that
members of the public would be more likely to cooperate with police wearing body
cameras. Finally, most of the public (73 percent) agreed that body cameras would help to
reduce incidents of police violence (Morin et al. 2017).
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5.6

Anti-Violence Values and Police Use of Force
An individual’s orientation toward violence generally should help shape their

evaluations of the circumstances surrounding recurring incidents of police violence.
Specifically, those who are averse to violence should sympathize more with suspects, be
less likely to approve of an officer’s use of deadly force and be more likely to advocate
for more resources to better track and ultimately decrease the rate of police violence in
the United States.
The correlational findings and regression analyses performed in previous chapters
helped inform my expectations for my inductively derived measure. Recall that on
average, females were significantly more averse to violence than males. Individuals who
deplore violence were significantly more likely to believe a victim of violence, but
violence-justifying ideology moderated anti-violence values such that they no longer
produced the normatively positive outcomes they otherwise would. In the present
context, those who abhor violence should disapprove of a deadly police shooting and
support increased spending on efforts to better track and prevent police violence. Racial
prejudice, however, should attenuate the positive force of anti-violence values –
especially when the suspect is black. It is not clear, however, whether violence-averse
individuals would be persuaded one way or the other by varying arguments against police
use of deadly force. It is also not clear whether violence-averse individuals would
approve of a police shooting when the suspect imposes a high level of threat upon an
officer. Based upon the limited information about the nature of anti-violence values that I
gained in the previous chapters, I derive the following hypotheses:
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H1a: “On average, females will score higher on anti-violence values when
compared to males.”
H1b: “Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be less likely, on
average, to believe a police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect is
appropriate or legal.”
H1c: “Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely,
on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to reduce
police violence.”
Much of my focus in this chapter is on whether individuals who condemn
violence are more likely to support public policies to decrease the prevalence of police
violence in the United States. I expect that the answer is “yes”, in many cases violenceaverse individuals will be significantly more likely to sympathize with, support, and
demand justice for victims. However, I argue that violence-justifying ideologies have the
power to dampen the effects of anti-violence sentiment. In the following pages I examine
additional factors that should attenuate the otherwise positive effects of anti-violence
values. When it comes to questions of police violence, one prejudicial belief system
(violence-justifying ideologies) warrants additional discussion. Racial Stereotypes can
lead people to excuse police violence and be unsympathetic to victims. I discuss facets of
race and police violence in more detail in the following sections.
5.7

Racial Attributions and Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System
Research examining the role of racial resentment and stereotypes in predicting

white individuals’ evaluations of the criminal justice system is extensive (Johnson 2008;
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Ghandnoosh 2014; Hutchings 2015; Filindra & Kaplan 2016). And, the idea that racism
drives many individuals’ crime policy preferences has serious implications; institutional
legitimacy is based on the idea that in a “democratic society it is unacceptable for racial
prejudice to guide public policy. Insofar as racial prejudice motivates calls by the public
and perhaps public officials for the harsher treatment of criminals, such treatment is
unjustified” (Barkan and Cohn 1998, 751). We know, for instance, that the punitive
attitudes of whites toward criminals are based partially on racial prejudice (Cohn et al.
1991; Aguirre & Baker 1993; Green et al. 2006; Peffley et al. 2017), and that racial
prejudice conditions many whites’ fear of being criminally victimized (St. John & HealdMoore 1996; Oliver & Fonash 2002; Farrell et al. 2009).
Research suggests that support for capital punishment also varies by race, and that
whites are more likely than blacks to support the death penalty (Young 1991; Soss et al.
2003; Barkan & Cohn 2005). This is not surprising; like much of the justice system in the
United States, capital punishment takes a disproportionate toll on people of color. It could
be argued, from a historical standpoint, that racial disparities in capital punishment
represent an institutional extension of the barbarous lynching of blacks beginning in the
19th century. Today, numerous southern states – including Mississippi, Georgia,
Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana – are part of what scholars call the “death belt” because
of the “high correlation they find between the history of lynching against AfricanAmericans and today's disproportionate arrests, prosecution, and sentencing to death of
African-Americans” (Mikulich 2015).
Research beyond the United States provides additional evidence that minority
group-members oppose the death penalty more than members of the majority. Focusing
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on Eastern Europe, Peshkopia and Voss found that “attitudes toward the death penalty
depend on the extent to which one identifies with the rulers who would control the
instruments of death” (2016, 39).
While the association between racial attitudes and policy preferences is welldocumented, so too are the weaknesses of common measures for racial stereotypes and
resentment (Huddy & Feldman 2009). In a recent study, Peffley et al. (2017) used
dispositional attribution in place of common stereotype measures to overcome a major
problem – they ignore perceptions of racial discrimination. The authors constructed two
separate, and distinct measures of racial attributes, “one that focuses on blacks’
dispositions (e.g. blacks’ tendency toward violence and crime) and another focusing on
discrimination against blacks (e.g. whether police and courts are biased against blacks)”
(2017, 1). To test the new measures, they examined racial disparities in support for
capital punishment.
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three arguments against the death
penalty. They were presented either a “racial argument” that blacks are more likely to be
put to death, a “innocent argument” that too many innocent people are being put to death,
or a “no argument” baseline that simply asked whether the respondent favors or opposes
capital punishment. Among black respondents, they found that both arguments decreased
support for capital punishment. Across all groups, racial dispositions had no significant
effect on support for capital punishment in the baseline condition. On the other hand,
results indicated that whites who blame blacks’ harsh treatment by the criminal justice
system on their disposition, when presented the “racial argument”, became more
supportive of the death penalty compared to those in the baseline condition – what
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scholars call the “backlash effect” (Knoll et al. 2011). This research provides important
insight on how arguments against punitive policies are received by different audiences. If
individuals, interest groups, politicians, and policymakers want to gain support for
criminal justice reforms, issue-framing suggests that tailoring policy proposals to specific
audiences is one way to increase support. This should apply to reforms intended to
decrease incidents of lethal officer-involved shootings.
Numerous cities in the United States have implemented training programs to
prepare law enforcement officers to de-escalate and safely manage crises. When an
individual poses a serious threat to an officer or others the officer is authorized to use
lethal force, yet de-escalation methods enable officers to manage many dangerous
encounters without discharging a firearm. Effective communication and active listening
are sometimes sufficient, but if an individual resists verbal commands an officer could
use “soft” bodily force (e.g. grabbing, restraining), or “hard” bodily force (e.g. hitting,
kicking) if necessary, to gain control of the situation. When these methods are not
enough, officers have a range of non-lethal technologies including batons, chemical
sprays, and high-voltage tasers. If officers use these methods appropriately the need for
using deadly force decreases (Oliva et al. 2010). Convincing officers on the beat that less
aggressive measures can be effective, however, may be difficult. In a 2016 survey of law
enforcement, 56 percent of officers agreed that “in certain areas of the city it is more
useful for an officer to be aggressive than to be courteous”, and 44 percent agreed that
“some people can only be brought to reason the hard, physical way” (Morin et al. 2017).
Officers’ tendency to be aggressive could be rooted in self-preservation; recent research
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suggests that law enforcement officers working for departments with de-escalation
policies are more likely to be killed or injured in the line of duty (Douliery 2017).
Following the Michael Brown shooting in 2014 public demands for police
reforms reached a fever pitch, leading then-President Barack Obama to order a
Presidential Task Force on 21st Century Policing to conduct nationwide inquiries of law
enforcement agencies. The final report, released in 2015, included 60 recommendations
to improve police-community relations. One of those recommendations was a call to
designate de-escalation a core element of police training and practice (President’s Task
Force on 21st Century Policing 2015). Research suggests that de-escalation will help
decrease use-of-force incidents and improve officers’ ability to resolve conflicts without
violence (Oliva et al. 2010). Others argue that de-escalation training is as important as
academy training in physical force and self-defense (Walker & Katz 2013). Much like the
death penalty and other punitive policies, it is likely that support for police reforms varies
by race. In order to gain support for police reforms, issue-framing suggests that tailoring
policy proposals to specific audiences is one way to increase support. Based on prior
research I derive the following hypotheses:
H2a. “Blacks and other minorities will be more likely, on average, to attribute
racial disparities in the justice system to racial discrimination when compared to
whites.”
H2b. “Because discrimination attributions focus on racial bias among police and
courts, individuals who embrace the idea that the justice system is biased against
blacks will be less likely, on average, to approve of a police officer shooting – and
killing – a black suspect.”
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H2c. “Because dispositional attributions focus on racial stereotypes, whites who
embrace negative stereotypes about blacks, when presented the “racial
argument” will be less likely, on average, to support institutional reforms to
decrease police violence when compared to those in the baseline condition.”
H2d. “Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of antiviolence values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black
dispositions will be less likely, on average, to condemn a police officer shooting –
and killing – a black suspect.”
H2e. “Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of antiviolence values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black
dispositions will be less likely, on average, to support policies to track and reduce
police violence.”
5.8

Racial Amalgamation of Officer and Suspect
Researchers, activists, and interested members of the public do not have access to

definitive statistics on police-involved fatalities in the United States. While detailed
information is not always available, journalists and organizations that maintain data on
police killings agree that around 1,000 to 1,200 occur annually. Young black males –
particularly those in their 20s – are at greatest risk of being killed by police, and
minorities in general are more likely to be killed than white individuals (Edwards 2019).
The amalgamation of race between an officer and suspect in OIS incidents matters –
especially when the officer is white, and the suspect is black. Debates over shootings
exhibit a recurring theme; white officers are primarily to blame for the death of young
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black males. Yet, it is difficult to test whether racial disparities vary by officer
characteristics because most available databases do not include details about the officers
involved. Johnson et al. (2019) spent more than 1500 hours collecting data for their paper
on racial disparities in OIS. Armed with the information reported by the Washington Post
and the Guardian, the authors contacted listed police departments (more than 650 in
total) to uncover the characteristics of the officers involved. They used that information
to create a national database for every fatal OIS (more than 900) that occurred in the
United States in 2015, and it includes the race/ethnicity of the officer involved. After
close examination of the data, the authors found “no evidence of anti-black or antiHispanic disparities across shootings, and white officers are not more likely to shoot
minority civilians than non-white officers. Instead, race-specific crime strongly predicts
civilian race. That is, as crime rates increase for a given group (e.g. blacks or Hispanics)
the odds that a person belonging to that group will be killed by police increases as well
(2019, 15877). The authors admit, however, that their analyses examine racial disparities
only in shootings that result in deaths, and not officers’ decision to use force more
generally.
Extant research provides many reasons blacks might be suspicious of, and
negatively evaluate incidents involving police use of force (Weitzer and Tuch 1999;
Reisig and Parks 2000; Rosenbaum 2005). Shootings involving a white officer and a
black civilian often spark additional violence and destruction. From Ferguson, Baltimore,
and Charlotte we know that local protests of police violence sometimes transform to
widespread riots. Following the announcement that Officer Darren Wilson would not be
indicted for killing Michael Brown more than 25 buildings in and around Ferguson were
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burned and many more were vandalized and looted. Hundreds of vehicles, and entire car
lots were also set ablaze (New York Times 2014). Widespread riots in Baltimore in
protest to the death of Freddie Gray while in police custody caused an estimated $9
million in damages. More than 100 vehicles and 15 buildings were incinerated as
violence swept the city (Toppa 2015). Finally, protests turned to riots lasting weeks in
Charlotte after police shot and killed Keith Lamont Scott in an apartment complex
parking lot. Damage to buildings, including the Nascar Hall of Fame and the Convention
Center, along with overtime pay for police and firefighters cost taxpayers upwards of
$4.6 million (Harrison 2016).
In its 2017 survey of police and the public, the Pew Research Center asked,
“How much of the protest over deaths of blacks during encounters with the police are
motivated by long-standing bias against the police?” 95 percent of white officers and 85
percent of whites believe that protests are at least somewhat motivated by anti-police
bias, and 64 percent of black officers agree. However, 64 percent of blacks believe that
protests are motivated by a genuine desire to hold police accountable for their actions.
Understanding the factors that contribute to evaluations of police violence is crucial from
a policy standpoint. If citizens believe that racial disparities in OIS are a direct result of
discrimination by white officers, policies to increase the diversity of those officers might
improve community-police relations. Based on prior research assessing attitudes toward
law enforcement, I derive the following hypotheses:
H3a. “Police shootings involving a white officer and a black suspect are common
in the news. When a black suspect is killed by a white officer respondents will be
less likely, on average, to agree that the use of deadly force was appropriate.”
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H3b. “In some cases, officers have no choice but to use lethal force. When a
suspect imposes a high level of threat on an officer respondents will be more
likely, on average, to believe that the use of deadly force was legal.”
To examine the role of race and other factors in citizens’ evaluations of police
violence I utilized a 2 * 2 * 3 experimental survey design. Participants were randomly
assigned to either a control, or one of four treatment conditions which varied the racial
amalgamation of a police officer and a suspect (“baseline” vs. “BO / BS” vs. “BO / WS”
vs. “WO / WS” vs. “WO / BS), and media frames depicting the level of threat imposed
by a suspect (“low” vs. “medium”, vs. “high”) as the independent variables. 34 The photo
variation is important; respondents were told nothing explicitly to make them focus on
race. Threat was portrayed using four fictitious police shooting scenarios . In each
scenario, the suspect was wanted on felony charges for assault with a deadly weapon. In
the “low threat” condition, he exits his vehicle and advances toward the responding
officer before suddenly stopping and running in the opposite direction. In the “medium
threat” condition the suspect also advances on the officer before stopping and reaching
for his inside jacket pocket. Finally, in the “high threat” condition, our suspect advances,
stops, but then reaches for a firearm protruding from his waistband. The treatments I
employed in the survey experiment are included in “Appendix B”, and examples of each
are included in Figure 5.8.1, and 5.8.2 below. 35

34 In sample A, the threat condition was presented as a fictional newspaper account of a police shooting.
In sample B, the threat condition was presented textually in the body of the survey.
35 Racial amalgamations: baseline: race-neutral control group; BO/BS: black officer/black suspect;

BO/WS: black officer/white suspect; WO/WS: white officer/white suspect; WO/BS: white officer/black
suspect. Threat: low; medium; high.
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Figure 5.8.1 | Image Frame for White Officer / Black Suspect

Figure 5.8.2 | Image Frame for High Threat to Officer

This experimental manipulation allowed me to establish the causal effect of racial
characteristics and threat on individuals’ belief that the officer acted not only
appropriately, but legally.
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5.9

Data and Measurements
To test my assumptions about anti-violence values, racial attributions in the

justice system, confidence in the police, and experience with law enforcement – along
with the level of threat a suspect imposes, the racial amalgamation of an officer and
suspect, on respondents’ evaluations of an officer involved shooting incident, and support
for policies to reform policing, I administered two surveys.
Data from two unique surveys are reported throughout this chapter. Anti-violence
values were assessed with one of two measures, but my primary focus is on the
inductively specified scale produced in chapter 3 (see Table 5.9.1). Independent and
dependent variables of interest are not uniform across each survey sample, so findings are
reported where available throughout the relevant subsections herein. Sample A
administered question items in an online questionnaire form to 736 unique Mechanical
Turk workers. This survey included a seven-item honor-based measure which I
constructed using deductive reasoning (i.e. choosing the question items from the full
honor beliefs scale which I premised would best capture a person’s orientation toward
violence).36

36 Deductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “An individual should not be afraid to fight”; “People should be
expected to fight for themselves”; “You would want your child to stand up to bullies”; “A person who
doesn’t ‘take any crap’ from anybody is an admirable reputation to have”; “It is a person’s responsibility
to protect their family”; “If an individual is insulted, that person’s pride is insulted”; “A person’s family
should be their number one priority”.
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Sample B administered additional question items, including the seven-item
inductive version of anti-violence values to 1,120 unique Mechanical Turk workers. 37
violence).38 Sample B administered additional question items, including the seven-item
inductive version of anti-violence values to 1,120 unique Mechanical Turk workers. 39
Table 5.9.1 | Survey Samples for Police Violence Analyses
INDUCTIVE

DEDUCTIVE

SURVEY

DATE

SAMPLE

TYPE

MHBS

HBS

ANTI-VIOLENCE ANTI-VIOLENCE

Sample A

5/21/2018

N = 737

M-Turk

O

O

O

P

Sample B

3/10/2020

N = (1,120)

M-Turk

O

O

P

O

I controlled for the effects of factors common to most empirical analyses in the
social sciences including individuals’ age, biological sex, education, income, and political
ideology. Based on prior research, I also included several items which should be useful in
characterizing individuals and their views of the justice system, or that might influence

37 Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “It is important for a person to be tougher than other people”; A
person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp”; You would praise a person who acted
aggressively to an insult”; “Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable”; “It is morally
wrong for a person to walk away from a fight”; “A person who doesn’t take any crap from anybody is an
admirable reputation to have”; and “Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself”.

38 Deductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “An individual should not be afraid to fight”; “People should be
expected to fight for themselves”; “You would want your child to stand up to bullies”; “A person who
doesn’t ‘take any crap’ from anybody is an admirable reputation to have”; “It is a person’s responsibility
to protect their family”; “If an individual is insulted, that person’s pride is insulted”; “A person’s family
should be their number one priority”.
39 Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “It is important for a person to be tougher than other people”; A
person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp”; You would praise a person who acted
aggressively to an insult”; “Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable”; “It is morally
wrong for a person to walk away from a fight”; “A person who doesn’t take any crap from anybody is an
admirable reputation to have”; and “Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself”.
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attitudes toward suspects, law enforcement, and policies to address police violence.
Following Jacoby (2000) I included a control for attitudes toward government spending
which asked respondents to place themselves on a continuum between the following
positions: 0 “Government should provide many fewer services, reduce spending a lot”,
and 10 “Government should provide many more services, increase spending a lot”.
In both samples I included a control for authoritarianism. The most popular
measure today is Altemeyer’s Right Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale (Altemeyer 1981;
1988, 1996), but critics argue that it confounds social conservatism and authoritarianism
(Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). While much of the extant research suggests that
authoritarianism is a uniquely right-wing phenomena, recent research (Conway III et al.
2017) supports the idea that left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) is also a viable construct
in ordinary United States samples.
Conway III et al. found that left-wing authoritarianism significantly correlates
with measures of liberalism, prejudice, dogmatism, and attitude strength which “largely
paralleled those correlating with RWA with identical conservative-focused
measurements, and an overall effect-size measurement showed LWA was similarly
related to those constructs” (2017, 1). In sample A, I included a truncated version of both
the right-wing (Altemeyer 1996) and the left-wing (Conway III et al. 2017)
authoritarianism scales. Respondents were randomly assigned to complete either the
RWA, or LWA battery.
In sample B, following Hetherington et al. (2011) I used the four-item
authoritarianism index included in the American National Election Survey (ANES) which
asks respondents to indicate which of two positive traits is most important for a child to
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have: “respect for elders” versus “independence”; “obedience” versus “self-reliance”;
“curiosity” versus “good manners”; and “being considerate” versus “being wellbehaved”. As the authors point out, these values are “fairly well-divorced from political
ideology and attitudes; therefore, the measure is unlikely to be conflated with social
conservatism and is easily distinguishable from the dependent variables” (551).
Where anti-violence values play a primary role in my analysis, I focus solely on
sample B, which includes the inductively derived anti-violence measure. Recall that
principal component analysis in Chapter 3 produced a 7-item attitudes toward violence
factor (Eigenvalue = 1.85) including items that tap either the belief that individuals
should maintain a no-nonsense reputation, or that violence is often acceptable. These
were the least popular question items suggesting that most individuals do not condone
violence. Respondents reported their agreement with these statements on seven-point
scales ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”, and the scale was then
recoded so that higher scores indicated a greater aversion to violence.
Sex Differences:
Recall H1a, that “On average, females will score higher on anti-violence values
when compared to males”. An independent t-test was run on the data from Sample B to
determine if there were differences in the endorsement of anti-violence values based upon
the respondent’s biological sex. H1a was supported and is visually displayed in Figure
5.9.2 below.40

40 Sample B: (t = 7.12, with 1,119 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
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Figure 5.9.1 | Anti-Violence Values

Females, on average, scored significantly higher on anti-violence values when
compared to males in sample B. Because the deductively derived scale administered in
sample A is statistically inferior to the inductively derived version administered in sample
B, results for the former were excluded. 41
Respondents’ dispositional (internal) and systemic (external) explanations for
racial disparities in the justice system were measured following Peffley et al. (2017). The
“blacks discriminated against” items tap respondents’ agreement with the idea that the
police and the justice system are biased against blacks. The “blacks’ negative
dispositions” items tap respondents’ agreement with the idea that blacks are more
aggressive by nature, and more likely to commit crimes.

41 Some question items (e.g. “It is a person’s responsibility to protect their family”; “If an individual is
insulted, that person’s pride is insulted”; “A person’s family should be their number one priority”) are
likely not related to individuals’ orientation toward violence, which might explain the lower scores on
these scales for both sexes when compared to the statistically constructed scale in sample B.
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Recall H2a. Blacks and other minorities will be more likely, on average, to
attribute racial disparities in the justice system to racial discrimination when compared
to whites. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine whether
individual perceptions of discrimination in the justice system varied by respondents’
race/ethnicity. Data is mean +/- standard error.
In sample A, participants were classified into four groups: white (n= 562), black
(n= 52), Hispanic/Latino (n= 43), and other (n= 79). Despite the fact that the number of
respondents in most groups is relatively small, and disproportionately so compared to the
“white” group, these numbers are high enough to warrant subgroup analyses. 42
Preliminary analyses showed that there were statistically significant differences between
group means (F (3, 732) = 12.99, p < .001), and a Tukey post-hoc test revealed that
blacks (0.82 +/- 0.14, p < .001), and Hispanics/Latinos (0.38 +/- 0.15, p = .060), are
significantly more likely than whites to believe that the police and the justice system are
biased against blacks.43 However, those who identified as “other” were significantly less
likely than blacks to believe that the police and the justice system are biased against
blacks (-0.38 +/- 0.17, p < .001). There were no statistically significant differences
between the remaining racial/ethnic groups. An additional analysis was conducted to

42 Six assumptions must be met to obtain valid results using a one-way Anova: 1) the dependent variable

should be continuous; 2) the independent variable should consist of three or more unrelated groups; 3)
there should be independence of observations; 4) there should be no significant outliers; 5) data should
be normally distributed in each group; and 6) there should be homogeneity of variance. While
unequal/small sample sizes can affect the homogeneity of variance assumption, a Bartlett’s test for equal
variance indicated that heterogeneity of variance is not a problem. For sample A, all six assumptions for a
valid one-way Anova analysis were satisfied.
43 A Tukey post-hoc test is used to examine the specific differences between three or more groups when
an analysis of variance (ANOVA) produces a significant F-test. ANOVA alone will not reveal exactly where
those differences lie.
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determine whether individual perceptions of blacks’ dispositions varied by respondents’
race.
Preliminary analyses showed that there were statistically significant differences
between group means (F (3, 732) = 2.65, p < .05), and a Tukey post-hoc test revealed that
blacks are significantly less likely than whites to believe that blacks are more aggressive
by nature and more likely to commit crimes (-0.30 +/- 0.12, p < .05). However, those
who identified as “other” were significantly more likely than blacks to embrace negative
black stereotypes (0.37 +/- 0.15, p < .05) see Table 5.9.2 below.
Table 5.9.2 | ANOVA for Justice System Discriminatory, by Race/Ethnicity
Justice System Discriminatory
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares
36.17
679.57
715.74

DF
3.00
733.00
736.00

Mean Square
12.06
0.93
0.98

N
563
52
43
79
736

Mean
2.47
3.29
2.85
2.51
2.55

SD
0.97
0.79
1.09
0.96
0.99

Contrast
0.82
0.38
0.05
-0.44
-0.78
-0.34

Std. Err.
0.14
0.15
0.12
0.20
0.17
0.18

5.88
2.50
0.39
-2.21
-4.51
-1.84

F
12.99

Prob > F
0.00

p > |ᵼ|
0.00
0.06
0.98
0.12
0.00
0.26

Lower
0.46
-0.01
-0.25
-0.95
-1.21
-0.81

Group Means
White
Black
Hispanic/Latino
Other
Total
Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=736)

Differences in Means
Black v. White
Hispanic/Latino v. White
Other v. White
Hispanic/Latino v. Black
Other v. Black
Other v. Hispanic/Latino

ᵼ

Upper
1.18
0.77
0.34
0.07
-0.33
0.13

Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=736)

In sample B, participants were classified into four groups: white (n= 837), black
(n= 92), Hispanic/Latino (n= 63), and other (n= 127). Preliminary analyses showed that
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there were statistically significant differences between group means (F (3, 1115) = 7.99,
p < .001), however, the data did not meet the six assumptions required for a valid
ANOVA. As a result, I was not able to conduct sub-group analyses for sample B. 44
Overall, H2a was partially supported. In sample A, blacks (0.82 +/- 0.14, p <
.001), and Hispanics/Latinos (0.38 +/- 0.15, p = .060), were significantly more likely than
whites to believe that the police and the justice system are biased against blacks.
However, respondents who identified as “other” were not statistically different from
whites. Additionally, blacks were significantly less likely than whites to believe that
blacks are more aggressive by nature and more likely to commit crimes (-0.30 +/- 0.12, p
< .05). In sample B, however, I was not able to conduct sub-group analyses because the
ANOVA assumptions were not satisfied.
Recall H3a, that “Police shootings involving a white officer and a black suspect
are common in the news. When a black suspect is killed by a white officer individuals will
be less likely, on average, to agree that the officers’ use of deadly force was
appropriate”. Additionally, while the racial characteristics of an officer and suspect
likely impacts individuals’ evaluation of a lethal OIS, the level of threat imposed by a
suspect should be an important consideration as well. Thus, H3 b, “In some cases, officers
have no choice but to use lethal force. When a suspect imposes a high level of threat upon
an officer individuals will be more likely, on average, to believe that the officer’s use of
lethal force was appropriate or legal”.
44 The data for sample B did not meet the six assumptions required for valid ANOVA results. The
unequal/small sample sizes in sample B affected the homogeneity of variance assumption. Although
ANOVA is considered robust to moderate departures from this assumption, they should be small when
the sample sizes are vastly different. Additionally, a Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that the data for “whites”
and “blacks” was not normally distributed – another assumption required to obtain valid ANOVA results
(Pierce et al. 2004).
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Respondents were randomly assigned to either a baseline condition with very
little information about the suspect or officer in a fictional account of a deadly OIS, or
one of four treatment conditions varying the racial amalgamation of the officer and
suspect involved. Using an experimental design, I examined the effect of the racial
amalgamation of an officer and suspect, and the level of threat imposed upon an officer,
on respondents’ evaluations of a police shooting – including whether they believe the
officer’s actions were appropriate or legal.45 The distinction is important; some OIS are
determined to be technically legal, but not necessarily appropriate (e.g. some form of
non-lethal force may have been sufficient).
I also developed four fictitious police shooting scenarios to examine the impact of
the level of threat imposed. In each scenario, the suspect was wanted on felony charges
for assault with a deadly weapon. In the “low threat” condition, he exits his vehicle and
advances toward the responding officer before suddenly stopping and running in the
opposite direction. In the “medium threat” condition the suspect also advances on the
officer before stopping and reaching for his inside jacket pocket. Finally, in the “high
threat” condition, our suspect advances, stops, but then reaches for a firearm protruding
from his waistband.

45 Control: No racial information provided; BO/BS: Black officer; black suspect; BO/WS: Black officer;
white suspect; WO/WS: White officer; white suspect; WO/BS: White officer; black suspect. In survey
sample A, whether the officer acted appropriately was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1.
“Inappropriately” to 5. “Appropriately”.
Whether the officer acted within the law was a dichotomous measure: 0. “No” and 1. “Yes”. Because this
is not a continuous variable, I did not conduct ANOVA to examine differences in group means. Evaluations
of legality are assessed using logistic regression in the following section.
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5.10

Experimental Results – Belief that a Lethal OIS was Appropriate

Racial Amalgamation of Officer and Suspect
Respondents were randomly assigned to view either the control, or one of four
treatment conditions. In survey sample A (N= 736), the difference in the average score on
“appropriate” between treatment groups was significant (F (4, 732) = 6.46, p < 0.001).
The Post Hoc results are displayed in Table 5.10.1. 46
Table 5.10.1 | ANOVA for Racial Amalgamation Experimental Conditions
Officer Acted Appropriately
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares
48.80
1381.46
1430.26

DF
4.00
732.00
736.00

Mean Square
12.20
1.89
1.95

N
129
136
153
148
170
736

Mean
2.24
2.51
2.80
2.45
2.07
2.41

SD
1.43
1.33
1.44
1.44
1.23
1.39

Contrast
0.56
-0.44
-0.73

Std. Err.
0.16
0.16
0.15

3.43
-2.81
-4.79

F
6.46

Prob > F
0.00

p > |ᵼ|
0.01
0.04
0.01

Lower
0.11
-0.88
-1.15

Group Means
Baseline
Black Officer/Black Suspect
Black Officer/White Suspect
White Officer/White Suspect
White Officer/Black Suspect
Total
Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=736)

Differences in Means
BO/WS v. Baseline
WO/BS v. BO/BS
WO/BS v. BO/WS

ᵼ

Upper
1.01
-0.01
-0.31

Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=736)

46 Differences in group means are excluded if the difference did not achieve statistical significance.
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In survey sample B (N= 1120), the difference in the average score between treatment
groups on “appropriate” was significant (F (4, 731) = 6.46, p < 0.001). The Post Hoc
results are displayed in Table 5.10.2. 47
Table 5.10.2 | ANOVA for Racial Amalgamation Experimental Conditions
Officer Acted Appropriately
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares
48.88
4000.11
4048.99

DF
4.00
1016.00
1120.00

Mean Square
12.22
3.61
3.64

N
211
205
239
223
240
1120

Mean
4.36
4.58
4.78
4.23
4.71
4.54

SD
1.88
1.86
1.89
1.98
1.88
1.91

Contrast
-0.55
0.48

Std. Err.
0.18
0.17

-3.11
2.70

F
3.39

Prob > F
0.01

p > |ᵼ|
0.02
0.04

Lower
-1.03
-0.01

Group Means
Baseline
Black Officer/Black Suspect
Black Officer/White Suspect
White Officer/White Suspect
White Officer/Black Suspect
Total
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)

Differences in Means
WO/BS v. BO/BS
BO/WS v. WO/BS

ᵼ

Upper
-0.07
0.97

Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)

Overall, H3a “Police shootings involving a white officer and a black suspect are
common in the news. When a black suspect is killed by a white officer respondents will be
less likely, on average, to agree that the use of deadly force was appropriate” was
partially supported. In many cases, respondents were prejudiced against white police
officers dealing with African-American suspects. In sample A, respondents who received
the “WO/BS” treatment were significantly less likely than those who received the
“BO/BS” to believe the officer’s actions were appropriate (-0.44 +/- 0.16, p < .05). Those
47 Differences in group means are excluded if the difference did not achieve statistical significance.

In survey sample B, whether the officer acted appropriately was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from
1. “Extremely Inappropriately” to 7. “Extremely Appropriately”.
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who received the “WO/BS” treatment were significantly less likely than those who
received the “BO/WS” to believe the officer’s actions were appropriate (-0.73 +/- 0.15, p
< .001). Those who received the “BO/WS” treatment were significantly more likely than
those who received the “Control” to believe the officer’s actions were appropriate (0.56
+/- 0.16, p < .001). However, respondents who received the “WO/BS” treatment were
not significantly more likely to disapprove of the officer’s actions compared to those in
the “Control” group (F (-0.17) = 0.16, p = .828).
To unpack these results in more detail, treatment group means for sample A –
broken down by respondents’ race/ethnicity, on belief the officer acted appropriately –
compared to control group means – are displayed in figure 5.10.1 below. Surprisingly,
significant differences in evaluations of the officer’s actions, across treatment groups,
emerged only among white respondents.
In sample B, preliminary analyses showed that there were statistically significant
differences between group means (F (3, 1115) = 7.99, p < .001), however, the data did
not meet the six assumptions required for a valid ANOVA. As a result, I was not able to
conduct sub-group analyses for sample B. 48

48 The data for sample B did not meet the six assumptions required for valid ANOVA results. The
unequal/small sample sizes in sample B affected the homogeneity of variance assumption. Although
ANOVA is considered robust to moderate departures from this assumption, they should be small when
the sample sizes are vastly different. Additionally, a Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that the data for “whites”
and “blacks” was not normally distributed – another assumption required to obtain valid ANOVA results
(Pierce et al. 2004).
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Figure 5.10.1 | Belief that the Officer Acted Appropriately, by Race/Ethnicity

Level of Threat Imposed by the Suspect
Respondents were randomly assigned to view one of three treatment conditions
varying the level of threat imposed upon the officer. In survey sample A (N = 736), the
difference in the average score on “appropriate” between treatment groups was not
significant (F (2, 734) = 0.15, p = 0.86). In survey sample B (N = 1,120), however, the
difference in the average score on “appropriate” between treatment groups was
significant (F (2, 1,118) = 20.90, p = 0.00). The Post Hoc results are displayed in Table
5.10.3.49

49 Differences in group means are excluded if the difference did not achieve statistical significance.
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Table 5.10.3 | ANOVA for Threat Imposed Experimental Conditions
Threat Imposed by Suspect
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares
146.83
3902.16
4048.99

DF
2.00
1018.00
1120.00

Mean Square
73.42
3.51
3.64

N
369
356
395
1120

Mean
4.06
4.58
4.94
4.54

SD
1.89
1.85
1.88
1.91

Contrast
0.52
0.88
0.36

Std. Err.
0.14
0.14
0.14

3.69
6.45
2.65

F
20.90

Prob > F
0.00

p > |ᵼ|
0.00
0.00
0.02

Lower
0.19
0.56
0.04

Group Means
Low Threat
Medium Threat
High Threat
Total
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)

Differences in Means
Medium v. Low Threat
High v. Low Threat
High v. Medium Threat

ᵼ

Upper
0.84
1.20
0.68

Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)

Overall, H3b “In some cases, officers have no choice but to use lethal force. When
a suspect imposes a high level of threat on an officer respondents will be more likely, on
average, to believe that the use of deadly force was legal.” was partially supported. In
sample B, respondents who received the “Medium Threat” treatment were significantly
more likely than those who received the “Low Threat” to believe the officer’s actions
were appropriate (+0.52 +/- 0.14, p = 0.00). Those who received the “High Threat”
treatment were significantly more likely than those who received the “Low Threat” to
believe the officer’s actions were appropriate (+0.88 +/- 0.14, p < 0.00). Finally, those
who received the “High Threat” treatment were significantly more likely than those who
received the “Medium Threat” to believe the officer’s actions were appropriate (+0.36 +/0.14, p < 0.02).
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Multiple-Regression Models
Overall, ANOVA indicated that when it comes to evaluations of lethal officerinvolved shootings the racial amalgamation of the officer and the suspect involved
matter. When the officer is white, people tend to be more suspicious and less likely to
view his actions favorably. On the other hand, when the officer is black, people tend to be
less skeptical and more likely to believe the officer’s actions were appropriate. The
treatment that garnered the strongest opposition, as expected, was the lethal OIS
involving a white officer and a black suspect. For the reasons put forth throughout this
chapter, it is not surprising that people are often apprehensive when a white officer kills a
black suspect.
When it comes to assessments of the level of threat the suspect imposes, the
results were mixed. In sample A, there were no significant differences in evaluations of
the officer’s actions based upon “threat”. I suspect, however, that this was because
respondents failed to closely read the fictitious newspaper accounts of the OIS, which
rendered the treatment ineffective. In sample B, threat was transmitted textually within
the body of the survey. As a result, approval of the officer’s actions increased
significantly as the level of threat increased.
My results thus far are unfolded mostly as expected, however, I have examined
differences in individuals’ evaluation of an OIS based only on the racial characteristics of
the officer and suspect – and the level of threat imposed by the suspect – independently,
absent additional covariates. I now turn to testing my remaining hypotheses for
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evaluations of a lethal OIS. Specifically, H1b: “Respondents who score higher on antiviolence values will be less likely, on average, to believe a police officer shooting – and
killing – a suspect is appropriate or legal”, and H2b. “Because discrimination
attributions focus on racial bias among police and courts, individuals who embrace the
idea that the justice system is biased against blacks will be less likely, on average, to
approve of a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect.
My overarching argument throughout this project is that violence-justifying
ideologies (primarily racial animus in the current analysis) will cancel out any
normatively positive outcomes that individuals’ aversion to violence might otherwise
produce. Assessing the attitudes that help determine individuals’ assessment of a lethal
police encounter provide another opportunity to empirically test my theory. Specifically,
H2d: “Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence
values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less
likely, on average, to condemn a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect.”
In order to test my hypotheses, I estimated five models. 50 My key independent
variables are the 7-item anti-violence values battery and the 2-item measure of negative
stereotypes (blacks’ negative dispositions). To assess the effect of negative stereotypes
about blacks on the predictive power of individuals’ aversion to violence, I included an
interaction term between blacks’ negative dispositions and anti-violence values. I expect
racial stereotypes to produce negative signs: respondents who believe that blacks are to
50 In the first model, I looked only at the racial amalgamation of the officer and suspect, and the
race/ethnicity of the respondents. Model 2 incorporates the level of threat imposed upon the officer.
Model 3 includes my measure of anti-violence values to examine its function absent competing
covariates. Model 4 incorporates the remaining independent variables that I believe help shape
evaluations of police violence, and Model 5, which I discuss in detail, includes my interaction term of
blacks negative dispositions * anti-violence values.
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blame for racial disparities in the justice system, will be more likely to endorse police
violence. Anti-violence values should produce positive signs: the more a respondent
abhors violence, the more likely they will be to disapprove of a lethal officer-involved
shooting. My underlying assumption, however, is that interacting these variables will
produce a negative sign; as racism increases, anti-violence values will no longer predict
disapproval of the officer’s actions.
I included additional experimental variables including the racial amalgamation of
the officer and suspect (Control, BO/BS, BO/WS, WO/WS, WO/BS), and the level of
threat imposed by the suspect (Low, Medium, High). The models also include age,
education, income, biological sex, race/ethnicity, blacks’ negative dispositions, blacks
discriminated against, political ideology (conservatism), and authoritarianism. 51 Results
from the fully specified model are reported for sample B; entries are OLS coefficients
with standard errors.

51 In the interest of saving space age, education, income, and biological sex (not significant) were omitted
from the regression table.
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Mechanical Turk Sample B
Table 5.10.4 | Belief that the Officer Acted Appropriately
MODEL 1
Racial Amalgamation
Black Officer / Black Suspect
Black Officer / White Suspect
White Officer / White Suspect
White Officer / Black Suspect

Hispanic / Latino

MODEL 4

MODEL 5

0.384 **
(0.176)
0.313 **
(0.177)
0.203
(0.183)
-0.118
(0.179)

0.413 **
(0.176)
0.342 **
(0.172)
0.208
(0.183)
-0.095
(0.179)

0.437 **
(0.171)
0.399 **
(0.171)
0.216
(0.178)
-0.021
(0.174)

0.439 **
(0.172)
0.403 **
(0.172)
0.217
(0.178)
-0.017
(0.174)

0.516 ***
(0.180)
0.125
(0.261)
0.346
(0.292)

0.511 ***
(0.139)
0.852 ***
(0.136)
0.517 ***
(0.177)
0.152
(0.257)
0.424
(0.288)

0.516
(0.138)
0.843
(0.135)
0.503
(0.177)
0.074
(0.259)
0.398
(0.281)
-0.117
(0.049)

0.573
(0.134)
0.851
(0.131)
0.298
(0.173)
0.04
(0.254)
0.397
(0.255)
0.009
(0.053)
-0.28
(0.066)
0.211
(0.074)
0.493
(0.132)
0.146
(0.244)

0.571
(0.134)
0.849
(0.131)
0.293
(0.173)
0.036
(0.255)
0.384
(0.283)
0.061
(0.129)
-0.286
(0.068)
0.133
(0.190)
0.493
(0.132)
0.15
(0.244)
-0.025
(0.055)

High

Black

MODEL 3

0.418 **
(0.179)
0.354 **
(0.179)
0.207
(0.186)
-0.118
(0.182)

Level of Threat Imposed
Medium

White

MODEL 2

Anti-Violence
Blacks Discriminated Against
Blacks' Negative Dispositions
Conservatism
Authoritarianism

***
***
***

**

Blacks Negative Dispositions *
Anti-Violence
Adj. R2
0.02
0.05
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)

0.05

0.13

***
***
*

***
***
***

***
***
*

***

***

0.13

In the fully specified model for sample B, we see that the racial characteristics of
the officer and suspect have a significant impact on individuals’ belief that the officer’s
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actions were appropriate.52 Respondents in the “Black Officer / White Suspect” group
(+0.40), and the “Black Officer / Black Suspect” (+0.44) groups were significantly more
likely to believe the officer acted appropriately. White respondents were significantly
more likely to agree (+0.29), all else equal. H2 b. “Because discrimination attributions
focus on racial bias among police and courts, individuals who embrace the idea that the
justice system is biased against blacks will be less likely, on average, to approve of a
police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect” was supported. For every one unit
increase in a respondent’s belief that blacks are discriminated against respondents were
less likely (-0.29) to approve of the officer’s actions. H1b: “Individuals who embrace antiviolence values will be less likely to believe a police officer shooting – and killing – a
suspect is appropriate or legal”; was not supported. Additionally, conservatives (+0.49)
were more likely to side with the officer.
Respondents presented with a medium level of threat (+0.57), or a high level of
threat (+0.85) to the officer approved of the shooting significantly more than those
presented with the low threat scenario. I found no empirical evidence to support H2 d: that
“Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values.
Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely,
on average, to condemn a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect.” The

52 In the first model, I looked only at the racial amalgamation of the officer and suspect, and the

race/ethnicity of the respondents. Model 2 incorporates the level of threat imposed upon the officer.
Model 3 includes my measure of anti-violence values to examine its function absent competing
covariates. Model 4 incorporates the remaining independent variables that I believe help shape
evaluations of police violence, and Model 5, which I discuss in detail, includes my interaction term of
blacks negative dispositions * anti-violence values.
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coefficient for my interaction of blacks’ negative dispositions * anti-violence values
performed as expected (-0.03) but was not significant.
Table 5.10.5 | Belief that the Officer’s Actions were Legal
MODEL 1
Racial Amalgamation
Black Officer / Black Suspect
Black Officer / White Suspect
White Officer / White Suspect
White Officer / Black Suspect

MODEL 2

MODEL 3

0.087 **
(0.043)
0.004
(0.043)
0.033
(0.044)
-0.024
(0.043)

0.082 *
(0.042)
-0.003
(0.042)
0.029
(0.044)
-0.025
(0.043)

0.077 *
(0.042)
-0.007
(0.043)
0.025
(0.044)
-0.022
(0.043)

0.089 **
(0.041)
0.003
(0.041)
0.025
(0.043)
-0.025
(0.043)

0.089 **
(0.042)
0.005
(0.042)
0.026
(0.043)
-0.031
(0.042)

0.077 *
(0.043)
-0.066
(0.062)
0.108
(0.070)

0.125 ***
(0.033)
0.167 ***
(0.032)
0.077 *
(0.420)
-0.063
(0.062)
0.122
(0.069)

0.124
(0.033)
0.168
(0.032)
0.079
(0.042)
-0.051
(0.062)
0.126
(0.069)
0.017
(0.012)

0.138
(0.032)
0.174
(0.032)
0.02
(0.042)
-0.040
(0.062)
0.096
(0.068)
0.032
(0.012)
-0.061
(0.016)
0.009
(0.018)
0.097
(0.032)
0.111
(0.059)

0.137
(0.032)
0.174
(0.032)
0.019
(0.042)
-0.041
(0.062)
0.094
(0.068)
0.042
(0.031)
-0.062
(0.016)
0.005
(0.046)
0.097
(0.032)
0.111
(0.061)
-0.005
(0.013)

Level of Threat Imposed
Medium
High
White
Black
Hispanic / Latino
Anti-Violence
Blacks Discriminated Against
Blacks' Negative Dispositions
Conservatism
Authoritarianism

***
***
*

*

MODEL 4

Blacks Negative Dispositions *
Anti-Violence
2

Adj. R
0.01
0.03
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)

0.03

***
***

**
***

***

MODEL 5

0.09

***
***

***

***

0.1

In the fully specified model for sample B, we see that the racial characteristics of
the officer and suspect have a significant impact on individuals’ belief that the officer’s
actions were legal. Respondents in the “Black Officer / Black Suspect” group were
significantly more likely (+0.44) to believe the officer acted within the law. H2 b.
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“Because discrimination attributions focus on racial bias among police and courts,
individuals who embrace the idea that the justice system is biased against blacks will be
less likely to approve of a police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect” was
supported. For every one unit increase in a respondent’s belief that blacks are
discriminated against respondents were less likely (-0.06) to believe the officer’s actions
were legal. H1b: “Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be less
likely, on average, to believe a police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect is
appropriate or legal” was not supported.
Respondents presented with a medium level of threat (+0.14), or a high level of
threat (+0.18) to the officer approved of the shooting significantly more than those
presented with the low threat scenario. I found no empirical evidence to support H2 d:
“Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values.
Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely,
on average, to condemn a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect.” The
coefficient for my interaction of blacks’ negative dispositions * anti-violence values
performed opposite as expected (-0.03) but was not significant.
In sum, the findings from sample B reveal consistent factors that impact
individual evaluations of incidents of lethal OIS. Anti-violence values were not in this
category; they were not a significant factor once other important predictors were included
in the model. Respondents were not significantly more likely to disapprove of a shooting
when the officer is white and the suspect is black, yet in every analysis, respondents were
more likely to approve of the shooting when a black officer was involved. When the level
of threat was measured in a straightforward manner, the perceived danger to the officer
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pulling the trigger was an important factor. As the level of threat increased, respondents
were significantly more likely to approve of the shooting and believe that the officer
acted within the law. Those who believe that racial disparities in the criminal justice
system result from discrimination against blacks were consistently less likely to approve
of the shooting or believe that it was legal. Finally, conservatives were consistently and
significantly more likely to condone police violence – regardless of the circumstances.
5.11

Support for Policies to Better Track and Reduce Police Violence
I now assess additional hypotheses concerning support for policies to better track

and reduce police violence.53 Specifically, H1c: “Respondents who score higher on antiviolence values will be more likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies
and services to reduce police violence” and H2c. “Because dispositional attributions
focus on racial stereotypes, whites who embrace negative stereotypes about blacks, when
presented the “racial argument” will be less likely, on average, to support institutional
reforms to decrease police violence when compared to those in the baseline condition.”
My overarching argument throughout this project is that violence-justifying
ideologies (racial animus in the current analysis) will cancel out any normatively positive
outcomes that individuals’ aversion to violence might otherwise produce. Specifically,
H2e: “Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence

53 Responses ranged between “strongly disagree”, and “strongly agree” on a 7-point Likert scale. Full
question battery is included in Appendix A. Additional items measuring support for increased government
funding were included in sample B. Respondents were asked “In terms of policies to help investigate and
prevent police violence please indicate whether you believe that government funding for the following
initiatives should be higher, or lower than the current levels”. Responses ranged between “much lower”
and “much higher” on a 7-point Likert scale. Full question batteries are included in Appendix B.
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values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less
likely, on average, to support policies to track and reduce police violence.”
In order to test my hypotheses, I estimated four models. My key independent
variables are the 7-item anti-violence values battery and the 2-item measure of negative
stereotypes (blacks’ negative dispositions). To assess the effect of negative stereotypes
about blacks on the predictive power of individuals’ aversion to violence, I included an
interaction term between blacks’ negative dispositions and anti-violence values. I expect
racial stereotypes to produce negative signs: respondents who believe that blacks are to
blame for racial disparities in the justice system, will be less likely to support policies to
better track and reduce police violence. Anti-violence values should produce positive
signs: the more a respondent rejects violence, the more likely they will be to support
those policies. My underlying assumption, however, is that interacting these variables
will produce a negative sign; as racism increases, anti-violence values will no longer
predict support for policies to address police violence.
I also included an issue-framing experiment following Peffley et al.’s (2017)
examination of support for the death penalty, but to assess instead the power of negative
stereotypes about blacks to influence support for policies to decrease incidents of police
violence.54 The authors found that “when presented with the argument that the death
penalty is biased against blacks, whites who blame blacks’ harsh treatment on their
dispositional shortcomings actually become more, not less, supportive of the death
54 Control Argument: Do you favor or oppose a requirement that police officers attempt to use non-lethal
methods first (e.g. a baton, pepper spray, a taser) when a suspect is non-compliant and being physically
aggressive toward an officer or other individual? Treatment conditions included in Appendix B.
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penalty compared with the baseline condition” (1046). In my analysis, I suspect that
whites who blame blacks’ harsh treatment on their dispositional shortcomings, when
presented with the “racial argument” will be less supportive of institutional reforms to
decrease police violence compared to those in the baseline condition. Results from the
fully specified model are reported; entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors.
Table 5.11.1 | Policies to Track, and Decrease Instances of Police Violence
SAMPLE B
Age

0.006
(0.002)
0.086
(0.064)
-0.003
(0.015)
-0.023
(0.022)
-0.168
(0.098)
-0.099
(0.144)
-0.384
(0.159)
0.154
(0.030)
0.09
(0.013)
0.397
(0.039)
-0.115
(0.042)
0.063
(0.076)
0.092
(0.139)

Female
Income
Education
White
Black
Hispanic / Latino
Anti-Violence
Government Spending
Blacks Discriminated Against
Blacks' Negative Dispositions
Conservatism
Authoritarianism

Blacks Negative Dispositions *
Anti-Violence

***

*

***
***
***
***
**

SAMPLE B
(Interactive)
0.006
(0.002)
0.085
(0.064)
-0.003
(0.015)
-0.026
(0.022)
-0.182
(0.098)
-0.112
(0.144)
-0.428
(0.159)
0.329
(0.073)
0.087
(0.013)
0.377
(0.044)
-0.377
(0.040)
0.059
(0.076)
0.079
(0.138)
-0.082
(0.031)

Adj. R2
0.25
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Sample B; (N=1,120)
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0.25

**

*

***
***
***
***
***

***

In the fully specified model for sample B, we see that whites were significantly
less likely (-0.17) to support police reforms as were Hispanics/Latinos (-0.38). The more
violent-averse were (as expected) more likely to support policy changes (+0.15), all else
equal. Those who blame racial disparities in the justice system on blacks’ dispositional
shortcomings were significantly less likely to favor reforms (-0.12). For every one unit
increase in a respondent’s belief that government should provide increase funding for
additional services support for policies to reduce police violence increased (+0.08). In
sample B, H1c: “Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more
likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to reduce
police violence” was supported. For every one unit increase in anti-violence values,
support for policies to reduce police violence increased (+0.33).
My primary hypothesis, H2e: “Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively
positive force of anti-violence values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative
black dispositions will be less likely, on average, to support policies to track and reduce
police violence.” was fully supported in the interactive model of sample B. The estimates
of the anti-violence slope decrease as a function of blacks’ negative dispositions. For
example, at the lowest level of blacks’ negative dispositions the anti-violence slope is at
(+0.25), and at the highest level the slope is at (0.00), a decrease of (-0.25). For every one
unit increase in blacks’ negative dispositions, the anti-violence slope decreases by (0.08). To visually display the impact of this interaction term I created a graph of the
adjusted means placing blacks’ negative dispositions on the x-axis and separate lines for
“low”, “medium”, and “high” levels of anti-violence (See Figure 5.11.1).
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Figure 5.11.1 | Predictive Margins Negative Black Dispositions * Anti-Violence

I now turn to the issue-framing experiment to assess the power of negative
stereotypes about blacks to influence support for policies to decrease incidents of police
violence. In my analysis, I theorized that whites who blame blacks’ harsh treatment on
their dispositional shortcomings, when presented with the “racial argument” would be
less supportive of police reforms to decrease police violence compared to those in the
baseline condition. H2c. “Because dispositional attributions focus on racial stereotypes,
whites who embrace negative stereotypes about blacks, when presented the “racial
argument” will be less likely, on average, to support institutional reforms to decrease
police violence when compared to those in the baseline condition” was not supported.
There was no significant difference between support for police reform between the
baseline and racial argument conditions along the negative blacks’ dispositions scale
among white respondents. Results from the fully specified and interactive model (whites
only) are reported; entries are logistic coefficients with standard errors.

192

Table 5.11.2 | Support for Police Reforms to Decrease Violence
SAMPLE B

Blacks Negative Dispositions *
Racial Argument

SAMPLE B
(Interactive)
0.023 ***
(0.008)
0.032
(0.204)
0.006
(0.065)
1.53 ***
(0.387)
-0.343
(0.499)
0.093
(0.224)
0.101
(0.442)
-0.290
(0.556)

Blacks Negative Dispositions *
Innocence Argument

-0.516
(0.538)

Age

0.023 ***
(0.008)
0.035
(0.202)
0.007
(0.064)
1.501 ***
(0.386)
-0.643 *
(0.377)
0.091
(0.224)
0.11
(0.444)

Female
Education
Blacks Discriminated Against
Blacks' Negative Dispositions
Conservatism
Authoritarianism

Pseudo R2
0.05
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Sample B; Whites (n=595)

5.12

0.05

Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, I empirically tested my argument that individual’s

orientation toward violence should help shape their evaluations of police violence. I
expected that individuals who are more averse to violence would be more likely to
disapprove of a police shooting, and more likely to support policies and spending to
better track and reduce incidents of police violence. Anti-violence values were assessed
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with my inductively specified scale which I produced using principal component analysis
in Chapter 3.55
As was the case in the previous chapter on sexual violence, I found empirical
support for the expectation that anti-violence values will produce normatively positive
results in terms of police violence-related outcomes of interest. On the other hand, I also
found empirical support for my overarching theory, that violence-justifying ideologies
(e.g. racial stereotypes) often diminish the normatively positive force that anti-violence
values would otherwise produce.
Across two empirical models, H1b: “Respondents who score higher on antiviolence values will be less likely, on average, to believe a police officer shooting – and
killing – a suspect is appropriate or legal” was supported in only one model. Overall, I
found little evidence that violence averse individuals were more (or less) likely to
disapprove of the lethal OIS, or to believe that the officer acted outside of the law.
Additionally, I did not find any support for my claim that interacting anti-violence values
and negative black dispositions would produce negative signs; as racism increased, antiviolence values would no longer predict disapproval of the officer’s actions. The
interaction term did not achieve significance in any of my models.
On the other hand, my primary hypothesis, H2e: “Racist stereotypes will attenuate
the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence averse individuals who
endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely, on average, to support policies to
55 Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “It is important for a person to be tougher than other people”; A
person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp”; You would praise a person who acted
aggressively to an insult”; “Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable”; “It is morally
wrong for a person to walk away from a fight”; “A person who doesn’t take any crap from anybody is an
admirable reputation to have”; and “Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself”.
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track and reduce police violence.” was fully supported in the interactive model of sample
B. The estimates of the anti-violence slope decreased as a function blacks’ negative
dispositions. Throughout this analysis, those who endorsed negative stereotypes about
blacks and were often more likely to approve of police violence, to resist police reform
policies and increased government spending to reduce that violence. Individuals’
aversion to violence did not translate to a propensity to question police violence, and
when it did produce significantly positive outcomes those effects were often diminished
by violence-justifying ideology – racism in particular.
Efforts intended to decrease police violence in the United States should focus on
breaking down the stereotypes that allow individuals to justify violence. Whether an
individual condones violence appears to have little impact on their perception of victims,
or their support for policies to better track and reduce OIS incidents once we account for
the violence-justifying ideologies that diminish the benefits of aversion to violence.
Victims’ advocates suggest that there should be a greater number of minorities in law
enforcement. I found some evidence that this would help police, community relations –
especially when a racially charged OIS takes place. In every case, respondents were
significantly more likely to say that the officer’s actions were both legal, and appropriate
when the officer involved was black. Absent efforts to break down violence-justifying
ideologies, it appears unlikely that widespread aversion to violence will make any
substantive difference.
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CHAPTER 6. DISSERTATION CONCLUSION
6.1

Conclusion
Stephen Pinker (2011) argues, in his seminal work The Better Angels of Our

Nature, that violence has declined over time and that we are living in the most-peaceful
era of human existence. He attributes the decline in violence to changing cultural norms.
It’s not just that opportunities for violence have declined, or that incentives for violence
have changed. Rather, “civilizing” influences are winning out. People are socialized into
a value system that teaches them to reject violence. This project focused on the
behavioral mechanism that supposedly explains declining violence – cultural norms and
anti-violence values. I was skeptical from the start about the extent to which abstract
values actually constrain politically relevant behavior, including how an individual
processes specific acts of violence or evaluates public policies rooted in violence.
Optimists argue that attitudes lead the way, that a decline in citizens’ tolerance of
violence has produced a corresponding increase in support for public policies that assist
victims and promote equitable judicial outcomes. Whether this is true is an important and
timely question in the United States. Do individual attitudes rejecting violence matter in
terms of politics and public policy? If so, does a broad decline in violence-justifying
attitudes actually translate to public support for policies to support victims and punish
perpetrators? What role do racial and gender stereotypes play in terms of public
perceptions of victims and suspects, or support for violence-related public policies? I
addressed these questions directly in this project.
I developed a theory that a wide-range of “ideological waivers” allow individuals
to forgive violent behavior – behavior they otherwise claim to abhor. To test my theory
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required that I create a gender-neutral measure of anti-violence values. Rather than ask
about men, husbands, or sons I asked about people more generally. Respondents may
have made assumptions about who would or would not be engaging in the actions I
presented, but I did not impose that judgement on them. 56 While I must admit that I was
not able to entirely divorce gender attitudes from attitudes toward violence, I did provide
strong support for the utility of my scale and evidence that it performs in a consistent
manner theoretically distinct from its gendered counterpart. I then used my new scale to
examine individual attitudes toward victims and support for public policies to reduce
violence.
Throughout chapter 4, I empirically tested my assumption that individual’s
orientation toward violence should help shape their attitudes toward victims – and
perpetrators – of sexual violence. I expected that individuals who are more averse to
violence would sympathize more with victims, support harsher punishments for
perpetrators, and advocate more for resources to assist survivors and decrease the rate of
these crimes in the United States. I did find empirical support for the expectation that
anti-violence values will produce normatively positive results in terms of sexual
violence-related outcomes of interest. On the other hand, I also found empirical support
for my overarching theory, that violence-justifying ideologies (e.g. sexism ‘hostile in
particular’, rape myth acceptance, etc.) often diminish the normatively positive force that
anti-violence values would otherwise produce.

56 In one of my surveys (N=923) the final question item asked respondents “When you were answering
the questions about violence (e.g. physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable) were you
primarily thinking about… 1. Male and female behavior; 2. Male behavior; or 3. Female behavior? 52.11
percent (481) said male and female behavior; 43.88 percent (405) said male behavior; 4.01 percent (37)
were thinking primarily of female behavior.
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My experimental findings produced unsettling results. When a victim appeared to
conform to traditional gender expectations, when it was clear that she was cautious to not
put herself in danger, when there was evidence that she fought fiercely to prevent being
violated, and when she reported the incident to law enforcement immediately, both males
and females were significantly more likely to believe her rape claim. On the other hand,
when a victim did not conform to traditional gender expectations, when it appeared that
she put herself at unnecessary risk of danger, when there was no physical evidence that
she put up fierce resistance, and when she did not report the incident to law enforcement
immediately, both males and females were significantly less likely to believe that the
victim was actually raped.
Respondents were also asked to recommend a sentence of no less than 5, and no
more than 50 years in prison for the perpetrator. Examining the data across four unique
surveys I found little evidence that anti-violence values significantly impact how harshly
respondents believe a perpetrator should be punished. In fact, violence averse individuals
might view incarceration itself as a form of violence. In one model, for every one unit
increase in anti-violence respondents recommended significantly less (-2.94 years) time
in prison, perhaps sparing the perpetrator.
Throughout my analyses, those who endorsed rape myths and other negative
stereotypes about women were consistently more likely to blame the victim, to be more
lenient on her perpetrator, to resist increased government spending to assist victims and
reduce sexual violence, and to decline to engage in any way personally to advocate or
support victims. Individuals’ anti-violence values did little of substance to benefit victims
or punish perpetrators, and when it did produce significantly positive outcomes those
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effects were easily diminished by violence-justifying ideology – hostile sexism in
particular. Efforts to reduce rape should focus on breaking down the stereotypes that
allow people to overlook violent behavior, and reforming policies that make it difficult
for a victim to receive justice. Absent those efforts, it appears unlikely that widespread
aversion to violence will make any substantive difference.
Throughout chapter 5, I empirically tested whether an individual’s orientation
toward violence would help shape their evaluations of police violence. I expected that
individuals who are more averse to violence would be more likely to disapprove of a
police shooting, and more likely to support policies and spending to better track and
reduce incidents of police violence. Overall, I found very little evidence that violence
averse individuals were more (or less) likely to disapprove of a lethal officer-involved
shooting, or to believe that the officer acted outside of the law. Throughout my analyses,
those who endorsed negative stereotypes about blacks were often more likely to approve
of police violence, to resist police reform and increased government expenditures to
reduce that violence. Individuals’ aversion to violence did not translate to a propensity to
question police violence, and when it did produce normatively positive outcomes those
effects were often diminished by violence-justifying ideology – racism in particular.
Victims’ advocates suggest that there should be a greater number of minorities in
law enforcement. I found some evidence that this would help police, community relations
– especially when a racially charged OIS takes place. In every case, respondents were
significantly more likely to say that the officer’s actions were both legal, and appropriate
when the officer involved was black. Absent efforts to break down violence-justifying
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ideologies, it appears unlikely that widespread aversion to violence will make any
substantive difference.
This dissertation speaks to a much broader debate over the success of the
“civilizing process” and its likely durability. Had I found that anti-violence values are
more than just lip service, that they genuinely constrain people – that they shape policy
preferences or govern politically relevant judgements about predators and victims of
violence – would have offered some hope that the relative peacefulness of today’s world
is a construct that can be passed down through socialization to future generations.
Unfortunately, my empirical evidence suggests that people can partition these abstract
values from their practical assessments of real-life circumstances, and apply them only to
certain groups of people, and only some of the time. The “civilizing process”, therefore,
seems to be more vulnerable to changes in context than the optimists let on.
My data are cross-sectional, so I cannot observe how these attitudes and policy
preferences have changed over time. Additionally, I am limited to a “snap-shot” – a
single moment in time when public opinion is shaped, in part, by the current events of the
day. Additionally, my analysis was limited strictly to officer-involved shootings that
resulted in the suspect’s death; I did not include scenarios involving excessive physical
force by the police. Finally, each of my experimental vignettes portrayed a suspect
imposing some level of threat upon an officer prior to the shooting. As that level of threat
increased, respondents were more sympathetic to the officer’s use of deadly force. Future
research designs should include scenarios depicting a victim who is in police custody
when the incident occurs; people are much less likely to endorse police violence when the
officer involved is not in serious danger.
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As it was, I collected my survey data well before May 25, 2020 when George
Floyd, a 46-year-old African American man, was choked to death by Derek Chauvin, a
white Minneapolis police officer. All four officers involved in Floyd’s arrest have been
fired and criminally charged and Chauvin, who was filmed kneeling on Floyd’s neck for
almost eight minutes faces second-degree unintentional murder, third-degree murder, and
second-degree manslaughter. He faces a combined maximum of 35 years in prison.
Floyd’s death represents an additional decline in threat that I would have predicted to
undermine public support even more than occurred in my experimental design. Much like
the instances I detailed in chapter 5, his death sparked a new surge in both peaceful
protest and outright violence.
In June, a large but peaceful group of Black Lives Matter demonstrators gathered
in front of a police station in Seattle, Washington. They were quickly met by riot officers
donning combat helmets and brandishing batons. While police are given broad discretion
in responding to demonstrations that get out of hand, an arbitrary or excessive response
sometimes escalates violence unnecessarily. Protesters were given no warning before
police deployed flash-bang grenades, tear gas, and pepper spray to disperse the crowd.
During a subsequent protest weeks later and at the same location, police scaled back their
response and protesters ultimately dispersed without incident (Del Pozo, 2020).
In other cases, the lines have blurred as other groups with ulterior motives have
hijacked peaceful protests calling for racial justice. Thousands of people have swarmed
the streets in at least 140 American cities. Protests have descended into absolute chaos in
some cases including shootings, lootings, and wide-spread vandalism. In at least 21 states
the National Guard was activated to restore order (Silverstein 2020). Demonstrators
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vandalized police vehicles with graffiti in Minneapolis where officers used tear gas and
rubber bullets to disperse crowds. In Atlanta, protesters threw bottles and other projectiles
at police, and when crowds gathered outside the White House President Trump was
moved to an underground bunker intended for terrorist attacks. Reacting to violence in
major cities across America, President Trump threatened to deploy the military, saying
“If a city or a state refuses to take the actions that are necessary to defend the life and
property of their residents, then I will deploy the United States military and quickly solve
the problem for them” (Taylor 2020, 10).
This dissertation focused on the behavioral mechanism that supposedly explains
declining violence. One observable implication of the Pinker school of thought is that
cultural norms ought to shape public opinion in a fashion that alters public policy. At the
individual level, therefore, whether someone rejects, or embraces violence-justifying
attitudes ought to shape that person’s policy-relevant opinions. I remain skeptical about
the extent to which abstract anti-violence values actually constrain politically relevant
behavior, including how an individual processes a specific act of violence as well as how
the individual evaluates public policies rooted in violence. It seems instead that
individuals’ “better devils” quite easily diminish the otherwise positive force of antiviolence sentiment. The evidence suggests that we must confront these darker forces if
we want to reduce violence in the United States.
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APPENDIX A: SEXUAL VIOLENCE EXPERIMENTAL VIGNETTES
Setting the Scene (Everyone Views)
The following pages provide a brief summary of a trial involving a rape allegation. We
would like you to put yourself in the role of a juror as you evaluate the evidence in this
case. When determining the severity of the prison sentence you impose, please be
realistic - as if you were an actual juror at the sentencing phase of this trial. Thank you
for your time and help with our research.
A middle-aged female answered a knock at her apartment door late one Friday night. She
opened the door to a stranger who explained that he was having car trouble and wanted to
borrow her phone to call AAA. She agreed, and after placing his call, the man claimed
that it would be about two hours before a tow truck would arrive.
Baseline (Control)
While waiting for the tow truck, the accuser claimed that the man raped her and then fled
the apartment. She immediately called the police to report the rape. Later the next day,
the police arrested a suspect who fit the description given. The suspect, a man named Jim
Reynolds admitted that he'd had sexual intercourse with the accuser, but claimed it was
consensual. Nonetheless, police charged Reynolds with rape.
Non-Precipitory Vignette
While waiting for the tow truck, she told the man that he would have to wait on her front
porch until the driver arrived. The woman alleges that the suspect then forced his way
in, raped her in her own living room, and then fled the apartment. She immediately called
the police to report the rape. Later the next day, the police arrested a suspect who fit the
description given. The suspect, a man named Jim Reynolds, admitted that they had sexual
intercourse, but claimed it was consensual. Nonetheless, police charged Reynolds with
rape.
At the trial, the accuser's attorney revealed that the she had never lived with a male, and
that she has developed a deep fear of men since the attack. Her attorney argued that a
medical examination provided evidence that she had put up physical resistance to
Reynolds. She showed bruising and had skin under her fingernails. Her attorney argued
that the reason his client resisted was that she feared for her life.
Precipitory Vignette
While waiting for the tow truck, she asked the man if he would care to wait in her
apartment and watch television until the driver arrived. The woman alleges that at some
point between 10:30 and 11:00 pm the suspect forcibly raped her in her own living room,
then fled the apartment. She called the police a few days later to report the alleged rape.
Later that week, the police arrested a suspect who fit the description given. The suspect, a
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man named Jim Reynolds admitted that they had sexual intercourse, but claimed it was
consensual. Nonetheless, police charged Reynolds with rape.
At the trial, Reynold's attorney revealed that the accuser had previously lived with other
men to whom she was not married. During cross examination, she also admitted to
having sexual relations with other men since the alleged attack. The defense team argued
that a medical examination did not provide evidence that the accuser had put up any
resistance to Reynolds. She showed no bruising and did not have skin under her
fingernails. Her attorney argued that the reason his client did not resist was that she
feared for her life.
Trial and Sentencing Phase (Everyone Views)
In the courtroom, the accuser positively identified Reynolds as the offender. After careful
deliberation, a jury found Jim Reynolds guilty of rape in the first degree. During the
sentencing phase, the judge informed jury members that the punishment they impose for
this felony could range from 5 to 50 years in prison. Reynolds continues to maintain that
the sex was consensual.
We would like you to put yourself in the role of a juror and indicate how many years you
think the perpetrator should be confined to prison based on the facts provided. When
determining the severity of the sentence you recommend, please be realistic - as if you
were an actual juror at the sentencing phase of this trial.
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APPENDIX B: POLICE VIOLENCE EXPERIMENTAL VIGNETTES
Threat. Participants were exposed to one of three newspaper accounts of a police
shooting, which varied in the level of threat imposed by the suspect (pictured below).

In the “low threat” condition, he exits his vehicle and advances toward the
responding officer before suddenly stopping and running in the opposite direction. In the
“medium threat” condition the suspect also advances on the officer before stopping and
reaching for his inside jacket pocket. Finally, in the “high threat” condition, our suspect
advances, stops, but then reaches for a firearm protruding from his waistband.
Racial Amalgamation of Officer/Suspect. In this project I varied the race of the officer
involved in the shooting, and the race of the suspect. Respondents were not explicitly
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directed to focus on race. I randomly assigned respondents to be exposed to one of the
racial manipulations below:

Police Reforms.
Sample A:
1. "Law enforcement agencies, in every state, should be required to collect and share
the details of each and every incident involving police use-of-force so that this
information can be stored in a national database."
2. "The details of incidents involving police use-of-force should include not only
offender characteristics, but officer characteristics as well, including race, age,
gender, rank, and education."
3. "Police departments should require body-worn cameras for officers in the field so
that each and every citizen engagement will be recorded from the officer's
standpoint."
4. "Police departments should require that officers take part in racial sensitivity and
bias training at least twice annually."
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Funding Preferences (Sample B)
1. "Funding to help police departments adopt Department of Justice recommended
reforms that stress the importance of de-escalation and the sanctity of life."
2. "Funding to create civilian review boards to provide independent oversight of
police use-of-force incidents."
3. "Funding to provide police departments body-worn cameras for officers in the
field."
4. "Funding to provide police departments dash cameras for all squad cars active in
the field."
Issue Framing Experiment
Control Argument: Do you favor or oppose a requirement that police officers attempt to
use non-lethal methods first (e.g. a baton, pepper spray, a taser) when a suspect is noncompliant and being physically aggressive toward an officer or other individual?
Racial Argument: Some people say that police kill a disproportionate number of blacks,
compared to whites. Do you favor or oppose a requirement that police officers attempt to
use non-lethal methods first (e.g. a baton, pepper spray, a taser) when a suspect is noncompliant and being physically aggressive toward an officer or other individual?
Innocence Argument: Some people say that police kill a disproportionate number of
innocent people. Do you favor or oppose a requirement that police officers attempt to use
non-lethal methods first (e.g. a baton, pepper spray, a taser) when a suspect is noncompliant and being physically aggressive toward an officer or other individual?
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